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In respect of company law, there are two main principles that govern it. The first principle is 
that a company is a juristic person, having a separate legal identity and thus existing 
separately from the individuals who stand behind the corporate veil and enjoy the benefits of 
the company. The second principle is that of limited liability. Collectively, these two 
principles aim to promote capital investment whilst limiting the liability of potential 
investors. In the maritime industry however, these two principles serve an entirely different 
purpose. Ship-owners form ‘one-ship’ companies where each vessel within the same fleet is 
registered under the name of a different shipping company. Hence due to the separate legal 
identity of companies, claimants could only proceed against the guilty ship.  
In 1983 South Africa enacted its reform legislation by introducing the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act with the aim to provide consistency and certainty within the legal sphere of 
the maritime industry. In doing so, the legislature saw the opportunity to remedy the mischief 
created by ‘one-ship’ companies by introducing the associated ship provisions which based 
the central enquiry in such arrests on ‘common-control’ rather than ‘common ownership’. 
Thus, the purpose of the provision was to provide claimants with a mechanism to penetrate 
complex corporate structures so as to locate and hold the true debtor in a maritime dispute 
liable. The general understanding therefore in associated ship cases was that the provisions 
concerned themselves with the ultimate or actual control of a shipping company. The leading 
case in interpreting the term ‘control’ is the Heavy Metal wherein the SCA adopted a 
restrictive and narrow understanding of ‘control’ which centralised the enquiry on the 
registered shareholder of a ship-owing company and in doing so, allowed for the existence of 
two repositories of control. It therefore allowed an association to be formed on the basis that 
the companies in question shared a common majority nominee shareholder without 
considering the fact that such a person may hold the said shares for two different entities. In 
this manner, the judiciary opened a ‘legal Pandora’s box’ in the sense that it created 
confusion and uncertainty in respect of the meaning to be acquainted to the term ‘control’. 
This dissertation will trace the background and history of the associated ship provisions so as 
to determine its nature, scope and underlying purpose. It will also conduct an investigation of 
the provisions and the relevant case law in order to determine what is meant by the term 
‘control’. Lastly the dissertation will determine the correctness of the Heavy Metal case and 
its legal impact on courts applying its ratio.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKROUND 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
South Africa is a country with a vast coastline, rich in natural resources which may be used 
for international trade, and most importantly, is strategically located in the southern 
hemisphere as a result of the country’s suitable position at the tip of Africa. It is such factors 
that prompted the Dutch to settle at the Cape of Good Hope in the 1600s in order to establish 
a colonial settlement to supply ships with necessities when passing by. With such an 
impressive outlook on paper, it seems as though South Africa ought to have been a leading 
maritime state in respect of being at the forefront in the development and enforcement of 
maritime law. However, this was not the case as the maritime jurisprudence in South Africa 
remained dormant for many years until the latter part of the 1960s – A time during which 
there appeared to be a proliferation of maritime matters reaching South African courts.1  It is 
therefore useful to mention that factors such as the growth in international trade in the 20th 
century as well as the closure of the Suez Canal, resulted in an increase of maritime 
movement alongside the South African Coastline.2 Such factors prompted the legislature to 
enact reform legislation to cater for these maritime matters. This led to the enactment of the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 (hereafter ‘The Act/AJRA’).  
In respect of the Act, Miller JA held the following in the case of the Berg: 3 
‘I agree that it is proper to approach the Act as one that is ‘new’, not only because of the 
recency of its commencement, but mainly because there are in it bold departures from the old, 
the possible impact of which needs to be carefully assessed.  The departures with which we 
are now concerned are in the provisions of ss 3 and 5’.4 
In a subsequent case, Friedman J further reiterated by noting that ‘the Act, which came into 
operation on 1 November 1983, contains a number of sections apart from s 5 (3) with novel, 
unusual and at times far-reaching provisions’.5  One of the provisions which Friedman J 
refers to in the aforementioned paragraph is that of the associated ship arrest provisions as 
                                                          
1 M Wallis The Associated Ship & South African Admiralty Jurisdiction 1 ed Cape Town (2010) 1. 
2 H, Staniland ‘The Implementation of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act in South Africa’ (1985) 3 
LMCLQ 464. 
3 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ and Others 1986 (2) SA 700 (A). 
4 The Berg supra note 3 at 711 E-F. 
5Katagum Wholesale Commodities Co Ltd v The MV Paz 1983(3) SA 261 (N) at 263B. 
2 
 
contained in section 36 of AJRA as for the first time an action in rem proceeding may be 
pursued by the arrest of an associated ship as opposed to the guilty ship (the ship which gave 
rise to the cause of action in question).7 
The true novelty in respect of the associated ship provisions and what makes it unique when 
compared to any other arrest in rem procedures in other maritime jurisdictions is that 
‘control’ and not ownership now forms the central enquiry in determining whether or not a 
ship may be arrested.8 This dissertation will therefore aim to provide an understanding of 
what the term ‘control’ means and the scope of its application whilst also looking at whether 
or not the leading case in associated ship arrest, the Heavy Metal9 case, has correctly 
interpreted this provision. In unpacking this dissertation, chapter one will focus on the 
background of the of the associated ship provisions in terms of AJRA so as to obtain an 
understanding of the aims, objectives and overall purpose of the provisions. Chapter two will 
concentrate on establishing the correct meaning which should be acquainted to the term 
‘control’ by comparing the original associated ship provisions with the 1992 amendments 
whilst simultaneously analysing the case law attached thereto. Chapter two will therefore 
provide the lens through which the majority decision in the Heavy Metal will be critically 
analysed. Chapter three will determine the correctness of the majority’s decision in the SCA 
judgement of the Heavy Metal. In doing so, it will analyse the findings of the High Court 
decision as well as all three judgments in the Supreme Court of Appeal. Chapter three will 
thereafter critically analyse the majority decision in light of the findings of chapter two in 
                                                          
6 Section 3 (6) of AJRA provides that: 
 ‘An action in rem, other than an action in respect of a maritime claim referred to in paragraph (d) of 
the definition of ‘maritime claim’, may be brought by the arrest of an associated ship instead of the ship 
in respect of which the maritime claim arose’. 
7 H Staniland ‘The Arrest of Association Ships in South Africa: Lifting the Corporate Veil too high’ (1996-
1997) 9 U.S.F. Mar.L.J  417-418. Staniland further notes that the reason why the associated ship provisions may 
be regarded as novel is that they merely brush aside the corporate veil as opposed to merely lifting it at 418. 
8 Section 3(7)(a) provides: 
‘(7) (a) For the purposes of subsection (6) an associated ship means a ship, other than the ship in 
respect of which the maritime claim arose- 
(i) Owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by the person who was the owner of the ship 
concerned at the time when the maritime claim arose; or 
(ii) Owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a person who controlled the company which 
owned the ship concerned when the maritime claim arose; or 
(iii) Owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a company which is controlled by a person 
who owned the ship concerned, or controlled the company which owned the ship concerned, when the 
maritime claim arose’. 
Section 3 (7) (b) (ii) states that a ‘person shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or 
indirectly, to control the company’. 




terms of the interpretation which should be bestowed on the term ‘control’. Lastly, chapter 
four will look at cases subsequent to the Heavy Metal which have strictly applied its ratio. 
This chapter will thus aim to provide insight as to the practical difficulties faced by courts in 
strictly applying the reasoning of the majority in the Heavy Metal. 
For the purposes of this introductory chapter, it is essential before discussing the provisions 
itself, to make note of the historical background and developments so as to provide a 
contextual and purposive understanding of the provisions. Such an approach is necessary in 
understanding what mischief a true associated ship arrest sought to remedy. In doing so, the 
following introduction will look briefly at the previous legal regime (i.e. the position of South 
African Admiralty law prior to the enactment of the AJRA). It will then consider the reform 
process during the enactment of AJRA and the policy considerations which were considered 
when the associated ship provisions were enacted.  In respect of the latter, this chapter will 
focus on the 1952 International Convention for the Unification of Rules relating to the Arrest 
of Sea-going ships (hereafter ‘Arrest Convention’), the difficulties associated with the 
upsurge of ‘one-ship’ companies and its uncanny relationship with the corporate law 
principle which notes that a company acts as a separate legal entity apart from its directors or 
shareholders. This will provide an understanding of the policy considerations and the purpose 
of the provisions which in turn form part of the enquiry in determining the correct 
interpretation of the associated ship provisions.10 
 
1.2. The Previous Regime 
 
South Africa is a country which was occupied by both the English and the Dutch. The effect 
of this dual colonial infiltration is that it gave rise to two systems of law of which either one 
could have been applicable in a maritime dispute.11 From the English admiralty law, South 
Africa inherited the action in rem proceeding whilst on the other hand; South Africa received 
the Roman-Dutch law principle of attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam 
jurisdictionem.12It is these two separate legal regimes which could be approached by a 
maritime claimant in order to seek redress. In this respect, any discussion as to the nature of 
associated ship arrests, would be incomplete without brief mention of these two avenues 
available to a maritime claimant prior to 1983 i.e. before the enactment of AJRA, as it is the 
                                                          
10 Natal Joint Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at 603F-C. 
11 A Rycroft ‘Changes in South African admiralty jurisdiction’ (1984) LMCLQ 417. 
12 Wallis (note 1 above; 6-7). 
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differences between these two systems and the difficulty of having a dual system that 
prompted the legislature to enact reform legislation in the form of AJRA.13 
1.2.1. Attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem:  
 
In terms of Roman-Dutch Law, jurisdiction was based on the principle actor sequitur forum 
rei, which required the plaintiff in the respective suit to sue the defendant at their place of 
domicile.14 The courts of Holland identified two forms of attachment 1) attachment in 
securitatem debiti arising ex necessitate and 2) attachment ad fundandam jurisdictionem 
arising ex utilitate. The former, was granted against both citizens and non-resident strangers 
whilst the latter was granted only in respect of a peregrinus.15 
Consequently, a distinction was drawn between an incola (persons who live permanently in a 
location) and a peregrines, which referred to a person who did not reside permanently within 
a location but occupied it on a provisional basis.16 An incola possessed the same rights as a 
citizen of that particular state and was initially allowed to arrest a peregrinus debtor for the 
purpose of instituting a court’s jurisdiction, although further developments allowed for the 
property of such a debtor to be arrested to establish such jurisdiction. This was seen as an 
alternative to arresting the said debtor.17 The attachment of property allowed the incola 
claimant to avoid the needless complications and costs of having to pursue the peregrinus at 
their place of domicile and also allowed for the submission to the court’s jurisdiction.18  On 
this detail, the South African approach has been described by Pollak as follows:  
‘That an incola of the area to which the courts belongs can secure the attachment of property 
of a peregrinus to found jurisdiction even though the cause of action arose outside such 
area’.19 
In essence, the court exercising ordinary civil jurisdiction (applying Roman-Dutch Law) prior 
to the enactment of AJRA, could exercise maritime jurisdiction over matters where the 
claimant, is an incola of the court and the defendant a peregrinus of the country. In a 
                                                          
13 Wallis (note 1 above; 6-7). 
14 Thermo Radiant Oven Sales (Pty) Ltd v Nelspruit Bakeries (Pty) Ltd 1969 (2) SA 295 (A) at 305 C-D. 
15 Thermo Radiant Oven Sales supra note 14 at 306E. 
16 Wallis (note 1 above; 7). In modern terms a true peregrinus may refer to a person who is merely passing by 
i.e. does not reside in the state concerned nor does such a person intend to reside within the state 
indeterminately. In other words such a person is not domiciled within the particular area concerned. see Pete … 
et al Civil Procedure: A Practical  Guide 2 ed ( 2011) 82. 
17 Wallis (note 1 above; 7-8). 
18 Thermo Radiant Oven Sales supra note 14  at 306F-G. 
19 As referred to in Wallis (note 1 above;10). 
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situation where both parties are an incola of South Africa, but the debtor is a peregrinus of 
the court which is approached to hear the matter, jurisdiction of the court could only be 
invoked if; the respective contract which gave rise to the dispute was undertaken or 
performance of which was to be rendered or the cause of action arose within the court’s 
jurisdiction.20 
1.2.2. The Action in rem: 
 
At the outset, it is useful to mention that the origin of the action in rem itself has been the 
subject of much academic debate and is nevertheless beyond the scope of this dissertation. 21 
Nevertheless, no writing on associated ship arrest may be complete without the mention of 
the action in rem, therefore for the purposes of completion, this dissertation will briefly 
discuss the key elements of the nature of the action in rem and the manner in which it was 
passed on into South African law. Briefly stated, the object of this arrest proceeding was to 
require the defendant to provide security or bail for a said claim.22  
In terms of the early English admiralty law, the ship was personified, the effect of which 
resulted in the action in rem being in a claim against the ship itself.23 In this respect, the 
proceeding was against the ship i.e. the res and there was no need for the claimant to proceed 
against the ship-owner themselves.24 The result of this was that the ship was arrested or 
security was furnished in order to secure bail for the satisfaction of the judgment. Where the 
owner of the vessel did not enter an appearance to defend the action, the owner incurred no 
personal liability and the value of the ship provided the limit of liability.25 The 
demobilization of the Doctors commons in 1860 and the subsequent appointment of 
common-law judges to the admiralty court seem to have encouraged what is known as the 
‘procedural theory’ (where the action in rem is seen as a procedural method intended to bring 
the ship-owner before the court to defend the matter).26 The procedural theory received 
reinforcement in the judgment of The Dictator27, where the court held that following a notice 
of appearance to defend by the owner of the vessel , the claim proceeded as both an in rem 
                                                          
20 Wallis (note 1 above; 13). 
21 Wallis (note 1 above; 14 and 20).  
22 G Hofmeyr  Admiralty Jurisdiction Law and Practice in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 96. 
23 Gilmore and CL Black The law of Admiralty 2nd ed (1975) 589. 
24 Hofmeyr (note 22 above; 98). 
25 Hofmeyr (note 22 above; 98) also J Hare Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009).  
26 Hofmeyr (note 22 above; 98). 
27 [1892] P 304 ([1981-4] All ER Rep 360. The position in the Dictator received a further boost in the case of 
Republic of India and Another v Indian Steamship Co Ltd ( The Indian Grace) (No2) [ 1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 




proceeding and action in personam. The effect of this judgment was that the owner became 
personally liable for the action which resulted in the owner’s assets, including the ship, being 
liable to an execution in order to satisfy the debt.28 
Section 35 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 in England allowed the jurisdiction of the high 
Court of Admiralty to be invoked either through the action in rem proceeding or the action in 
personam.29 In this respect, the in rem proceeding will commence by the arrest of the vessel 
or other goods and the proceedings in personam would be initiated by the arrest of the debtor. 
Naturally, the in rem proceeding would be the most advantageous option as it provided 
claimant’s with security. This was the proceeding and procedure which South Africa 
inherited through the colonisation by the English and which existed until the AJRA.30 
In this respect, claimants were afforded with two legal procedures of which either one could 
be used in a maritime dispute. Such claimants could either use the Attachment ad fundandam 
et confirmandam jurisdictionem in terms of Roman Dutch Law or the in rem procedure 
provided by English Admiralty law. The main problem with this dual system of law, which 
will be discussed in the succeeding section, is that it creates inconsistency in the law as cases 
of similar facts may give rise to completely different conclusions depending entirely on the 
choice of law of the claimant 
1.3. The Issues Associated with the Dual System of Courts and the Need for Reform 
Legislation 
 
South Africa, being a British colony, originally had the Vice-Admiralty Courts which 
administered English Admiralty law.31These courts, however, ceased to exist following the 
enactment of The Colonial Courts of Admiralty of 1890 by the British Parliament, which 
replaced the Vice- Admiralty courts with what was referred to as the Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty.32 In this way, there existed two ways in which a claimant could enforce their 
                                                          
28 Hofmeyr (note 22 above; 99). 
29 Wallis (note 1 above; 28). 
30 Wallis (note 1 above ; 28). 
31 G Glover ‘Sister Ship Arrest and the Application of the Doctrine of Attachment in Australia: a Jurisdictional 
Comparative Analysis in the wake of the 1952 Arrest Convention’ (2008) 22 Austl. & N.Z. Mar. L.J. 107 also 
Rycroft (note 11 above; 417) 
32 Section 2 (1) of the Act provided:  
‘Every Court of law in a British possession, which is for the time being declared in pursuance of this 
Act to be a court of Admiralty, or which, if no such declaration is in force in the possession. has therein 
original unlimited civil jurisdiction, shall be a Court of Admiralty, with the jurisdiction in this act 
mentioned, and may for the purpose of that jurisdiction exercise all the powers which it possesses for 
the purpose of its other civil jurisdiction, and such Court in reference to the jurisdiction conferred by 
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claim, namely; the Colonial Courts of Admiralty which applied English admiralty law, and 
the ordinary courts of the Supreme Court which exercised Roman-Dutch Law.33 This clearly 
created an undesirable system as the court may administer one system of law in one case and 
a completely different system of laws in another case - the result of which allowed a same set 
of facts to yield two different results as the South African Law Commission stated: 
‘The position, therefore is that not only may the rights of the parties themselves 
depend upon whether action is instituted in the admiralty court or in the ordinary 
courts, but rights of persons who are not parties to the action at all may depend upon 
which court decides the action’.34 
During this period, few admiralty decisions were heard in the courts.35 However, following 
the closing of the Suez Canal, an increase of maritime traffic flowed at South African ports.36  
Wallis also notes other factors which may have contributed to this increase in traffic in South 
African waters which may include inter alia; the increase in commercial trade following the 
end of World War 2, where entrepreneurs took advantage of trade conditions which existed at 
the time as well as the influx of flags of convenience which referred to the situation where 
non-citizens of a country were allowed to register their ship in that particular country as 
opposed to orthodox approach where ship companies were registered in the same country in 
which the owners resided.37The reasoning behind ship-owners opting to register their 
companies in such states is to obtain benefits which those states provided such as lower taxes 
and the less stringent requirements in relation to the incorporation and registration of such 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
this Act is in this Act referred to as a Colonial Court of Admiralty. Where in a British possession the 
Governor is the sole judicial authority, the expression 'Court of law' for the purposes of this section 
includes such Governor’. 
In this respect it is important to note that the Colonial Court of Admiralty Act continued to be in force in the 
country even after the formation of the republic in 1910 see  Crooks & Co v Agricultural Co- Operative Union 
Ltd 1922 AD 423, Tharros Shipping Corporation SA v Owner of the Ship ‘Golden Ocean’ 1972 (4) SA 316 at  
317E-F and Trivett & Co (Pty) Ltd v Vm Brandt’s  Sons & Co. Ltd 1975 (3) SA 423(A) at 432E-F and 436E-G.  
33 Glover (note 31 above; 108) and also H Staniland ‘The Arrest of Associated Ships in South Africa: Lifting the 
Corporate Veil too high?’ (1996-1997) 9.U.S.F.Mar.L.J  407-409. In essence there were two avenues in which a 
claimant could pursue a claim whilst in form there was only one court. see The South African Law Commission 
Report on the Review of the Law of Admiralty titled ‘Project 32’ 15 September 1982 page 7. The same case 
may therefore result in two different conclusions. see also D B Friedman, ‘Maritime Law in the Courts after 1 
November 1983’ 1986 SALJ 678. 
34 The South African Law Commission Report on the Review of the Law of Admiralty titled ‘Project 32’ 15 
September 1982 page 9. 
35 Rycroft (note 11 above; 418). 
36 Glover (note 31 above; 108)  Friedman also notes the increase in the South-African ship repair industry at the 
Cape as well as the opening of the Richard’s bay harbour which prompted the exportation of iron ore and coal as 
factors which increased the volume of shipping in the South Africa  see  D B Friedman ‘Maritime Law in 
Practice and in the Courts’ 1985 SALJ 46-47. 
37 Wallis (note 1 above ; 41). 
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shipping companies.  In this regard, South Africa’s admiralty law experienced two major 
problems. Firstly, the dual court system which had the effect of allowing claimants to choose 
the forum which would be most favourable to them, and secondly, the courts sitting as 
Colonial Courts of Admiralty failed to take into account the international developments in 
maritime law over the past 75 years as jurisprudence was fixed as at 1890.38 Furthermore, the 
relevant legal material of Roman Dutch writers which were found in the Groot Placaat Boek, 
were not readily accessible. Additionally, this material was written in either Latin or High 
Dutch, where most of the material was not translated into English or Afrikaans so as to make 
it available to practitioners.39It was such difficulties that prompted the South African Law 
Commission to enact reform legislation in the form of AJRA.  
1.4. The legislative Reform Process  
 
The increase in traffic along the South African coastline, the difficulties associated with the 
dual court system, as well as the failure of admiralty law in South Africa (prior to 1983) to 
cater and address the issues facing the maritime industry at the time, illuminated the need for 
reform legislation. In 1977, the South African law reform commission was instructed to 
review the admiralty law in the country and for this purpose the late Mr D J Shaw QC was 
appointed as an ad hoc member of the commission due to his vast experience and expertise in 
the field.40 This may very well be said to be the birth point of AJRA.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, it is relevant to discuss the 1952 International Convention for the Unification of 
Rules relating to the Arrest of Sea-going ships (hereafter ‘Arrest Convention’), as well as the 
advent of the ‘one-ship’ companies in order to obtain an understanding as to what mischief 
the associated ship provisions sought to remedy. 
1.4.1. The Arrest Convention: 
 
The Arrest Convention may be said to be in a development period of 20 years41 and began 
with the intention to provide an international standard of rules and regulations surrounding 
the right to arrest ships for the purpose of providing security for claims against a defendant 
                                                          
38 Wallis (note 1 above ; 46) and also G Bradfield ‘Guilt by Association in South African Admiralty law’ (2005) 
LMCLQ 237 where Bradfield submits that in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, South African courts were 
locked in a ‘time warp’ . 
39 Wallis (note 1 above; 46-47).  
40 Friedman (note 36 above; 53) ,Wallis (note 1 above; 47). 
41 In preparation for the CMI conference in 1930, the Bureau Permanent of the CMI welcomed the national 
associations to suggest new subject matter of study which the CMI could investigate. Three associations 
namely; France, Germany and Italy proposed the idea of the arrest of ships as a subject topic see F Berlingieri 
Arrests of Ships A Commentary on the 1952 and 1999 Arrest Conventions 5 ed (2011) 1. 
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ship-owner.42 In essence it began as a general enquiry into the arrest of ships and revolved 
around four main questions which were: 
1) ‘Who is entitled to arrest a ship?  
2) Which ships may be arrested?  
3) Where can the arrest be made?   
4) How can a ship be released from the arrest’?.43 
Essentially, the Arrest Convention allowed for the arrest of ‘sister ships’. Put simply, this 
referred to ships which were owned by the same person.44Wallis submits that in the reform 
process, there is no evidence which suggests that South Africa contemplated conceding to the 
Arrest Convention; however during this process of reform, local practitioners were to ensure 
that the new legislative provisions would reflect the provisions of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention.45 The Arrest Convention would therefore be something which the legislature 
would have considered in the development of AJRA. The South African Law Commission 
report described the Associated Ship provisions as an ‘extension’ of the ‘sister-ship’ arrest in 
terms of the 1952 Arrest Convention. However, Wallis submits that this is misleading, as an 
extension would involve broadening the provisions of the convention ‘without introducing a 
new and entirely different basis of liability on the part of a different person’.46  One of the 
reasons as to why the associated ship provisions has been described as such, is that the 
essential enquiry is based on common ‘control’ as opposed to ownership and in this way the 
provision allows  for a ‘statutory mode of piercing the corporate veil’.47 
1.4.2. The Separate legal Identity of a Company and its relationship with ‘one-ship’ 
companies: 
 
In respect of company law, there are two main principles which govern it. The first principle 
is that a company is a juristic person that has a separate legal entity and thus exists separately 
from the individuals who stand behind the corporate veil and enjoy the benefits of the 
                                                          
42 H Staniland H JS McLennan J.S ‘The Arrest of an Associated ship’ (1985) 102 S.African L.J 148. 
43 Berlingieri (note 41 above; 1). 
44 Article 3.1 of The Arrest Convention states: 
‘A claimant may arrest either the particular ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose, or any 
other ship which is owned by the person who was, at the time when the maritime claim arose,  the 
owner of the particular ship in respect of which the claim arose…’ 
 Article 3.2 provides that ships are deemed to be owned by the same person or persons where all the shares in 
the respective ships are owned by the same person or persons. 
45 Wallis (note 1 above; 60). 
46 Wallis (note 1 above; 63). 
47 Bradfield (note 38 above;238). 
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company. 48 The second principle, is that of limited liability.49 This position has been 
expressed by lord Macnaghten in the locus classicus of Salomon v Salomon50 where the 
respected judge stated: 
‘the company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; 
and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was 
before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the 
company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or a trustee for them’. 51 
Similarly in Dadoo52,Innes CJ stated that: 
‘a registered company is a legal persona distinct from the members who compose it…nor is 
the position affected by the circumstance that a controlling interest in the concern may be held 
by a single member…this conception of the existence of a company as a separate entity 
distinct from its shareholders is no merely artificial and technical thing. It is a matter of 
substance; property vested in the company is not, and cannot be, regarded as vested in all or 
any of its members…’.53 
These two principles effectively allowed individuals who participated in commercial activity 
to detach themselves from the company in so far as the company’s debts are concerned by 
limiting their liability.54 
In order to circumvent ‘sister ship’ arrests, ship-owning companies developed ‘single ship’ 
companies (i.e. each ship in a fleet was registered under a different company).55 Due to the 
                                                          
48 In this respect  Cassim et al notes that even though a legal person is a mere concept and exists irrespective of 
physical form, it enjoys the ability to acquire rights and incur legal obligations separate from those of the 
directors and shareholders see FHI Cassim… et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) at  28. The position 
has been confirmed in the Company’s Act of 2008 in terms of section 19 (1) (b) which states that from the date 
and time that the company is incorporated; the company has all the legal powers and capacities as a person to 
the extent that a juristic person is capable of obtaining such rights.  
49 Cassim et al  further note that limited liability  refers to ‘the liability of shareholders for the company’s debts 
is limited to the amount they have paid to the company for its shares’ see FHI Cassim… et al Contemporary 
Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 31 . Lord Macnaghten further held in the Salomon case that the main reasons for 
the formation of such companies is to avoid the risk of bankruptcy and to increase the creditworthiness of the 
company insofar as it relates to obtaining an increase of capital. Salomon v Salomon  [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 52. 
50 [1897] AC 22 (HL).  
51 Salomon supra note 49 at 51. 
52 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 see further Macaura v Northern Assurance Co 
Ltd [1925] AC 619 (HL) and Lee v Lee Air Farming Co [1961] AC 12. 
53 Dadoo supra  note 52 above at 550-551. 
54 Wallis (note 1 above;62). 
55 Staniland (note 2 above; 46) also refers to such a companies as ‘brass-plate’ or ‘asset-poor’ companies. 
Furthermore, each ship in the fleet was registered under the name of a different company, the effect of which 
rendered the requirement that the ‘sister ship’ had to be owned by the same person at the commencement of the 
action by the same party was gravely emasculated to the extent that it would never be satisfied see Bradfield 
(note 38 above; 238) 
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separate legal identity of companies, claimants could only proceed against the guilty ship.56 
In such cases, these companies were not developed to obtain the benefits of a separate legal 
entity or limited liability, but rather to limit the assets available to which the creditor may 
pursue against.57  Another problem with such companies was that they were, as Staniland 
describes, ‘notoriously elusive’ as the ship which is the sole asset of the company may never 
call at a given port, can swiftly depart on a moment’s notice and if the vessel was arrested, 
the claim often surpassed the value of the ship.58 Hare also notes two factors that could have 
prompted shipping companies to refinance their ships into ‘one-ship’ companies, the first of 
which referred to the potentially enormous oil pollution liabilities in respect of oil pollution at 
sea which was brought alight following the example of the MT Torrey Canyon incident 
which took place in the 1950s, whilst the second referred to the influx of registries/flags of 
convenience.59 These flags of convenience refer to the registration of a ship in a country other 
than the country in respect of which the ship is ‘beneficially owned, managed and 
controlled’.60 The main reasons as to why ship-owners may opt to register their company in 
such a state may be inter alia to avoid high taxes of the domestic state, to avoid onerous 
requirements and regulations for the building or construction of vessels and to evade labour 
law regulations.61 
To curb the advent of ‘one-ship’ companies, AJRA included the arrest of associated ships in 
order to assist plaintiffs seeking to obtain judgment against defendants which thus has the 
effect of allowing such claimants to surmount the jurisdictional limits of the arrest 
convention.62 The purpose of the provisions, briefly stated, is ‘to make the loss fall where it 
                                                          
56 It is important to note however that the use of wholly owned subsidiary companies through the use of 
common directors and partners is nevertheless a lawful manner in which a person may opt to conduct their 
business activities Staniland (note 7 above; 418-419).  
57Wallis (note 1 above; 79) where he notes that the intention behind the development of ‘one-ship’ companies 
was not to obtain the broad benefits attached to the general nature of companies i.e. Limited liability and the 
separate legal personality associated with it nor were they formed to obtain capital investment. Instead, such 
‘asset partitioning’ is associated with the limiting of assets against which a claimant may proceed against to 
satisfy the debt. Hofmeyr substantiates further as he submits that the creation of ‘one-ship’ companies enable 
fleet owners to limit their risk of exposure which in turn inhibit the creditor in procuring satisfaction of the debt 
G Hofmeyr (note  22 above; 133). 
58 H Staniland, J.S McLennan (note 42 above; 148).  In this respect, Hare also submits that Prior to the 
enactment of AJRA, asserting a maritime claim against a debtor might have been a highly problematic task e.g. 
the ship may never call in the respective port again, there may be other creditors which also have claims against 
the said vessel which may rank ahead of the arresting creditor, the guilty vessel might have sunk or been sold to 
a bona fide purchaser who has no knowledge of the prior history of the ship. see  Hare (note 25 above; 103). 
59 Hare (note 25 above; 104). 
60 Hare (note 25 above; 104). 
61 Hare (note 25 above; 202-203). 
62 Glover (note 31 above; 110) .In this respect, the Minister of Justice has stated that the position can be 
summarised as follows ‘although the principle of the sanctity of a separate corporate personality  of a company 
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belonged by reason of ownership or control’.63The purpose, therefore, of a true associated 
ship arrest, is to amputate the corporate veil protecting debtors in order to determine the 
identities of the real beneficiaries of the company.64 It is however submitted that the purpose 
of an associated ship is not to grant a maritime claimant carte blanche to arrest any vessel 
which is owned by persons who have an insignificant remote link to the actual maritime 
debtor concerned. Bradfield therefore refers to the associated ship provisions as a ‘statutory 
mode of piercing the corporate veil’.65 In this sense, a true associated ship arrest can be 
expressed as a means of disregarding the corporate veil altogether as opposed to piercing the 
corporate veil.66Therefore, once the ‘true debtor’ has been identified, any ship owned or 
controlled by them besides the guilty ship may be subject to an arrest as an associated ship.67 
It is however submitted that in light this chapter, there appears no support for the notion that 
the associated ship provisions allow for the arrest of property belonging to an innocent third 
party. Such a position does not support the underlying purpose of the provisions. 
1.5. Conclusion  
 
Following the enactment of AJRA, South Africa has been seen as a sanctuary for arrestors 
who seek to bring action in rem proceedings against debtors.68The associated ship provisions 
may be regarded as being novel, in the sense that although ownership was recognised for the 
formation of an association, the broader concept of control now forms the prime focus of 
associated ship jurisdiction.69 In this respect, it is useful to note that the Australian Law 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
distinct from its members was enshrined in Salomon v Salomon and company [1897] AC 22 (HL), our courts 
should brush aside the veil of corporate identity time and time again where fraudulent use is made of the fiction 
of legal personality’ (Lategan & Another NNO v Boyes & Another 1980 (4) SA 191 (T) as referred to in H 
Staniland, J.S McLennan (note 42 above; 148).     
63Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship Berg and Others 1986 (2) SA 700 (A) at 712A-B. in this 
respect, it is important to note that this case was decided prior to the 1992 amendment’s and therefore as 
suggested by Hofmeyr, it must be read in light of the subsequent amendments which focused on control of a 
company as opposed to control of the shares. Hofmeyr (note 22 above; 134) .Wallis brings up an important 
point as he notes that ‘it needs to be emphasised that it is not the purpose of the true associated ship jurisdiction 
to render liable for claims those who have absolutely no connection with the incurring of the relevant debt. Its 
purpose is to go behind the corporate curtain and to identify those who are the real beneficiaries of the company 
that owns the vessel in respect of which the claim arises and the commercial operations of that vessel’ see 
Wallis (note 1 above; 85). 
64 Wallis (note 1 above; 85). 
65 Bradfield (note 38 above; 236).  Bradfield further notes that the courts will usually pierce the corporate veil in 
exceptional circumstances such as cases of dishonesty, fraud or irregular use of the corporate form Bradfield 
(note 36 above; 240).   
66 Wallis(note 1 above; 85).  
67 Bradfield (note 38 above; 236-237). 
68 Bradfield submits that it is the provisions of AJRA which establish an association on the basis of common 
control which have no corresponding provision elsewhere in the world that have resulted in South Africa’s 
reputation as an arrest friendly jurisdiction. (note 38 above; 234-236). 
69 Wallis (note 1 above;185) Bradfield (note 38 above; 236). 
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Reform Commission considered the associated ship provisions but opted not to enact such a 
provision, and instead elected to enact ‘surrogate ship’ arrests as it decided to leave the issue 
of whether the corporate veil of a ship-owning company should be disregarded to be dealt 
with under the principles of its local corporation and insolvency law.70 
In light of the background provided in this introductory chapter, it is submitted that even at 
this early stage, the purpose of the associated ship provisions is abundantly clear. The 
provisions allow a creditor to locate the true debtor of which their claim is based and hold 
this person liable for the said debts. By shifting the focal point from ‘ownership’ to ‘control’ 
a maritime claimant is no longer ‘road-blocked’ when attempting to locate the maritime 
debtor. Furthermore, by using ‘control’ as the core enquiry, ship-owners are no longer 
shielded by their witty use of corporate structures in an attempt to present a distorted image to 
the outside world.The leading case in the interpretation of common control is the Heavy 
Metal71 case which has been the subject of much debate and criticism, due to the manner in 
which the majority in the Supreme Court of Appeal has interpreted the term ‘control’. Section 
3 (7) (b) (ii) of AJRA states that ‘a person shall be deemed to control a company if he has 
power, directly or indirectly, to control a company’. The majority held that for the purposes 
of AJRA, either ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ power to control a company would be sufficient. The 
majority associated ‘direct’ power with ‘de jure’ authority over the company which is 
exercised by the person whom, according to the register of the company, is entitled to control 
the destiny of the company. ‘Indirect’ power was equated to ‘de facto’ authority over the 
company which is exercised by the person who has influence over the person who has de jure 
authority. The majority then reasoned that if the person, who has de jure authority, controls 
the respective companies at the relevant time, the statutory requirement of a link between the 
companies would be met.72 Therefore, in this case, Mr Lemonaris who was the majority 
shareholder of the companies concerned was said to have had de jure control despite the fact 
that he was only a nominee shareholder.  
Hofmeyr submits that the interpretation afforded to the associated ship provision by the 
majority is ‘far-reaching’73 and in this respect the author substantiates by noting that the view 
of the majority has the effect of allowing an association to be formed on the basis that two 
companies share a common nominee majority shareholder even though that nominee 
                                                          
70 Bradfield (note 38 above;239).  
71 The Heavy Metal SCA supra note 9.  
72 The Heavy Metal SCA supra note 9 at 1106 [9]-[11]. 
73 Hofmeyr (note 22 above; 143). 
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shareholder may receive instructions in relation to those shares from two different 
people.74The majority nominee shareholder in such a case would have direct control or de 
jure control according to the majority judgment. The overall effect of such an interpretation is 
that an innocent ship-owner’s vessel may be arrested in a case where that ship is not 
associated with the guilty ship concerned. The majority decision has been criticized by many 
academics on the basis that it has failed to correctly interpret the associated ship provisions. 
Even in the minority decision, Marais J was aware of the difficulties presented by the 
interpretation afforded by the majority as he held that such an approach would be ‘tantamount 
to naked confiscation without compensation’ of which such an approach  is usually one 
which courts avoid ascribing to the legislature.75 
The Heavy Metal case was decided nearly fifteen years ago, and as such it creates an 
undesirable situation on the basis that there is uncertainty as to the meaning of the term 
‘control’. The fact however, is that only the SCA or the Constitutional Court on appeal can 
alter the decision of the Heavy Metal case.76 It seems as though the position as it stands, is 
that the lower courts are bound by the decision of the Heavy Metal.77  It is therefore useful to 
determine the correct manner in which the respective provisions should be interpreted. 
This introductory chapter provided an understanding of the background of the associated ship 
provisions so as to determine the aims, objectives and purpose of the provisions as well as the 
mischief that it sought to resolve.  Chapter two will now discuss the associated ship 
provisions in order to ascertain the correct interpretation of the term ‘control’ which will in 
turn form the benchmark through which the majority decision in the Heavy Metal will be 
analysed. 
                                                          
74 Hofmeyr (note 22 above; 143). 
75 The Heavy Metal SCA supra note 9 at 1111C-G. 
76 Wallis (note 1 above; 220-221). 
77 Wallis (note 1 above; 221). 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONCEPT OF ‘CONTROL’ 
2.1. Introduction 
 
During the reform process, the legislature opted to include novel provisions which were not 
found elsewhere in the world of which, the most significant being the associated ship 
provisions. In this respect there was no previous regime of which South Africa could follow, 
and as a result, although the said provisions may have appeared sound on paper, the 
legislature did not foresee possible discrepancies and difficulties which the associated ship 
provisions and the Act itself would experience in practice. Therefore in 1992, the legislature 
opted to amend the Act and the associated ship provisions, in order to iron out any 
inconsistencies and elucidate its intention.  
Chapter one of this dissertation focused on the background of the associated ship provisions 
so as to provide a broader understanding of its aims and objectives. In light of this 
background, chapter two will now aim to decipher the term ‘control’ in order to determine 
what is the correct meaning which should be afforded to it. The findings of this chapter will 
therefore serve as a yardstick against which the majority finding in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal decision of the Heavy Metal case will be critically analysed. 
This chapter will firstly look at the burden of proof which a potential arrestor must overcome 
to obtain and sustain an arrest against an associated ship, after which the chapter will analyse 
the original and amended associated ship provisions so as to determine what subsequent 
changes were made and the reasons for such amendments. The comparison between the 
provisions and the early decisions is useful as it provides an understanding as to what the 
legislature meant by the term ‘control’. As a result of the frequency of which the concept of 
‘beneficial ownership’ has appeared in associated ship cases, it is necessary to shed light on 
what this phrase means and how it relates to ‘control’. Lastly this chapter will analyse the 
possible meanings which can be attached to ‘control’ in order determine which meaning is 
the most appropriate in associated ship cases 
2.2. The Burden of Proof 
The terms ‘burden of proof’ / ‘onus of proof’/ ‘overall onus’ are often substitutable, and all 
refer to the obligation or onus upon a litigant to produce sufficient evidence to persuade the 
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court that they should succeed.1  The terms were noted in the case of Pillay v Krishna2 which 
held that the person who claims that they are entitled to something, bears the onus to satisfy 
the court that they are entitled to such relief.3 In civil cases, this onus is discharged on a 
balance of probability which requires that ‘on preponderance, it is probable that the particular 
state of affairs existed’.4 Where the applicant attempts to arrest and maintain the arrest of an 
associated ship, such an applicant needs to prove the association (i.e. the ships are associated 
by virtue of control or ownership on the ordinary standard of a balance of probabilities).5 It is 
therefore submitted that a failure to prove an association on a balance of probabilities, will 
result in the arrest being null and void.  
It is important to note that proving such control is by no means a tranquil task. The main 
issue experienced by practitioners is that such ships are owned by companies which are 
registered in countries which prohibit the founding documents from being publically 
disclosed. These ‘closed registries’ make identifying the beneficial owners of the company, 
virtually impossible.6 In addition to this, shipping lawyers may also be confronted with other 
difficulties such as that of bearer shares which are, as described by Wallis, ‘self-serving but 
incomplete set of documents designed to suggest the absence of common control, with 
elements such as cross-mortgages being explained on the basis of family membership or 
                                                          
1 P J Schwikkard & S E Van Der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3 ed (2012) 571.  
2 1946 AD 946. 
3 Pillay supra note 2 at 951-952. 
4 Schwikkard (note 1 above; 580). 
5 Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Ltd 1994 (2) SA 563 (A)  at 581 B-F where Corbett CJ held: 
‘It is clear that an applicant who seeks to arrest an associated ship in terms of s 3(4), read with ss 3(6) 
and 3(7), is required to establish that the vessel in question is an associated ship on a balance of 
probabilities C (see Transgroup Shipping SA (Pty) Ltd v Owners of MV Kyoju Maru1984 (4) SA 210 
(D) at 214I; Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB1985 (2) SA 486 (C) at 497A-B). The same rule 
as to standard of proof would apply to an application to arrest an associated ship to provide security in 
terms of s 5(3). Similarly it has been held that in applications for the attachment of property to found or 
confirm jurisdiction, either under the D common law or in terms of s 3(2)(b) of the Act, the onus is 
upon the applicant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the property to be attached belongs to the 
respondent (Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion De Mercadeo Agricola and Others1976 (4) 
SA 464 (A) at 489B-C; Sunnyface Marine Ltd v Hitoroy Ltd (Trans Orient Steel Ltd and Another 
Intervening); Sunnyface Marine Ltd v Great River Shipping Inc1992 (2) SA 653 (C) E ; Rosenberg and 
Another v Mbanga and Others (Azaminle Liquor (Pty) Ltd Intervening)1992 (4) SA 331 (E) at 335E-
336D). The same rule would apply to applications to arrest in terms of ss 3(4), (5) and (6) and 5(3) of 
the Act’.  
See also: The Leros Strength Roza v MV Progress, MV Progress v Stone Engineering Ltd SCOSA C20, 
Ipanema Navigation Corporation v The Silver Constellation SCOSA C141, The Sandokan Owners of the 
Sandokan v Liverpool  and London Steamship Protection and  Indemnity  Association Ltd SCOSA C73, Ya 
Mawlaya (NO 1 ) Delray Shipping Corporation v Eridiana Spa  SCOSA C30. 
6 M Wallis The Associated Ship & South African Admiralty Jurisdiction 1 ed (2010) 113 .For the meaning of the 
term ‘beneficial owner’ see the heading titled ‘beneficial ownership’ below. 
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long-standing friendship’.7 It is these corporate tools that form the very shackles in associated 
ship arrests, especially when regard is given to the fact that such arrests are usually 
considered on papers in motion proceedings, and not at trials where parties will have the 
opportunity to cross examine witnesses as well as the advantage of extra time so as to gather 
and produce sufficient evidence to establish an association.8This lack of intimate knowledge 
of the inner structures of the ship-owning company, accompanied with the onus to establish 
the requisite control or ownership on a balance of probabilities, places the arrestor in a 
difficult position. Although shipping documents such as the Lloyds Confidential Index and 
the ICC International Maritime Bureau may assist an arrestor in determining the identity of 
the registered shareholder, such documents may however be of little assistance where such 
holders are mere nominee shareholders.9 Proving an association is therefore a question of fact 
and where the identity of the true controller of a ship-owning company is cocooned by 
complex corporate structures, the arrestor may need to go beyond the company register and 
identify the true seat of control.10 
At first glance, this might be seen as overburdening a potential arrestor.  However, upon 
further investigation it becomes clear that the establishment of such a burden is necessary.  
As noted in chapter one, South Africa took a unique approach when adopting the associated 
ship provisions; an approach which is yet to be followed by any other maritime nation in the 
world. Where the arrest of ships is usually based on common ownership, South Africa elected 
the use of ‘control’ as the core enquiry in such arrests. In doing so, South Africa inadvertently 
expanded the scope of arresting ships in the country. As stated already, ship-owning 
companies usually cloak themselves in corporate structures so as to conceal the identity of the 
beneficial owners of the company shares, thus there is a high probability that an arrestor may 
make a bona fide error and arrest a ship which has no actual relationship with the guilty 
vessel. By using the balance of probability standard, as opposed to a prima facie standard of 
                                                          
7 Wallis (note 6 above;113). 
8 Wallis (note 6 above;126). In the Galaecia unreported judgment of DCLD Case No. A19/2006 delivered on 23 
March 2006 per Combrinck J, Combrinck J noted that summonses must contain sufficient facts so as to enable a 
defendant to have satisfactory clarity in respect of the case which they must meet. 
9 The Baconau Transportes Del Mar SA v Jade Shipping Co Ltd  SCOSA C42. 
10H Staniland ‘The Arrest of Association Ships in South Africa: Lifting the Corporate Veil too high?’ (1996-




proof, it is submitted that this not only maintains consistency in civil courts but also aims to 
prevent the arbitrary deprivation of property.11 
2.3. The Associated Ship Provisions 
 
Now that the dissertation has discussed the overall purpose of the associated ship provisions 
as well as the onus encumbered on a potential claimant seeking to establish an associated ship 
arrest, focus will now shift to determining what the term ‘control’ means in so far as such 
arrests are concerned. The starting point in respect of the latter enquiry will be the associated 
ship provisions itself. 
2.3.1. The Original Associated Ship Provisions: 
 
‘3   (6)   Subject to the provisions of ss (9) an action in rem, other than such an action in 
respect of a maritime claim contemplated in para (a), (b) or (c) of the definition of 'maritime 
claim', may be brought by the arrest of an associated ship instead of the ship in respect of 
which the maritime claim arose. 
(7)   (a)   For the purposes of ss (6) an associated ship means a ship, other than the ship in 
respect of which the maritime claim arose – 
(i) Owned by the person who was the owner of the ship concerned at the time when the 
maritime claim arose; or 
(ii) Owned by a company in which the shares, when the maritime claim arose, were controlled 
or owned by a person who then controlled or owned the shares in the company which owned 
the ship concerned 
(b)  For the purposes (a) -  
(i) Ships shall be deemed to be owned by the same persons if all the shares in the ships are 
owned by the same persons; 
(ii) a person shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or indirectly, to 
control the company. 
(c)   If a charterer or subcharterer of a ship by demise, and not the owner thereof, is alleged to 
be liable in respect of a maritime claim, the charterer or subcharterer, as the case may be, 
shall for the purposes of ss (6) and this subsection be deemed to be the owner.’ 
 
The original associated ship provisions were unfortunate in the sense that it created confusion 
as to whether ‘control’ should be interpreted in a narrow, restrictive sense as section 3 (7) (a) 
                                                          
11 The arbitrary deprivation of property as it relates to the Heavy Metal case will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter three and the postscript of this dissertation. 
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(ii) made mention of the control or ownership of the shares of a shipping company, as 
opposed to the control of the company itself. 
 
In the case of Dole Fresh Fruit International12, Nicholas AJA held that the plain meaning of 
the phrase ‘the shares in the company’ as contained in section 3 (7) (a) (ii) refer to ‘all the 
shares in a company’. In this respect, the court stated the following:  
‘The plain meaning of the words 'the shares in the company' in ss  (7)(a)(ii) is 'all the shares 
in the company'. Some of the shares in a company, even if they be the majority, are not 'the 
shares in the company'. That interpretation accords with the policy of the Act regarding 
associated ships’.13  
In this regard, the provision can be easily circumvented by vesting the said shares in a party 
other than the person who actually exercises control over the company.14 The court did 
however take notice of the fact that there is a difference between control of a company and 
control of the shares of a company as the court held further: 
‘A person may control a company without controlling all the shares in the company. And 
control over a company can be exercised even without a majority shareholding’.15 
It is therefore submitted that even before the 1992 amendments, courts acknowledged that 
control of a company is not dependent on the control or ownership of the shares of a 
company. 
This provision i.e. section 3 (7) (a) (ii) was particularly difficult to reconcile with subsection 
3 (7) (b) (ii) which deemed a person to have control over a company if such a person has the 
power ‘directly or indirectly’ to control it.16 The latter provision therefore provided a much 
broader scope as to what might constitute as ‘control’. Furthermore, in the definitions section 
of the Act, no terminology was provided for the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’. By strictly 
focusing on the ownership or control of the shares of a shipping company, it is submitted that 
the provisions failed to take into consideration the difficulties presented by bearer shares, 
                                                          
12 Dole Fresh Fruit International Ltd v MV Kapetan Leonadis and Another 1995 (3) SA 112 (A). 
13 Dole Fresh Fruit International Ltd supra note 12 at 119B.  
14 Wallis (note 6 above; 145). 
15 Dole Fresh Fruit International Ltd supra note 12 at 119F, see further Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna 
AB 1985 (2) SA 486 (C) at 489B-D and National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 (1) SA 475 (A) at 
485B-C. 
16 Staniland and McLennan writing prior to the 1992 amendments acknowledged this difficulty as they noted 
that subsection 3 (7) (b)(ii) is in the wrong place  as paragraph (b) was meant to amplify paragraph (a) yet 
paragraph (a) makes no mention of control of a company . H Staniland and J.S  McLennan ‘The Arrest of an 
Associated ship’ (1985) 102 S.African L.J 150.  
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majority shareholdings, the beneficial owner of the shares and also, as submitted by Wallis, it 
failed to cater for companies which did not have any shares, such as with a company limited 
by guarantee.17 
 
Following the problems illustrated above, it has been submitted that the issues could have 
been solved, albeit with difficulty, through proper interpretation of the provisions as opposed 
to an amendment of the Act.18 However, following certain discrepancies presented in section 
9 of the Act in relation to the arrest of associated ships and its subsequent sale in execution, 
the legislature opted to amend the Act, and in doing so, saw an opportunity to clarify any 
inconsistencies in the associated ship provisions. 19  
 
2.3.2.  The Associated Ship Provisions as Amended: 
 
The amended associated ship provisions are as follows: 
 
‘Section 3 (6) An action in rem, other than an action in respect of a maritime claim referred to 
in paragraph (d) of the definition of 'maritime claim', may be brought by the arrest of an 
associated ship instead of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose. 
 
Section 3 (7) (a) For the purposes of subsection (6) an associated ship means a ship, other 
than the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose- 
(i) Owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by the person who was the owner of 
the ship concerned at the time when the maritime claim arose; or 
(ii) Owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a person who controlled the 
company which owned the ship concerned when the maritime claim arose; or 
(iii) Owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a company which is controlled by 
a person who owned the ship concerned, or controlled the company which owned the ship 
concerned, when the maritime claim arose. 
 
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a)- 
(i) ships shall be deemed to be owned by the same persons if the majority in number of, or of 
voting rights in respect of, or the greater part, in value, of, the shares in the ships are owned 
by the same persons; 
                                                          
17 Wallis (note 6 above; 123). 
18 Wallis (note 6 above; 135). 
19 Wallis (note 6 above; 135-136). 
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(ii) A person shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or indirectly, to 
control the company; 
(iii) A company includes any other juristic person and any body of persons, irrespective of 
whether or not any interest therein consists of shares.’ 
 
One of the first perceptible differences in respect of the amended provisions is that the 
original provisions excluded maritime claims in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of the Act from 
being pursued against the associated ship. These claims referred to 
‘(a) The ownership of a ship or a share in a ship; 
  (b) The possession, delivery, employment or earnings of a ship; 
  (c) Any agreement for the sale of a ship or a share in a ship, or any agreement with regard to     
the ownership, possession, delivery, employment or earnings of a ship;’.20 
 
The amended provisions are less restrictive in that they only exclude paragraph (d) of the list 
of maritime claims in AJRA which refers to mortgage, hypothecation, right of retention, 
pledge or other charge, on or of a ship, and any bottomry or respondentia bond claims. In this 
respect, it is submitted that the reasoning behind such exclusions is that such claims are more 
intimately related to the ship with which the claim arose (the guilty vessel). Therefore the 
said claims would be best pursued against that particular vessel.21  
 
A more noteworthy modification in respect of the amended associated ship provisions, is 
illustrated in the manner in which the legislature has dealt with the issue of control. As stated 
above, the problem with the original provisions was that they referred to the control or 
ownership of all the shares of a company as opposed to the actual control of the company 
concerned. The amended version adequately deals with this issue as it states ‘controlled the 
company’.22 
                                                          
20 Section 1 of the Act. 
21 Wallis (note 6 above; 143). 
22 This difference has  been noted in the case of National Iranian Tanker Co v mv Pericles Gc 1995 (1) SA 475 
(A) where Corbett CJ provided the following example: 
‘X (the person concerned) owns all the shares in company A which in turn owns ship No 1. Ship No 2 
is owned by company B, in which X has a minor (as to number of shares), but controlling, 
shareholding. Prior to the coming into effect of the amending Act in 1992 (but after the coming into 
effect of the Act on 1 November 1983) an event occurs giving rise to a maritime claim in respect of 
ship No 1, thus causing it to become the guilty ship. After the amending Act has come into effect the 
claimant applies to arrest ship No 2 as an associated ship. If the Act and the original definition apply, 
ship No 2 cannot be arrested because at the time when the claim arose X did not own or control the 
shares in B company. If, on the other hand, the amending Act and the new definition were to apply, 
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It is therefore submitted that this centralises the enquiry to the relevant person who actually 
controls the company, and the control of the shares of company serves a more evidentiary 
purpose in the sense that it may be one of the factors which shows an association but is no 
longer a defining characteristic. 
Another noteworthy section in the provision, is section 3 (7) (b) (iii) which broadens the 
concept of a company to include any juristic person or a body of persons, whether or not any 
shares exist therein. It therefore respectfully submitted that by broadening the scope of what 
may be regarded as a company, the legislature was aware of the difficulties which corporate 
structures present insofar as it relates to the arrestor identifying the true source of control. It is 
further submitted that this section provides an all-encompassing provision to cater for an 
array of different corporate structures so as to avoid cases in which a ship, may for all 
purposes, be regarded as an associated ship, save for the fact that the structure of the ship-
owning company concerned, is plagued by unidentifiable shareholders, or its structure does 
not conform to the general structure associated with a company. Section 3 (7) (b) (ii) and (iii) 
therefore assists an arrestor in the sense that it may penetrate the corporate shields so as to 
locate the true seat of control irrespective of the internal structures of the company 
concerned. 
Another factor which must be considered in determining control, is the relevant time period 
when such control must exist in relation to the ships concerned. In terms of the guilty vessel, 
the relevant time period when such control must exist is ‘when the maritime claim arose’. 
Thus a subsequent sale of the guilty ship is immaterial in relation to the establishment of 
control.23 The relevant time period for the alleged associated ship is ‘when the action is 
commenced’.24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ship No 2 could be arrested because at the time the action commenced X controlled B company.’ at 
484I-485B. 
23 J Hare Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) 108.In the case of MV Cape 
Courage Bulkship Union SA v Qannas Shipping Co Ltd and Another 2010 (1) SA 53 (SCA) the court held that a 
claim may be said to have been ‘originated’ when there are sufficient factors present to indicate that the 
owner/controller of the ship concerned has ‘offended’. The court further held that the damage which result from 
the offending owners conduct need not yet be materialise but it is sufficient for the purposes of the Act that the 
damage will be suffered in due course. Paragraph [23]. The decision has been subject to much criticism and 
debate see G Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction Law and Practice in South Africa 2 ed (2012)136 . 
24 See section 3(7) above. 
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2.4. Beneficial Ownership 
 
The term ‘beneficial ownership’ originates from English law, the relevant provision of which 
lies in section 3 (4) of the English Administration of Justice Act. Although the term stems 
from English doctrine, it has been mentioned in numerous South African shipping cases 
which dealt with associated ship arrests.25 It is therefore necessary to determine what is meant 
by the term ‘beneficial ownership’ so as to provide insight as to how this term relates to the 
concept of ‘control’. This segment will briefly look at the relevant English provision and how 
the English cases have interpreted the term ‘beneficial owner’ after which it will look toward 
the relevant South African law. 
Section 3 (4) of the English Administration of Justice Act 1956 states: 
‘In the case of any … claim…being a claim in connection with a ship, where the person who 
would be liable on the claim in an action in personam was when the cause of action arose the 
owner or charterer of or in possession or in control of the ship the Admiralty jurisdiction of 
the High Court may… be invoked by an action in rem against (a) that ship if at the time when 
the action is brought it is beneficially owned as respects all the shares therein by that 
person…’ 
The aforementioned provision therefore allows the claimant to look beyond the corporate 
form of the company in order to locate the real source of ownership or control, which will 
generally be accompanied with an investigation of the relevant trusteeship/nominee holdings, 
and ultimately the beneficial ownership.26 
In the case of the Aventicum,27 a case which dealt with a claim for damages in relation to the 
damages to cargo on board the vessel the Aventicum, the court stated the following in terms 
of the concept of ‘beneficial ownership’: 
                                                          
25 See Owners of the Cargo Lately Laden on Board The mv Katina P v mv Afthoros SCOSA C1, The 
Eleftherotria (NO 2) Crusader Shipping Co Ltd v Canadian Forest Navigation Ltd SCOSA C5, Ya Mawlaya 
(NO 1 ) Delray Shipping Corporation v Eridiana Spa  SCOSA C30, The Baconau Transportes Del Mar SA v 
Jade Shipping Co Ltd  SCOSA C42, The Sandokan Owners of the Sandokan v Liverpool  and London Steamship 
Protection and  Indemnity  Association Ltd SCOSA C73, The Amer Whitney Shippers d’ Singapore Pte Ltd v 
Amer Whitney SCOSA C86, The Asian Hope Shipping Ltd  v Ocean Trade  S.A  C115, Sino West  Shipping Co 
Ltd v NYK-Hinode Line Limited C203, National Iranian Tanker Co v mv Pericles Gc 1995 (1) SA 475 (A). 
26C Cunningham The Arrest of an Associated Ship in terms of Section5 (3) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act, No. 105 of 1983 (As Amended) The Burden of Proof (unpublished LLM Thesis, University of 
Cape Town, 1999) 15. 
27The Aventicum [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 184. 
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‘where damages are claimed by cargo-owners and there is a dispute as to the beneficial 
ownership of the ship, the court in all cases can and in some cases should look behind the 
registered owner to determine the true beneficial owner… but of course it is plain that s 3(4) 
of the Act intends that the court shall not be limited to a consideration of who is the registered 
owner or who is the person having legal ownership of the shares of the ship; the directions are 
to look at the beneficial ownership. Certainly in a case where there is a suggestion of a 
trusteeship or a nominee holding, there is no doubt that the Court can investigate it’.28 
Ultimately the court held that in this case, the persons who beneficially owned the shares in 
the Aventicum, were not the same persons who were the owners at the time when the cause of 
action arose, thus the arrest was set aside. 29 Similarly in the Andrea Ursula,30 Justice 
Brandon stated the following in attempt to give meaning to the term ‘beneficial owner’: 
‘a ship would be beneficially owned by a person who, whether he was the legal or equitable  
owner or not, lawfully had full possession and control of her, and , by virtue of such control, 
had all the benefit and use of her which a legal or equitable owner would ordinarily have’.31 
It is respectfully submitted that what can be drawn from the above mentioned case law, is that 
the term ‘beneficial owner’ refers to the true holder of the benefits of the shares and extends 
beyond mere nominee holders or registered holders who act as agents of the beneficial owner 
and upon the latter’s directives. The aim, therefore, of Section 3 (4) of the English 
Administration of Justice Act is to locate and proceed against the true controller of the vessel 
in question and permeate the various corporate structures concealing the beneficial owner’s 
identity. The associated ship provisions differ from s 3 (4) of the English Administration 
Justice Act, therefore the interpretation assigned to that provision by the English courts, 
provides little assistance to the interpretation of section 3 (6) and (7) of AJRA, except to the 
extent that in determining where control lies, South African courts would follow the English 
courts and look beyond the corporate veil.32 
In respect of South African corporate law, the terms ‘beneficial interest’ has been mentioned 
in the Companies Act.33 In terms of section 56 (1), the Act states:  
                                                          
28 The Aventicum supra note 27 at 187. 
29  The Aventicum supra note 27 at 190. 
30 Medway Drydock & Engineering Co Ltd v MV The Andrea Ursula [1971)1 Lloyd’s Rep 145. 
31 The Andrea Ursula supra note 30 at 147.  
32 Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1985 2 SA 486 (C) at 488I. 
33 71 of 2008. 
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‘Except to the extent that a company's Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise, the 
company's issued securities may be held by, and registered in the name of, one person for the 
beneficial interest of another person’.34 
Although the term ‘beneficial owner’ is not specifically stated, it is clear that there is a 
relationship between the term ‘beneficial interest’ and ‘beneficial owner’ and in this respect, 
South African law recognises this concept as ‘right to be on the register is independent of the 
ownership of the shares’.35  Cassim provides insight in this regard as he states: 
‘the beneficial shareholder is entitled to the rights attached to the share while the registered 
shareholder is the person in whose name the share happens to be registered. Such a person is 
also known as a nominee, defined as ‘a person that acts as the registered holder of securities 
or an interest in securities on behalf of other persons’’.36 
There are numerous reasons as to why a shareholder may opt to cloak their identity by not 
registering the shares in their own name such as inter alia; they simply wish to keep their 
investment anonymous, where the directors of a company would have refused the transfer of 
shares or registration of such shares in another person. Therefore to bypass this, the seller 
may remain as the registered shareholder while the buyer would be regarded as a beneficial 
owner on his behalf, and also, cases where an investor opts to register the shares in their 
name on behalf of numerous investors in respect of dissimilar shares.37 A detailed analysis of 
                                                          
34 Section 1 of the Companies Act further states: 
‘beneficial interest', when used in relation to a company's securities, means the right or entitlement of a 
person, through ownership, agreement, relationship or otherwise, alone or together with another person to- 
(a) receive or participate in any distribution in respect of the company's securities; 
(b) exercise or cause to be exercised, in the ordinary course, any or all of the rights attaching to the 
company's securities; or 
(c) dispose or direct the disposition of the company's securities, or any part of a distribution in respect of the 
securities, 
but does not include any interest held by a person in a unit trust or collective investment scheme in terms of 
the Collective Investment Schemes Act, 2002’. 
35 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 331.  
36Cassim et al (note 35 above; 331) .see also Oakland nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & investment Co 
(Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A) AT 453 where the court discussed the position of a nominee shareholder and 
noted that such a  person; is an agent with limited authority ,holds the shares in the name of and may only act on 
behalf of the principal, from whom he takes instructions, the principal who is described as ‘beneficial owner ‘is 
not wholly accurate but is a convenient and well understood label.  
37Cassim et al (note 35 above; 331-332) Cassim further notes that one of the difficulties in respect of beneficial 
owners is that internal trading becomes difficult to determine, minority shareholders cannot determine the 
identity of the majority shareholder and furthermore directors cannot prevent a hostile takeover. Cassim et al 
(note 35 above; 331-332).  In respect of public companies section 56 (3) states that if a security of a public 
company is registered in the name of a person who is not the holder of the beneficial interest in all of the 
securities in the same company held by that person, that registered holder of security must disclose- 
‘(a) the identity of the person on whose behalf that security is held; and 
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the term ‘beneficial interest’ as contained in the Companies Act is beyond the mandate of this 
dissertation. The brief mention of it however, serves two main purposes, firstly it provides 
insight as to the position in South Africa in relation to shares not owned by the true owner 
and secondly it provides perspective as to how this concepts relates to corporate structures 
and the manner in which a person may register their shares, so as to conceal their identity. 
As stated above, the term ‘beneficial owner’ often appears in associated ship cases as well as 
other cases relating to shareholdings. It is therefore essential to determine what the relevant 
authorities have stated. In the Afthoros,38 Majid J held that ‘the phrase ‘ultimate sole 
beneficial owner’, has a well-recognised meaning in commercial circles when used in relation 
to a group consisting of a holding and several subsidiary companies’.39 Whilst in the 
Baconau40 the court held that ‘In our company law and that, for instance of the United 
Kingdom we understand that the beneficial owner is the true owner of the share and entitled 
to the dividends and any other benefits which flow from its ownership’.41  
In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd & another v Ocean Commodities Inc: 42  
‘Normally the person in whom the shares vest is the registered shareholder in the books of the 
company and has issued to him a share certificate specifying the share, or shares, held by him. 
Indeed, such a share certificate, duly issued, affords prima face evidence of his title to the 
shares specified therein…in some instances, however, the registered shareholder may hold the 
shares as the  nominee, i.e. agent, of another, generally described as the ‘owner’ or ‘beneficial 
owner’ of the shares. This fact does not appear on the company’s register, as it is the policy of 
the law that a company should concern itself only with the registered owner of shares… the 
term ‘beneficial owner’ is, juristically speaking, not wholly accurate, but it is a convenient 
and well-use label to denote the person in whom, as between himself and the registered 
shareholder, the benefit of the bundle of rights constituting the share vests’. 43  
In the Elefthoratoria44 the court held that the term ‘nominee’ refers to someone whose name 
is used in lieu of another and refers to the position where a registered shareholder or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(b) the identity of each person with a beneficial interest in the securities so held, the number and class 
of securities held for each such person with a beneficial interest, and the extent of each such beneficial 
interest.’ 
38 The Afthoros supra note 25. 
39 The Afthoros supra note 25 at C3-D. 
40The Baconau supra note 25. 
41The Baconau supra note 25 at C57-G. 
421983 (1) SA 276 (A). 
43 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd & another v Ocean Commodities Inc supra note 42 at 288H-289B. 
44 The Elefthoratoria supra note 25. 
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appointed director holds the shares or exercises their functions subject to the directive/ 
commands or orders of the actual or the beneficial owner of the shares or the person on 
whose behalf they act as director.45The court ultimately found that in this case, the ‘beneficial 
owner’ in question shielded his identity in order to conceal his involvement in the shipping 
company in question from Greek officials, and there was nothing to suggest that the nominee 
directors and shareholders did not act upon his instruction.46  
It is therefore submitted that the term ‘beneficial owner’ refers to the person who obtains the 
benefits associated with the relevant shareholdings and at whose discretion the nominee or 
registered shareholders act. It can therefore be said that for the purposes of associated ship 
arrests, the requisite control lies with this person who is the source of ultimate control. 
Therefore although the relevant English and South African provisions are different, insofar as 
they refer to ‘beneficial ownership’ they apply the same meaning. It is further submitted that 
not all cases of associated ship arrests will involve beneficial ownership as in some cases 
shareholders may hold their shares in their own name subject to no will but their own. In such 
cases control for the purposes of associated ship arrest may be said to lie with that person. 
However where the beneficial owner opts to register their shares in the name of another, 
claimants would need to go beyond the registered shareholdings so as to determine the true 
seat of control. 
2.5. The Type of ‘control’ Required to Establish Associated Ship Jurisdiction  
 
The Act does not provide any insight as to the meaning to be amalgamated with the term 
‘control’ except that it may be executed ‘directly or indirectly’.47 It therefore becomes 
necessary to look toward the relevant case law to determine how the term is to be interpreted. 
This portion of the dissertation will briefly look at the language of the statutory provisions 
itself, after which it will look at the various meanings which may be associated with the term 
‘control’  and which term best suits the overall purpose of the provision. 
The starting point with all statutory provisions is that of the provision itself. Section 3 (7) 
makes reference to control three times and in doing so refers to the word ‘person’ in the 
singular and not in its plural form.48 It therefore appears that what is meant by this is that 
                                                          
45The Elefthoratoria supra note 25 at C9D-G.  
46 The Elefthoratoria supra note 25 at C10-C11. 
47 Section 3 (7) (b)(ii) . 
48 Section(7) (a) (ii) states: 
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‘control’ for the purpose of associated ship arrest must rest with a single entity and not two or 
more. Simply put, the requisite control must rest with a single person.49 There is no 
suggestion in the provisions, that for the purposes of the provision there may be more than 
one repository of control. It is submitted that if this was intended by the legislature, it is likely 
that the legislature would have provided distinguishing factors and characteristics of different 
forms of control in order to determine which configuration of control has more authority, or 
is superior to others.50 
The next question which need be interrogated, is what is actually meant by the term 
‘control’? . Wallis submits that there are several possibilities in which the provision may be 
interpreted, the first of which being the narrow and formalistic interpretation i.e. based on the 
law of the country concerned in which the company was incorporated, whereby the person 
who is legally authorised to control the undertakings of the company concerned, is identified 
as the person who has control. This approach will basically restrict the enquiry to the 
determination of the registered shareholder of the shares of a company. Secondly, it may refer 
to the authority to oversee the operation of the vessel in question, which refers to the day-to-
day management of the company and lastly, it may refer to the ‘actual or ultimate’ control of 
a company .51  
With regard to the narrow interpretation i.e. the actual legal control of the company 
concerned, one usually looks at the registered shareholder of the company. It is only the 
registered shareholders that may exercise a vote in respect of the said shares and in this sense, 
undertake the affairs of the company. If such a person has the majority shares of the 
company, they may be said to legally control the company.52 Such an approach is restrictive 
in its nature and as such, does not cater for situations where control may be exercised without 
a majority holding, where voting rights are not proportionate with the shareholding of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a person who controlled the company which 
owned the ship concerned when the maritime claim arose; or 
(iii) Owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a company which is controlled by a person 
who owned the ship concerned, or controlled the company which owned the ship concerned, when the 
maritime claim arose. 
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a)- 
(ii) a person shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or indirectly, to control the 
company;’ (my emphasis included.) 
49 Wallis (note 6 above; 187). 
50 Wallis (note 6 above; 187). 
51 Wallis (note 5 above; 187). 
52 Wallis (note 5 above; 188). 
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company or cases of pyramid schemes.53 In the case of Zygos Corporation v Salen 
Rederierna AB54 , a case decided prior to the 1992 amendments, Friedman J provides further 
support in this regard as the respected judge states:   
‘It is possible for a person to control a company without necessarily controlling the shares in 
that company. For example, control over a company can be exercised without a majority 
shareholding where voting rights are not commensurate with shareholding, or where 
‘pyramiding’ takes place. . . . It is in each case a factual question whether the necessary 
ownership or control is present in order to bring the two ships within the terms of s 3(6) read 
with s 3(7) of the Act.’55 
 
In this respect Hare also notes that to look only to the person who, at the relevant time, has 
the bearer shares56 is to ‘oversimplify the inquiry to an extent that it is likely to emasculate 
it’, and in this sense it is important to note that the 1992 Amendment of the Act emphasises 
the control of the company, rather than merely controlling its shareholding.57 It is further 
submitted that if this restrictive interpretation was to be regarded as the correct meaning, it 
seems illogical for the legislature to use the catch-all phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ and would 
have rather expressly stated that control is to be determined by identifying the majority 
shareholder. Evidence of common ownership of shares, still carries probative value in the 
sense that they may indicate a common control between the companies.58 It is therefore 
submitted that the probative value of common ownership of shares will however depend on 
other factors which point toward common control.  
The second type of control i.e. managerial control, also presents further challenges. Such 
persons may be employees of the company and may perform key functions within the 
company. However, their mandate is limited and subject to the will of the shareholders. 
Before looking at the case law, it is useful to look at the nature and functions of directors 
generally. In this aspect, it is however difficult to make a comparison with the corporate 
                                                          
53Staniland (note 10 above; 414). In Dole Fresh Fruit International Ltd supra note 12 at 119F the court held ‘A 
person may control a company without controlling all the shares in the company. And control over a company 
can be exercised even without a majority shareholding’. 
54 1985 (2) SA 486 (C). 
55Zygos Corporation supra note 12 at 488I-489C: 
56 In this respect the person who is in possession may be regarded as the person who has the requisite control. 
The difficulty however is that it is easily transferable from one person to another. 
57 Hare (note 22 above;109). 
58Staniland (note 10 above; 414). Hare also notes that the determination of control may involve a multi-faceted 
enquiry into the shareholding of a company, the board of directors, the CEO or managing director of the ship-
owning company as well as relevant legislation which may imply control such as that the company being under 
the power and authority of a judicial manager. Hare (note 23 above; 109). 
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provisions across the world, and such a discussion is beyond the mandate of this dissertation. 
The discussion will therefore focus on the position of directors in South African law. A 
company is a juristic person and as such, can only act through its duly appointed agents and 
representatives.59 The day-to-day business affairs of the company are therefore managed by 
the directors who have the authority to implement all the powers and perform all the 
functions of the company insofar as the memorandum of incorporation and the Companies 
Act allow.60 The board of directors therefore have the legal power to manage the business 
affairs and make vital decisions relating to the everyday running of the company.61 Directors 
are elected by the shareholders and as such, they may be removed by ordinary resolution by 
the shareholders.62 The directors are therefore subject to the command of the shareholders. 
Therefore, their control extends no further than the everyday operations of the company and 
important decisions which relate to the direction of the company, such as an election to 
liquidate the company, will be decided by the shareholders. Hence, although being able to 
provide insight and input in respect of decisions to be made, such persons lack the ability to 
have the final say in such matters.63 
In terms of determining whether managers may be regarded as having the requisite control 
for the purposes of associated ship arrests, it is useful to look at the decision of  R v Mall64 
where the court made mention of the legal position of directors and managers. The court 
stated that managers are employees of the company and are therefore subject to the authority 
of the directors, and the scope of their mandate is a question of fact.  Furthermore, whilst the 
directors are appointed and may be removed by the shareholders, the managers are employees 
of the company and are appointed and dismissed at the discretion of the directors.65 
Therefore, from a South African company law perspective, it seems as though neither 
directors nor managers of a company have the necessary ‘control’ for the purposes of 
associated ship arrests. However it is still necessary to look at what the relevant case law has 
                                                          
59Cassim et al (note 35 above;383).   
60 66(1) see also P Delport The New Companies Act Manual (including Close Corporations and Partnerships) 
Student Edition (2011) 90.  
61Cassim et al (note 35 above; 375).    
62Section 71 (1) of the Companies Act 2008 states that:  
‘despite anything to the contrary in a company's Memorandum of Incorporation or rules, or any 
agreement between a company and a director, or between any shareholders and a director, a director 
may be removed by an ordinary resolution adopted at a shareholders meeting by the persons entitled to 
exercise voting rights in an election of that director, subject to subsection (2)’. See also Delport (note 
60 above 80-81). 
63Wallis (note 6 above; 189). 
641959 (4) SA 607. 
65 Cassim et al (note 35 above;387).  
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mentioned in respect of the control held by directors and managers and whether such control 
is sufficient. 
 King J, writing before the amendment of the Act, held that control in terms of section 3 7(b) 
(ii) refers to overall control ‘and not its day-to-day management’.66 The respected Judge went 
on further to state that ‘there must be managing agents in all the major ports of the world who 
in a sense, control innumerable merchant ships owned by different interests and quite 
independent of each other. It could never have been the intention of the legislature that such 
vessels could be arrested as ‘associated ships’’.67 In this case the court was not satisfied with 
the applicant’s assertion that the two vessels were associated on the basis that they had the 
same agents. The applicant thereafter amplified their papers and averred that each of the 
companies that own one of the alleged sister-ships has a common director/president. It was 
further asserted that the president of such companies could sign and act on behalf of the 
corporation and with their signature, bind the corporation. Another common factor between 
the companies was that they shared a common director/ secretary. The court ultimately held 
that a case of association had been made out. It is also important, in this respect, to note the 
case of Hasselbacher68. In this case, the applicants applied for, and had been granted an 
urgent order for the arrest of the motor vessel m.v. Stavroula as security for their claim in the 
English High Court of Justice against Dunnet Bay Shipping (Dunnet Bay) as owner of the 
m.v. Manolis L. On the return day, the owners of the m.v. Stavroula, North Sea Maritime, 
applied for an order that the arrest be set aside on the ground that the applicants had not 
proved that the two ships were associated. The applicants were aware of the identity of the 
owner of the shares in Dunnet Bay i.e. Captain Lelakis. However, North Sea was registered 
in Liberia, and it was therefore not possible to identify the shareholders of the company. The 
applicants therefore looked at the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine which stated in a 
letter that Universal Glow represented North Sea and managed the vessel m.v. Stavroula. The 
Lloyds confidential list of ship-owners for 1984-1985 stated that Universal Glow is the 
manager of 23 ships owned by single-ship companies, including vessels inter alia the m.v. 
Stavroula and m.v. Manolis. The director of Universal Glow was a Mr. Lambros Karakostas 
who was also one of the trustees which held shares in the Dunnet Bay shipping on behalf of 
Captain Lelakis. In the Lloyds confidential index March 1985 annexure it had the following 
entry: 
                                                          
66 E E Sharp & Sons v MV Nefeli 1984 (3) SA 325 (C) at 326-327. 
67 E E Sharp & Sons supra note 66 326H-327A. 
68 Hasselbacher Papier Import and Export (Body Corporate) and Another v MV Stavroula 1987 (1) SA 75. 
32 
 
‘Universal Glow Inc,… (registered in Liberia) ( Antonis Lelakis & Peter G Stamoulis)’69 
.Furthermore, there was evidence of a list of 38 vessels and the companies owning them, all 
managed by Universal Glow. The applicants have shown that ten of these companies are 
directly or indirectly controlled by Captain Lelakis. No further information existed in respect 
of the other vessels. Another factor which the court considered was that Th Skoulas, who 
acted on behalf of the respondent and placed the m.v. Stavroula under the management of 
Universal Glow and nominated it as its representative, was presumably the same person as 
Theodorus Skoulas who was the co-holder of shares in Dunnet Bay and the trustee of Captain 
Lelakis. The court made reference to the dictum in the E E sharp case at 327A as mentioned 
above, but stated that the control referred to by King AJ in that case is a different type of 
control exercised by Universal Glow in this case. Burger J then stated: 
‘it seems to me that its management and control is not confined to management in a 
port but was so complete in its extent and overall that indicates an association 
between the ships managed by Universal Glow’.70 
In this respect, it is therefore important to note that there may be such cases where the nature 
and extent of the management over a vessel is so complete that it may satisfy section 3 (7) of 
AJRA but this will depend ultimately on the facts of a particular case and the location of the 
true seat of control.  It is important however, to note that one of the main factors which 
played a role in the court upholding the arrest, was the refusal by the respondent to deny the 
allegations with regard to whether Captain Lelakis had control over the respondent.71  
In the Eleftherotria (NO 2)72 , the Eleftherotria was arrested by Canadian Shipping Co Ltd on 
the basis that it was an associated ship of the Esquire. Both ships were both managed by the 
same company i.e. Dileship Marine Corporation. The Eleftherotria was owned by Crusader 
Shipping Co Ltd and the Esquire was owned by Serenissima Shipping Co Ltd. The ultimate 
owners of the two companies were separate persons. However a 1 % shareholder in Crusader 
was also a nominee shareholder of 1% of the shares in Serenissima. The ultimate owner of 
shares in Serenissima was a person who held 100% of the bearer shares in a holding company 
of Serenissima.73 It was found that this person was a business manager and had no previous 
experience in shipping and entered into the shipping business with unexplained financial 
                                                          
69 Hasselbacher supra  note 68 at 77F-J. 
70 Hasselbacher supra note 68 at 78H. 
71 Hasselbacher supra note 68 at 78J-79A.  
72 Eleftherotria (NO 2) supra note 25. 
73Eleftherotria (NO 2) supra note 25 at C5F-G. 
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resources, and in doing so attempted to screen his activities from the Greek Foreign 
Exchange Authorities. He was a friend of the owners of Crusader, and therefore entrusted 
them to handle the day-to-day management of the Esquire in order obscure his involvement 
in its operations from the Greek officials.74 The court based its enquiry on who was the 
ultimate controller of the company and found that there was no evidence to suggest that the 
nominee holders did not act on behalf of the beneficial owner. The importance of this case is 
that it shows that; common management is insufficient to establish ‘control’ and that the true 
enquiry of associated ship arrest is based on the question of who exercises ultimate control 
over a company, nominee holders are subject to the directives of the beneficial owner of a 
company, and as such, do not have an independent unfettered discretion as to how they may 
use such shareholdings, and lastly, that one of the reasons as to why a person may opt to 
conceal their identity and involvement in a company may be to avoid the relevant authorities 
of a state. 
In the Kardiga 5(NO 1)75 - JA Chapman arrested the Kadirga 5 and claimed payment in 
respect of fleet insurance, of which the Kardiga was a part.  It was alleged that the owner of 
the Kadirga 5 was controlled by the same person/persons with whom JC Chapman had 
insurance claims against. The allegations were faced by denials by the respondents and the 
matter therefore had to be referred to oral evidence.76 However the court did state the 
following, in respect of common management: 
‘in order to prove its case, Chapman relies inter alia on a degree of common shareholdings 
and a degree of common directorships. Suffice it to say that neither the common shareholding 
nor common majority directorships is sufficient in themselves to establish the requirements of 
control set out in section 3 (7) (b) (ii)’. 77  
In the case of the Sandokan78, Liverpool and London Steamship Protection and Indemnity 
Association Ltd arrested the Sandokan on the basis that it was an associated ship of the 
vessels: Lina, Alan, Rapan and Shane. Each of these vessels, except the Sandokan, was 
                                                          
74Eleftherotria (NO 2) supra note 25 at C5G-H. 
75The Kadirga Five (No.1): JA Chapman & Co Ltd v Kardiga Denizcilik ve Ticaret AS SCOSA C12. 
76The Kadirga Five (No.1) supra note 75 at C17-C19. 
77The Kadirga Five (No.1) supra note 75 at C14I-C15. see also East Cross Sea Transport Inc v Elgin Brown & 
Hamer (Pty) Ltd 1992 (1) SA 102 (D) at 107 E-G  where the court stated : 
‘If they had common directors, those directors, acting together, would have controlled the management 
of the companies' affairs. That is not, however, to say that they controlled the shares in the companies 
for there is a vast conceptual and factual difference between control of the management of a company's 
affairs and control of the shares in that company’. 
78The Sandokan supra note 25. 
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entered into as a fleet entry where each vessel was jointly and severally liable for all claims in 
respect of the said fleet entry. Super Bulk Ltd., the company which registered the ships as a 
fleet entry, was also jointly and severally liable. Mini Bulk Ltd., the company owning the 
Sandokan had no interest in the other vessels. The commonality in this case between the two 
companies, was that they shared a common director. The court held: 
‘It was not seriously in contention between the parties that the word ‘control’ as used in this 
section means ultimate control of the destiny of the ship and not mere day to day control or 
management thereof. To be a director in the company owning the ship is usually insufficient 
in itself to prove control, particularly where that director holds no shares in the company’.79  
The court held further, that the fact that a vessel is entered as part of a fleet entry for the 
insurance purposes, may indicate an association. However, in this case there is no 
relationship between the other vessels and the Sandokan, save for the fact that the two ships 
share a common director.   
In the Theokeetor80, the Theokeetor was arrested as an associated ship of the Theometor of 
which Ssang Yong had a claim against. The agent of the ships affirmed that the ships were 
only associated to the extent that they were part of the same fleet in which they were both 
managed. There was no further evidence to suggest that the two ships were controlled or 
owned by the same persons. The court noted that there were sound commercial reasons as to 
why ships may be managed by the same persons, which included inter alia the fact that such 
common management facilitates the raising of funds and also the use of cross guarantees 
which are supplied by investors for mutual benefit.81 The court held that the two ships were 
not associated and that in an industry such as shipping, it is unlikely that the shipping 
companies would be able to operate without such ‘community of interests’.82 The court went 
on further to note that the situation where various ships are managed by the same company, is 
similar to commercial developments where an estate agent gathers together a congregate of 
investors to invest in property.83 
It is therefore submitted that common management of ship owning vessels cannot, for the 
purposes of establishing common control, be the primary and sole criterion, but rather one of 
                                                          
79 The Sandokan supra note 25 at  C74 D-E. 
80Ssang Yong Shipping Co Ltd v The MV Theokeetor SCOSA C 81. 
81The Theokeetor supra note 80 at C83. 
82The Theokeetor supra note 80 at C84 E-G. 
83The Theokeetor supra note 80 at C84 E-G. 
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the characteristics amongst others that point towards common control.84 Put simply, common 
management forms one of the factors that need to be considered in establishing common 
control as there may be cases where companies act as professional managers for investors 
who lack the intimate and practical knowledge of shipping.  
Ultimately, neither legal control nor managerial control are sufficient to support the 
underlying purpose of an associated ship arrest, which is to make the loss fall where it 
belonged by reason of ownership or control85 ,as these interpretations allow for the associated 
ship provisions to be circumvented easily through the vesting of shares in others or through 
pyramid schemes. It therefore makes no sense for the legislature to take such a bold approach 
in enacting the associated ship provisions if they were to be so easily thwarted. Hence, it is 
the ultimate or overall control that needs to be looked at. In this respect, Bradfield submits 
that when regard is given to the mischief at which the associated ship provisions is aimed at; 
it becomes clear that it is the real control and not apparent control which parliament had in 
mind.86 
When determining control of a company, as stated above, it is important to note that the fact 
that a party may be a majority shareholder in a company, does not necessarily mean that the 
said party has the necessary ‘control’ for the purposes of associated ship arrests. In such cases 
the court will have to take into account the relevant terms and conditions of the shareholders 
agreement as part of the inquiry into the ultimate/actual control of a company. A clear 
illustration of this is seen in the case of The Guangzhou87 . In this case, China National 
Chartering Co. Ltd. arrested the Guangzhou on the basis that it was an associated ship of the 
Global Commander which it had a claim against for hire and damages. The owner of the 
Guangzhou was the GC Guangzhou Pte Ltd which was wholly owned by GC Tankers Pte Ltd 
whose shareholders were owned by Centre Securities Ltd (40% shareholding) Hainan 
American Ltd (10% shareholding) Grand Columbia Shipping Ltd (25% shareholding) and 
Grand Mississippi Shipping Ltd (25% shareholding) . The latter two companies were owned 
by Mega Bulk Holdings Co Ltd. Mega Bulk and Grand China Shipping were subsidiaries of 
                                                          
84 Other factors may include common mortgage bonds of the respective vessels, where two or more vessels 
guarantee performance under different charter parties, common: addresses facsimile numbers, surety ship and 
power of attorneys. see Staniland (note 10 above; 416). 
85Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship Berg and Others 1986 (2) SA 700 (A) in this respect, it is 
important to note that this case was decided prior to the 1992 amendment’s and therefore as suggested by 
Hoffmeyr , it must be read in light of the subsequent amendments which focused on control of a company as 
opposed to control of the shares. Hofmeyr (note 23 above; 134). 
86 G Bradfield ‘Guilt By Association in South African Admiralty Law’ (2005) 2 LMCLQ  247. 
87China National Chartering Co Ltd v The Guangzhou SCOSA C197. 
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Grand China Logistics Holding Co Ltd which formed part of the HNA group of companies. 
HNA controlled the Global Commander. China National also alleged that HNA controlled 
the Guangzhou through the control of the two subsidiary companies which were owned by 
Mega Bulk Holdings Co Ltd and that it had control of Hainan American. Guangzhou denied 
that  HNA controlled Hainan American and further provided evidence of clause 5.2 of the 
shareholders agreement, concluded by the shareholders of GC Tankers, which provided that 
the company could only act with prior resolution of the shareholders and consent of 75% of 
the voting rights at a general meeting. The applicants’ contention in this case was that the 
HNA group controls Hainan American, which in turn results in HNA controlling 60 % of the 
shareholding in GC Tankers.88 The court held that this was insufficient to establish the 
requisite control in terms of section 3 (7) as control of 60% of shares was insufficient to 
establish control of the company, as the shareholders agreement requires control to the extent 
of 75%. The court also went on state that ‘it is perfectly in order to arrange one’s affairs in 
such a way as to avoid the effect of statutory provisions, provided of course that the 
arrangements are genuine and not simulated so as to disguise the true position’.89  The court 
therefore looked beyond the majority shareholding and focused on the true seat of control. 
The courts investigation as to the ultimate control of a company will often involve an enquiry 
into the company laws of the state in which the shipping company was registered. In the case 
of Baconao,90 Jade Bay Shipping Co Ltd chartered the Jade Bay to Empresa Cubana De 
Fletes (Cuflet Chartering of Havana, Cuba). A dispute arose between the parties, and Jade 
Bay arrested the Baconao in Durban to obtain security for claims which were subject to 
arbitration proceedings in London.  The Baconao was owned by Transportes Del Mar SA.  
To prove the association, Jade Bay submitted documents showing a) that Transportes Del 
Mar SA was the owner of the Baconao which was listed as such under the subheading of a 
company called ‘Empresa Navegacion Mambisa’ in the Lloyds confidential index and b) 
certain documents from the ICC International Marine Bureau which stated that Cuflet was a 
Cuban state-owned or controlled company which operated vessels owned by Mambisa who 
was also controlled/owned by the government of Cuba. Transportes Del Mar SA argued that 
it was the owner of the Baconao, that Mambisa and Cuflet were separate entities and that 
neither the government of Cuba nor Mambisa controlled the Baconao. Transportes Del Mar 
SA further submitted that it was formed as joint venture between Mambisa and another 
                                                          
88The Guangzhou supra note 87 at C199 F-G. 
89The Guangzhou supra note 87 at  C200I-C201A. 
90 Transportes Del Mar SA v Jade Bay Shipping Co Ltd SCOSA C42. 
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company named Glyfada Marine Co Ltd where Mambisa contributed the Bacanao and 
Glyfada contributed capital. It was further contended that under the revised Cuban legislation, 
the Cuban government did not control such joint ventures. The court found that the submitted 
revised Cuban law was more aesthetic than a reality and that it merely showed that various 
one-ship companies had been established to own the various vessels which were previously 
owned by Mambisa. It did not however terminate the fact that the state had ultimate control 
over the vessels, nor did it prove that the ships in question were not associated ships. In this 
sense, the court noted that ‘there would accordingly be nothing inherently improbable in a 
state which was a large shipowner and was converting from strict socialism, where doctrine 
required all its assets to belong to the state, to a more open economy, taking advantage of the 
schemes evolved by business men, to hide the true ownership of its property whether for 
business or political reasons’. 91 The court therefore applied a common sense approach and 
focused on the actual identity of the controller of the companies concerned, rather than 
merely looking at the picture presented to the outside world. It can therefore be deduced that 
the court in this case favoured an approach which focused on with whom the ultimate control 
actually resided as opposed to with whom it merely appeared to reside with. 
The courts applied a similar approach in the case of Le Cong92  where it had to determine 
whether the respective companies in the case, Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Company and the 
Shantou Sez were controlled by the same person i.e. the state of China. The court looked at 
the relevant corporate law provisions, The Constitution of China as well expert witnesses on 
behalf of the parties, and concluded that Guangzhou was founded and financed by the central 
government of China as opposed to Shantou Sez which was established and funded at 
municipal level by the Shantou Municipal Government. The court found that according to the 
law in China, each level of government is elected by popularly elected bodies. In the case of 
the central government, it is the National People’s Congress whilst the low tiers of 
government are elected by the Local People’s Congress. In terms of the budget laws of 
China, each level of government has its own independent financial status and has exclusive 
rights in relation to capital funds. Therefore the power to control Shantou Sez vested with the 
Shantou City Municipal Government. The central government is thus legally precluded from 
exercising any form of control in respect of the assets of Shantou Sez.93 In this case once 
                                                          
91The Baconao supra note 90 at  C56. 
92International Marine Transport SA v The Le Cong SCOSA 107. 
93The Le Cong supra note 92 at C110-C111. 
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again, the court adopted an approach which aimed to locate the true source of control as 
opposed to merely focusing on the picture presented to the outside world. 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by noting that one of the main difficulties faced by potential arrestors is 
overcoming the evidentiary burden of on a balance of probabilities. This difficulty is further 
amplified when regard is given to the fact that ships call into ports for a relatively short 
period of time and as such, shipping practitioners have to, within such time constraints; 
provide facts which prove common control or ownership. This task becomes even more 
problematic as many of these shipping companies are one-ship owning companies which 
consist of complex corporate structures which shield the true source of control through 
avenues such as bearer or nominee shareholdings. However, although proving such an 
association may be a burdensome task, it aims to prevent the wrongful arrest of ships. 
The chapter also provided a comparison between the original provisions and its subsequent 
amendments. What can be clearly noted here, is that whereas the original associated ship 
provisions were difficult to interpret and overall restrictive in its nature, the amendments 
allowed for a broader interpretation to be associated with ‘control’ as it is the control of the 
company that is now the central enquiry and not control of all the shares. The effect of this 
amendment is that it facilitates the arresting party in locating the actual or ultimate source of 
control of a ship-owning company, irrespective of whether or not the company contains any 
shareholdings. Thus, factors such as bearer shares, nominee shareholdings and pyramid 
schemes no longer pose as factors which serve as a bar to establishing associated ship 
jurisdiction, as it did under the original provisions. To amplify on this discussion, the chapter 
also looked at the term ‘beneficial ownership’ and what meaning is attached to it when it is 
referred to in shipping cases. It is submitted that although the relevant English and South 
African law are distinguishable, they both provide the same understanding of ‘beneficial 
ownership’ in that it relates to the true holder of the benefits of the shares of a company and 
at whose directive the nominee holders act. This is important as it is with such a person that 
‘control’ can, for the purposes of associated ship arrests, be said to lie. 
Lastly this chapter looked at the various forms of ‘control’ which could be used to establish 
associated ship jurisdiction.  What could be concluded from this discussion, according to the 
case law, is that neither managerial control nor the strict formalistic control is sufficient to 
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satisfy section 3 (7). Instead, what is required from the Act is to look at the ultimate or actual 
control of the company concerned. It is this form of control which bests fulfils the purpose of 
the provision, which is to make loss fall where it belonged by virtue of common ownership or 
control.94 Now that it has been established that it is the ultimate or actual control with which 
the associated ship provisions is concerned, it is this benchmark which will be used when 
determining the correctness of the majority decision in the Heavy Metal case.
                                                          
94The Berg supra note 85 at 712A-B. 
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In chapter one of this dissertation, it was noted that the underlying purpose of associated ship 
arrests is to hold the true debtor in a maritime dispute liable for the debt in question. 
However, it is important to note that the associated ship arrests do not aim to provide an 
arrestor with free reign in obtaining such arrests and such a person will bear the onus of 
proving the association on a balance of probabilities. To achieve this end, chapter two 
submitted that the interpretation of ‘control’ which best supports and promotes this 
underlying purpose is the ‘ultimate or actual control’ of a company which in turn will refer to 
a single repository of control. The main reason for this submission as noted in chapter two is 
that, the other meanings of ‘control’ such as managerial control or strict legal control allows 
debtors to easily circumvent the provisions of the Act through the crafty and astute use of 
corporate structures.  
In light of this background, chapter three will aim to use the abovementioned findings as a 
yardstick with which the findings of the majority in the SCA decision of the Heavy Metal1 
case will be critically analysed. In doing so, this chapter will firstly discuss the facts of the 
case, after which it will look at the findings of the High Court. Subsequent to this, this 
chapter will look at the three judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal decision. Following 
this, the majority decision will be critically analysed by firstly looking at whether the 
interpretation afforded by the majority supports the underlying purpose of associated ship 
arrests. Secondly, this chapter will determine whether the majority was correct when it 
acquainted the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ to the Latin terms de jure and de facto. Lastly 
this chapter will briefly look at the Constitutionality of the decision and whether it has the 
effect of allowing a ship-owner to be arbitrarily deprived of their property. The latter enquiry 
will be discussed more fully in the postscript of this dissertation. The findings of this chapter 
will then be used in chapter four in terms of determining the legal impact of the Heavy Metal 
case in terms of providing insight as to the practical difficulties faced by courts when strictly 
applying the ratio of the majority. 
                                                          
1MV Heavy Metal: Belfry Marine v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA). 
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3.2. The Facts 
 
The dispute in this case arose as a result of a breach in the Memorandum of Agreement 
(MOA) in which Dahlia Maritime sold the m.v Sea Sonnet to Palm Base Maritime. In terms 
of the MOA, the seller was to deliver the vessel free of recommendations and shall notify the 
classification society of any matters coming to their knowledge prior to delivery which, upon 
being reported to the classification society would lead to the withdrawal of the vessels class 
or to the imposition of a recommendation relating to her class.2 According to a report 
furnished by a consultant marine engineer, numerous problems were uncovered after the 
delivery of the vessel and these were matters which warranted to be reported to the sellers 
classification society. Furthermore, the consultant also stated that the seller was in breach of 
the MOA and that if the matters in question were reported to the classification society, 
recommendations would have been imposed.3 
Palm Base Maritime accepted delivery of the m.v. Sea Sonnet and did not elect to cancel the 
agreement and intended to bring arbitration proceedings in London against Dahlia. In order 
obtain security for its claim; Palm Base Maritime sought the arrest of the m.v. Heavy Metal 
on the basis that it was an associated ship with the m.v. Sea Sonnet in terms of s 3(6) and s 3 
(7) of the Act and that it had a genuine and reasonable need for security in the arbitration.4 
The owners of the m.v. Heavy Metal (Belfry Marine) challenged the arrest and denied the 
association. 
To secure the arrest of the m.v. Heavy Metal,   Palm base Maritime had produced a body of 
evidence which portrayed the two vessels as having close ties.  In its founding affidavit, Palm 
Base had alleged that Mr Lemonaris, a Cypriot advocate, was the majority shareholder and 
sole director of Dahlia and Belfry Marine and also that a Mr Nikolaos Vafias exercised 
ultimate control over an entire group of vessel owning companies and a company called 
Brave Maritime Corporation Inc. (incorporated in Greece), which managed and operated a 
fleet of vessels which included the m.v. Heavy Metal and the m.v. Sea Sonnet when it 
belonged to Dahlia.5  The two companies also had the same registered address, the same 
secretary and the same company managed the vessels as part of a fleet of vessels regarded as 
                                                          
2 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1088J-1089B. 
3 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1089C. 
4 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1089E.  
5 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1089G-H. 
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a group, many of which had musical names. Furthermore in a previous incident where a ship 
in the fleet was arrested, security had been provided. 
In response to the aforementioned allegations, Mr Lemonaris, in an opposing affidavit, stated 
that he held both the shares in both Dahlia and Belfry as a nominee shareholder for non-
residents of Cyprus.6 He further admitted that the m.v Sea Sonnet was managed by Brave 
Maritime Corporation Inc. but denied that the vessel was operated by it.7 In a subsequent 
affidavit, Mr Lemonaris stated that during the period from 23 October 1996 ( the date of the 
MOA relating to the sale of the vessel) to 9 December 1996 ( the date on which the vessel 
was delivered to.) , the m.v. Sea Sonnet was owned by Dahlia, the shareholding in which 
during that period, 52% was held by himself as a  nominee holder on behalf of a Liberian 
corporation called Carnation Finance Inc. and the other 48 % by another Liberian company 
called Wichita Maritime and Trading Inc. He further stated that during the period in question, 
all the shares in Carnation Finance Inc. were owned by a Mr Nikolaos Tsavliris and that he 
had been specifically authorised to disclose the identity of Mr Tsavliris as the ultimate 
beneficial owner of the m.v. Sea Sonnet during the relevant time period in question. He 
further stated that he: 
‘acted as a nominee shareholder in respect of the controlling interest in the MV Heavy Metal. 
I am not authorised by the beneficial owner of the MV Heavy Metal to disclose to the above 
honourable Court the true identity of such owner. However, I can state that Mr Nikolaos 
Tsavliris had no interest, whether as owner or otherwise, in the MV Heavy Metal on 1 April 
1988 or at any time to date hereof’.8  
It is important to state that in this case, Mr Lemonaris had no beneficial interest in the shares 
of the companies concerned and could not make any decision without the instructions from 
                                                          
6 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1090A-E where Mr Lemonaris stated: 
‘It is normal practice in Cyprus for advocates to be appointed as nominee shareholders and directors. 
We act on the instructions of beneficial owners, which instructions are often given through 
intermediaries. We are required by the laws of Cyprus to abide strictly by, and carry out, these 
instructions and we are more often than not, as in the case of my relationship with [Dahlia] and [the 
appellant], simply ‘postboxes’ .I am therefore merely a nominee director and shareholder of [Dahlia] 
and [the appellant] in which I have no interest or ownership. I exercise no control over these companies 
and, indeed, I have no discretion to represent these companies without having received instructions as I 
have, for example, for the purpose of dealing with this application.Cypriot advocates are not, in terms 
of the ethical rules applicable, permitted to disclose information given to them in confidence by their 
clients. The information contained in the instructions given to me when I attended to the registration of 
[Dahlia] and [the appellant] was given to me in confidence and I am accordingly not at large to disclose 
this information.I am, however, able to disclose that Mr Nikolaos Vafias did not own or control 
[Dahlia] at the time of the delivery and sale of the MV Sea Sonnet or at any other material time.’ 
7 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1  at 1090F. 
8 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1091C-D. 
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his principal. Furthermore, although he disclosed the identity of the beneficial owner of the 
m.v. Sea Sonnet, he did not provide reasons for his non-disclosure in respect of the identity of 
the beneficial owner of the m.v.Heavy Metal. He merely stated that they were owned by 
different persons. 
3.3. The High Court Decision 9 
 
Thring J found that in this case, the respondents had the following in common: a registered 
office address, a majority shareholder (Mr Lemonaris), a sole director (Mr Lemonaris) and a 
secretary (Mrs Theocharidou). The respective judge further submitted that a prima facie 
strong case ‘is made out on these facts that both companies are controlled or were, at the 
relevant times, controlled by the same person, Lemonaris.  Alternatively, if they are or were 
not in fact controlled by him, he has or had power to control them at the relevant times and is 
accordingly deemed to have controlled them.’10 In this sense it is difficult to fathom the 
situation where a person does not factually control the said shares but may nevertheless have 
control over the company concerned. 
With regard to the purpose of the respective provisions, Thring J held that the purpose of the 
Act is to make the loss fall where it belongs by reason of ownership and in the case of 
companies this will refer to the ownership or the control of the said shares.11  Thring J 
thereafter goes on to state the following: 
‘It is against this background, it seems to me, that the deeming provision of s 3(7) (b) (ii) of 
the Act must be construed. In my view it was intended to assist a claimant who seeks to rely 
on the 'associated ships' provisions of the Act in order to recover money due to him from the 
owner of an associated ship. It is frequently difficult for a claimant in this position to establish 
and prove who the beneficial owners of the shares in a particular ship-owning company are, 
because they are concealed from him. Indeed, this is amply demonstrated in this very case. 
Accordingly, it seems to me, the Legislature came to the aid of such claimants by providing, 
in effect, in s 3(7)(b)(ii) that the claimant need establish no more than that the person 
concerned has the power to control the company concerned, directly or indirectly. Whether or 
not he in fact exercises that power himself or whether it is exercised through him by others is 
immaterial. He is deemed to control the company, that is to say he is regarded as controlling 
the company, whether he does so in fact or not. In other words, this is a situation in which the 
                                                          
9 MV Heavy Metal :Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD v Dahlia Maritime Limited and Others 1998 (4) SA 479 
(C). 
10 The Heavy Metal High Court supra note 9 at 489 F-G. 
11The Heavy Metal High Court supra note 9 at 490 I-J. 
44 
 
Legislature sought to achieve finality as regards the identity of the person or persons who 
control such companies, even at the expense perhaps of artificiality. Had it not sought this 
result, it seems to me that the Legislature would not have used the very strong word 'deemed' 
in the subsection (Afrikaans text: 'geag'): it would have used some less far-reaching 
expression such as 'presumed until the contrary is proved'.’ 12 
Thring J thereafter held that the only question which therefore needs to be considered is 
whether Mr Lemonaris had during the relevant time period, the power to control the 
companies.13 Thring J then held that there is nothing in Mr Lemonaris’s affidavit which 
stated that the laws in respect of the control of companies were different in Cyprus as in 
South Africa and thereafter notes that in the absence of evidence to the contrary it is 
presumed that foreign law is the same as the law applied in South Africa.14 Thring J then 
looks at section 404 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which defined ‘control’ in the 
following terms: 
‘. . . a holding or aggregate holdings of shares or other securities in a company entitling the 
holder thereof to exercise, or cause to be exercised, the specified percentage or more of the 
voting rights at meetings of that company, irrespective of whether such holding or holdings 
confer de facto control’.15 
Following this, Thring J then held that in terms of South African company law, the ultimate 
control of a company is exercised by the members of such a company in a general meeting of 
who may determine who the directors are of the company and that for those purposes, it is the 
registered shareholders which are referred to.16 Thring J in conclusion, held that even if Mr. 
Lemonaris is a nominee shareholder, he remains the registered shareholder and as such has 
the power directly to control these companies by voting the majority of the shares in a 
shareholder meeting. Thus he exercises overall control of the company and can control the 
destiny and assets of the respective company.17 Furthermore, Thring J emphasised that Mr 
Lemonaris is the sole director of the respective companies and, as such, is probably the only 
person who exercises managerial powers over such companies. The respective Judge also 
held that it is irrelevant that other persons may be entitled to direct Mr Lemonaris as to the 
manner in which he exercises his powers, the companies are  nevertheless obliged to give 
                                                          
12 The Heavy Metal High Court supra note 9 at 491A-F. 
13 The Heavy Metal High Court supra note 9 at 491J. 
14 The Heavy Metal High Court supra note 9 at 492B-C. 
15 The Heavy Metal High Court supra note 9 at 492C. 
16 The Heavy Metal High Court supra note 9 at 492D-F . 
17 The Heavy Metal High Court supra note 9 at 492F-G . 
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effect to his legitimate wishes as he is the majority shareholder of the company and directly 
controls it.18 
Following the above reasoning, Thring J therefore concluded that Mr Lemonaris has or had at 
the relevant time period in question, the power to control both companies and that in terms of 
section 3 (7) (b) (ii) of the Act, Mr Lemonaris is deemed to control both the companies at the 
relevant time period. The m.v Heavy Metal and the m.v. Sea Sonnet were therefore held to be 
associated ships for the purposes of section 3(6) and 3 (7) of AJRA.19 
In this sense it is submitted that Thring J adopted a rather technical and formalistic approach 
in respect of interpreting the concept of ‘control’ and failed to look at the substance of the 
matter. Wallis notes that it is difficult to draw any real inference of common control from the 
fact that companies may have a common nominee shareholder between them.20 He further 
notes that in many Mediterranean states, there is an abundance of specialist legal firms which 
focus on registering ship companies and acting as nominee shareholders for the respective 
companies so as to mask the identity of the beneficial owner.21Such evidence may only be 
probative in light of other factors which point toward common control.  Evidence which may 
prove to be probative may include inter alia; that the vessels in questioned are entered as part 
of a fleet entry with the respective P & I club, that they are managed by the same personnel 
and that a common manager has put up guarantees in respect of the debts of both vessels.22 It 
is however submitted that proving an association or ‘control’ is a question of fact and that 
there is no single defining characteristic which points toward common control. The facts of 
each case will have to be viewed holistically in light of all evidence put forth. 
Wallis has also criticized, and rightly so, of the manner in which the court dealt with the 
evidence presented and notes:  
‘The court took certain pieces of evidence and concluded that they pointed towards a 
particular conclusion. Only then did it consider the evidence on behalf of Belfry Marine, 
which was directed at establishing the opposite proposition. It is with respect unhelpful to 
                                                          
18 The Heavy Metal High Court supra note 9 at 492G-H . 
19 The Heavy Metal High Court supra note 9 at 492I. 
20 M Wallis The Associated Ship & South African Admiralty Jurisdiction 1 ed (2010) 198. 
21 Wallis (note 20 above;198). 
22 Wallis (note 20 above ; 198-199). 
46 
 
weigh evidence in this piecemeal fashion. It also creates the risk of fragmenting the onus of 
proof.’23 
Put simply, the court in this case failed to consider the evidence as a whole and opted to form 
conclusions based on a certain aspects of the judgment as opposed to considering the 
evidence in its entirety. Ultimately it can be stated for all purposes that Thring J adopted a 
rather narrow approach in interpreting the relevant provisions relating to control. The 
respected judge opted to rather interpret the provision in a technical manner by focusing 
primarily on who held the shares in terms of law i.e. the registered shareholder rather than 
with who had actual control. The difficulty here is that Thring J acknowledged the fact that 
Mr Lemonaris may have received instructions from two different persons but nevertheless 
chose to overlook this factor. 
3.4. The Supreme Court of Appeal Decision 
3.4.1. Smalberger JA for the Majority: 
 
Smalberger JA begins by stating that in order to properly interpret a statutory provision and 
to give effect to the enactment ‘regard must be had to the language used, the apparent 
purpose of the provision, its contextual setting and the object of the Act as a whole’.24 He 
notes that the object of the provision was to benefit a party applying for an arrest by affording 
the claimant with a means of recovery against an alternate defendant. The effect of which 
results in the respective claimant being afforded relief to which he would not previously been 
entitled to. Smalberger JA then goes on to state the following: 
‘[8] The subsection elaborates upon and refines the concept of control by that person. Control 
is expressed in terms of power. If the person concerned has power, directly or indirectly, to 
control the company he/she shall be deemed ('geag . . . word') to control the company. 'Power' 
is not circumscribed in the Act. It can be the power to manage the operations of the company 
or it can be the power to determine its direction and fate. Where these two functions happen 
to vest in different hands, it is the latter which, in my view, the Legislature had in mind when 
referring to 'power' and hence to 'control'. In South African legal terminology that means 
(essentially for the reasons given by the Court a quo at 1998 (4) SA 479 (C) at 492C-F ('the 
reported judgment'); see also s 195(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973) the person who 
controls the shareholding in the company. Foreign law is a question of fact. If the appellant 
                                                          
23 Wallis (note 20 above; 199-200). 
24 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1105F. 
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wished to make out a case that the law of the Republic of Cyprus differed significantly from 
the law of South Africa, it should have adduced evidence to that effect. It did not do so. 
Consequently there is no reason to surmise that the applicable law in Cyprus differs 
materially from that of South Africa (cf Caterham Car Sales & Coachworks Ltd v Birkin Cars 
(Pty) Ltd and Another1998 (3) SA 938 (A) at 954B-E)’.25 
Within the aforementioned paragraph, Smalberger JA notes that control may refer to the 
power to manage the operations of a company or the power to determine its direction and 
fate. In this sense, the decision does not depart in any material aspect from what was said in 
earlier judgments26 as in the EE sharp case27, the court held that control refers to ‘overall 
control’ of the assets and destiny of the company which may be exercised by a majority 
shareholder but it does not refer to mere ‘day to day management administration’. Smalberger 
JA then held: 
‘[9] The subsection clearly distinguishes between 'direct' and 'indirect' power. That distinction 
must be given a meaning. Indirect power can only refer to the person who de facto wields 
power through, and hence over, someone else. The latter can only be someone who wields 
direct power vis-à-vis the company and the outside world and who therefore, in the eyes of 
the law (ie de jure), controls the shareholding and thus determines the direction and the fate of 
the company. On the facts of the present case Lemonaris is the person in that situation. Of 
course, the same person may in given circumstances exercise both de facto and de jure 
control.  
[10] In my view, therefore, direct power refers to de jure authority over the company by the 
person who, according to the register of the company is entitled to control its destiny; and 
indirect power to the de facto position of the person who commands or exerts authority over 
the person who is recognised to possess de jure power (ie the beneficial 'owner' as opposed to 
the legal 'owner'). This extension of de jure power to de facto power is in line with the 
objective of the section: to prevent the true 'owner', by presenting a false picture to the outside 
world, from concealing his assets from attachment and execution by his creditors. 
[11] From the above analysis it follows, in my view, that, if the person who has de jure power 
happens to control, at the relevant times for such control, both companies concerned (ie the 
company which owns the guilty ship and the company which owns the targeted ship), the 
                                                          
25 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at [8]. 
26 Wallis (note 22 above; 203). 
27E E Sharp & Sons Ltd v MV Nefeli 1984 (3) SA 325 (C). at 326H and 327A. 
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statutory requirement of a nexus between the two companies will have been satisfied. This is 
the position in which Lemonaris found himself. 
[12] On the other hand, if de jure control of the respective companies vests in different hands 
it would still be open to the applicant for arrest to establish that the same person was in de 
facto (ie indirectly) in control of both, thereby also supplying the required statutory nexus to 
satisfy the provisions of s 3(7) (a) of the Act. 
[13] The principal purpose of the Act is to assist the party applying for arrest rather than the 
party opposing it. While the section is designed, in the interests of an applicant, to cater for 
the situations referred to in paras [11] and [12] above, it is not, in my view, designed to cater 
for the converse situation where de jure control over both vessels (companies) vests in one 
person but the owner of the targeted ship is able to show that such person is a mere puppet 
dancing at the string of two different masters. If the latter approach were to be the correct one, 
the distinction drawn by the Legislature between 'direct and indirect control' would fulfil no 
purpose. The only issue, on that approach would be de facto control. If that had been the 
Legislature's intention, it need only to have spoken of the 'power to control' in the section. 
Any approach which effectively negates a clear provision in an Act cannot be sound unless 
there are compelling reasons to the contrary. No such compelling reasons have been advanced 
in the judgment of my Colleague 
[14] It needs to be emphasised that the subsection does not speak merely of the 'power to 
control'. If it did, the decision in Barclays Bank Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1961] 
AC 509 (HL) referred to by my Colleague may have been of greater relevance to its 
interpretation. There is much to be said for the view that where one speaks simply of a 'power 
to control' one is concerned with a single repository of power - the person who is in actual, 
overall control. But the power to control directly or indirectly envisages two possible 
repositories of power, one de jure and one de facto. Either form of control can be satisfied to 
bring the subsection into operation. If there can only be one repository of power in terms of 
the subsection it would follow that the person who has de jure control could be ignored once 
it has been established that someone else has de facto power. This would appear to be 
contrary to the clear wording of the subsection. By using the words 'directly or indirectly' the 
Legislature clearly intended to extend and not restrict the expression 'power to control' (cf 
Olley v Maasdorp and Another1948 (4) SA 657 (A) at 665 ff and Lipschitz NO v UDC Bank 
Ltd1979 (1) SA 789 (A) at 797D-E). 
[15] In my view, and on the undisputed facts, the respondent therefore succeeded in 
establishing the requisite nexus for the conclusion that the Heavy Metal was an associated 
ship of the Sea Sonnet. If that conclusion results in the bizarre position referred to in para [57] 
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of my Colleague's judgment that is the direct and foreseeable consequence of a shipowner 
choosing to operate behind a cloak of secrecy. It is precisely for that reason, because the 
creditor is at such a disadvantage in tracing the assets of his debtor, of which this case is a 
prime example, that the subsection was worded as it is. The result is not as unfair as it may at 
first blush seem, for it lies within the power of the shipowner to arrange his affairs and his 
relationship with the company in question so as to avoid any prejudicial consequences to 
himself (cf National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 (1) SA 475 (A) at 485C).’ 28 
Smalberger JA thereafter held that according to him, the appellant (Belfry Marine Ltd) in the 
case failed to rebut the inference which had been created on the papers i.e. the two vessels 
were associated. The majority held that the reasoning behind this harsh judgement can be 
attributed to the silence on behalf of the appellant who Smalberger JA found had no difficulty 
in revealing the identity of the beneficial owner of the m.v. Sea Sonnet but had refused to 
identify the beneficial owner of the m.v. Heavy Metal.29 Smalberger JA further held that as a 
result of the appellants presenting a distorted picture as to Mr Lemonaris being majority 
shareholder, and having refused to identify the beneficial owner of the m.v. Heavy Metal, the 
respondent could not therefore be criticized for leading contradictory evidence.30 
3.4.2. Marais JA concurring: 
 
Marais JA firstly notes that he agrees with the conclusion reached by Smalberger JA but on 
entirely different grounds. Furthermore he agrees with the judgment of Farlam AJA except 
with the respected judge’s assessment of the facts. He then states that what the legislature is 
concerned with in terms of the concept of ‘control’ is where the power to control a company 
actually resides rather than where it appears to reside.31 Marais JA held further: 
‘In my opinion, the manifest purpose of the provision is to enable claimants to penetrate 
protective facades such as nominee shareholdings and demonstrate that real power to control 
the company lies in other hands where such is in fact the case. And, if the real situs of power 
to control is the criterion, as I consider it to be, I see no justification for saying that it is only 
open to a claimant to demonstrate where it lies and that it is not open to the targeted ship's 
owner to do so.’ 32 
                                                          
28 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at [9]-[15]. 
29 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1107J. 
30 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1109B-C. 
31 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1110I-J. 
32 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1110I-J. 
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In respect of section 3 (7) (b) (ii) having two repositories of control, Marais JA held that the 
provisions do not give a claimant a choice between two different repositories of control and 
thereby allowing a claimant to choose that which suits them the most.33 The respected judge 
further held that the provision does not create a fiction which would place innocent third 
parties at risk of having ‘their ships arrested to secure payment of claims brought against 
persons or ships of whose existence they were quite oblivious’.34 Marais JA held further that 
such a purpose would amount to confiscation without compensation and is a purpose which 
one avoids ascribing to the legislature unless it is what the legislature specifically and 
unequivocally intended.35 The purpose of the provision, according to Marais JA is to allow 
the ‘clamant to piece the veil of the apparent or ostensible power to control a company and so 
reveal the identity of the real holder of power to control the company’. 36 Marais JA then 
found that the words ‘directly or indirectly’ was intended by the legislature to emphasise that 
the true seat of power, whether it be direct or indirect power, is what is material for the 
purposes of the provision and further notes that it is not the power to manage the operations 
of the company but rather the power to determine the fate and direction of it.37 
With regard to proving the association, Marais JA notes that it is not necessary to name the 
actual person who has control but that it would be sufficient to prove that whoever that 
person may be, it is the same person who exercises control over the respective companies.38 
Marais  JA then looks at the material facts in the current case : both companies have the same 
nominee and sole director, the addresses of the respective companies are the same, both 
vessels were managed (if not operated ) by Brave Maritime Corporation Inc., the Greek 
Shipping Directory portrays both vessels as having the same operating addresses, the 
managing director of Brave Maritime was noted in a published list of Piraeus Shipping 
Offices to be Mr Nikolaos Vafias, that he is the registered shareholder of 10% of the shares in 
Belfry Marine and that there exists a fleet of vessels managed by Brave Maritime many of 
which have names relating to music.39 Furthermore, when a vessel in that fleet was arrested 
in another jurisdiction in respect of a claim against another ship in the fleet, security was put 
forth by Brave Maritime. 40 Marais JA then looks at the aforementioned facts in light of the 
                                                          
33 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1111-A-B. 
34 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1111C-G. 
35 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1111C-G. 
36 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1111C-G. 
37 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1112E-G. 
38 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1113G-I. 
39The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1113J-1114D. 
40The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1114E-H. 
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responses put forth by the applicants and held that ‘the pattern consists of some specific and, 
to my mind, selective and limited denials in instances where the facts enabled denials to be 
made but, for the rest, of either diversionary strategies or argumentation as to what the value 
was of evidential material placed before the Court by the respondent’.41 In this case the 
allegation of providing security when a previous vessel was arrested on the basis of being an 
associated ship was met with the argument that it was inadmissible evidence of similar facts.  
The accusations of common control as contained in reliable publications published within the 
shipping industry were dismissed as hearsay. In essence no attempt was made to counter the 
allegations put forth by producing a full set of facts disassociating the m.v. Heavy Metal from 
the m.v. Sea Sonnet. Marias JA further notes that in the first answering affidavit, Mr 
Lemonaris failed to identify the beneficial owner of both Dahlia and Belfry without any 
explanation as to why such persons would object to such identification. He subsequently filed 
another affidavit in which he stated that he had been authorised to disclose the beneficial 
owner of Dahlia (Mr Tsavliris) but was not authorised to disclose the identity of the 
beneficial owner of Beflry Marine except that he asserted that the two vessels were not in any 
way associated.  In essence, the appellants adopted a rather a coy approach as Marais JA held 
that no affidavit was provided by Mr Tsavliris and furthermore no explanation was given as 
to who holds the share in Whichita Maritime and Trading Inc. which was said to own a 48 % 
share in Dahlia. Furthermore, as to the remaining 52% of the shares (which were held by Mr 
Lemonaris as a nominee shareholder for Carnation Finance Inc, which in turn was owned by 
Mr Tsavliris and thereafter sold by him) 42, nothing was said as to who the purchaser of the 
shares was, except that Mr Tsavliris had no interest in the m.v. Heavy Metal. Marais JA 
therefore concluded by stating that: 
‘I do not think that a litigant in motion proceedings who resorts to this kind of response in the 
face of a powerful circumstantial showing that, on the probabilities, whoever ultimately had 
the power to control the company which owned the guilty ship also has the power to control 
the company which owns the ship sought to be arrested as an associated ship can shelter 
behind the principles laid down in the case of Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd. In a few words, such 
an approach should not be regarded as giving rise to a genuine dispute of fact’.43 
 
                                                          
41The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1114E-H. 
42 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1114E-1115B. 
43 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1108H-I. 
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3.4.3. Farlam AJA dissenting: 
 
In interpreting the term ‘control of a company’, Farlam AJA looked at the House of Lords 
decision in Barclays Bank Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1961] AC 509 (HL). All the 
lords in this case agreed that a person could be said to control a company if they could, by 
their votes, control the company in a general meeting. However there was a difference of 
opinion in answering the question of whether it made a difference if the shareholder in 
question might be subject to external control. Viscount Simonds, Lord Cohen and Lord Keith 
of Avonholm concluded that it was irrelevant. Lord Reid and Lord Denning on the other hand 
disagreed and held that control means real control and that the shareholder in question did not 
have control of the company as concluded by the majority on the basis that the shareholder 
could not exercise his majority vote without consent of his co-trustees.44 Farlam AJA then 
emphasised that Lord Reid was of the view that what was required was ‘real control’ and not 
‘apparent control’. Following this, the respected judge held that by using the phrase ‘power, 
directly or indirectly, to control a company’, parliament did not intend to restrict the enquiry 
to the company register.45 Farlam AJA then stated that what is required for the purposes of 
section 3 (7) (b) (ii) is ‘real’ control and not  ‘apparent’ control as a nominee shareholder who 
can be directed by an order from a court as to how he must vote at a general shareholders 
meeting cannot be said to control a company.46  He then states the following: 
‘The reference to 'power directly . . . to control', in my view, is to real control exercised by the 
person in whose name the relevant shares are registered and who is not subject to external 
control, while the reference to 'power . . . indirectly to control' is once again to real control 
this time exercised indirectly through the registered shareholder who is entitled to exercise the 
majority of votes at the general meeting. There is nothing in the section which indicates that 
apparent as opposed to real, control is sufficient. When one has regard to the mischief at 
which the section is directed, viz the device of hiding the fact that two vessels are associated 
in that a single person 'owned' them at the relevant times, it becomes obvious that an 
association based on apparent but not real control was not what Parliament had in mind when 
it enacted the section. Furthermore if apparent controls were to be held to be sufficient this 
would lead to the bizarre result to which Mr Gauntlett referred.’47 
                                                          
44 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1102C-E. 
45 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1103I. 
46 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1104B-D. 
47 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1104B-D. 
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Farlam AJA then concluded that in the present case, the respondents had argued that Mr 
Lemonaris had direct control. However they later contradicted themselves by stating that he 
was a ‘post-box’ who was controlled by another person who had indirect control over the 
companies. The learned judge then stated that in this case, control over the companies may 
not be in the hands of one person but in the hands two different persons. He therefore held 
that the respondent had failed to establish that the vessels were controlled by the same person 
at the relevant times.48 
 
3.5. The Critique of the Majority Decision In The Heavy Metal Case 
 
The previous chapter aimed at providing an understanding as to what is meant by the term 
‘control’. This chapter will now provide a critical analysis of the manner in which the Heavy 
Metal case has interpreted the term. In doing so, the following segment will look at: 
3.5.1. Whether the reasoning and interpretation provided by the majority in the Heavy Metal 
case in relation to the term ‘control’ accords to the underlying purpose of the 
provision; 
3.5.2. Whether the majority had correctly interpreted the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ ; and  
3.5.3. Whether the decision of the majority has the effect of infringing section 25 (1) of the 
Constitution i.e. whether it allows for an innocent party to be arbitrarily deprived of 
property. 
3.5.1. Does the interpretation of the majority adhere to the underlying purpose of the 
associated ship provisions?: 
 
In answering this question, it becomes clear that this task inevitably involves an interpretation 
of a statutory provision. In this respect, it is therefore useful to note some general principles 
in relation to the interpretation of statutes. In the case of Natal Joint Municipal Pension 
Fund49 , Wallis JA states the following: 
‘Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it 
legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided 
by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and 
the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the 
                                                          
48 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at [78]. 
49Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA). 
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document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of the ordinary rules 
of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the apparent purpose to 
which it is directed and the material known to those responsible for its production. Where 
more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these 
factors. The process is objective, not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one 
that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the 
document. Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute what they 
regard as reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words actually used. To do so in regard 
to a statute or statutory instrument is to cross the divide between interpretation and 
legislation; in a contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties other than the one 
they in fact made’.50 
In this sense, the correct point of departure is the language of the provision itself read in light 
of the context of the statutory provision, the apparent purpose of the provision and the 






                                                          
50Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra note 49 at  603F-604C. 
51Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra note 49 at 604D. In Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General 
Hendrick Schoeman Primary school 2008 (5) SA (1) (SCA) Van Heerden JA stated  
‘It has also long been recognised in our case law that the aim of statutory interpretation is to give effect 
to the object or purpose of the legislation in question’.at [19]. The court further noted that the 
construction of words in a statutory provision must be interpreted in light of their contextual setting at 
[17].  See also Jaga v Dönges, NO and Another; Bhana v Dönges, NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 
(A)  where Schreiner JA stated: 
‘Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statement that the words and expressions used in a 
statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning is the statement that they must be 
interpreted in the light of their context. But it may be useful to stress two points in relation to the 
application of this principle. The first is that 'the context', as here used, is not limited to the language of 
the rest of the statute regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted. Often 
of more importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, its 
background. The second point is that the approach to the work of interpreting may be along either of 
two lines. Either one may split the inquiry into two parts and concentrate, in the first instance, on 
finding out whether the language to be interpreted has or appears to have one clear ordinary meaning, 
confining a consideration of the context only to cases where the language appears to admit of more 
than one meaning; or one may from the beginning consider the context and the language to be 
interpreted together’.at 662G- 663A. 
the above quote from the judgment of Schreiner JA in the Jaga v Dönges has been quoted with approval in the 
constitutional court case of Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) 
SA 490 (CC) by Ngcobo J at [89]. See also; Thoroughbred  Breeders' Association v Price Waterhouse, 2001 (4) 
SA 551 (SCA) at para 12,  Lauritzen Bulkers A/S v The Chenebourg, The Cape Gulf Maple Maritime Inc v 
E.A.S.T. International Ltd SCOSA C 183 at C185-C186 and Pancoast Trading SA v Orient Shipping Rotterdam 
BV SCOSA C188 C 191-C192. Also C Botha Statutory Interpretation 5 ed (2012) 112-155 and G Devenish 
Interpretation of Statutes 1 ed (1992) 32-53. 
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In the case of Jaga v Dönges52 Schreiner JA held: 
 
‘Seldom indeed is language so clear that the possibility of differences of meaning is wholly 
excluded, but some language is much clearer than other language; the clearer the language the 
more it dominates over the context, and vice versa, the less clear it is the greater the part that 
is likely to be played by the context’.53 
It is therefore submitted that although the starting point of interpretation is with the ordinary 
text, reference must be made to the context of the provision especially in cases where the 
ordinary words are not clear.54  
With regard to the phrase ‘intention of the legislature’, it is submitted that this may be 
something of a ‘loose term’ on the basis that the primary object of statutory interpretation is 
determining the meaning of the language of the provision itself.55In this sense, courts do not 
aim to emasculate the legislative purpose, but rather to give effect to the provision within the 
confines of the language adopted by the legislature. 56In essence the correct approach is to 
therefore take a holistic approach in interpreting a statute i.e. from the outset, to read the 
words in their contextual setting and in light of the relevant circumstances. Hence, when the 
provision is read within its contextual setting that is the appropriate meaning to be given to 
the language used.57 However, where the context makes it clear that following the meaning 
suggested by the plain language of the text will lead to absurdity, irrationality or illogicality, 
the courts will afford an interpretation which avoids such absurdity.58 On the other end, 
where the language of the provision is ambiguous, the apparent purpose of the provision and 
the context in which it occurs will serve as guidelines as to the correct interpretation.59 In this 
sense, an interpretation will not be acquainted to a provision whereby it leads to ‘impractical, 
unbusinesslike or oppressive consequences or that will stultify the broader operation of the 
legislation or contract under consideration’.60 
The main controversy with regard to the Heavy Metal case is that it fails to deal with the 
underlying purpose of the associated ship provisions. In the majority judgment, Smalberger 
                                                          
52 Jaga v Dönges supra note 51. 
53 Jaga v Dönges supra note 51 at 664 E-F. 
54 Department of Land Affairs and Others v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC) at 
219A. 
55 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra note 49 at 605 C-D.  
56 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund  supra note 49 at 608 F-G. 
57 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra note 49 at 609D-F and 610A. 
58 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra note 49 at 609D-F and 610A. 
59 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra note 49 at 609D-F and 610A 
60 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra note 49 at 610A-C. 
56 
 
JA makes reference to the purpose of associated ship provisions as he held that the objective 
of the section is to prevent the ‘true’ owner from concealing their assets from the claimant 
and thereby presenting a false picture to the outside world.61 Smalberger JA makes reference 
to a ‘true’ owner, however the legal effect of the majority judgement is that it allows for the 
situation in which a ship may be regarded as being associated with another ship on the sole 
basis that the respective ship owning companies share a common nominee shareholder even 
though the companies may not be connected in any other way. It is therefore submitted that 
the purpose of the provision is not to permit a situation in which an innocent third party will 
be put in jeopardy by having their ships arrested to secure payment of a claim of which they 
are oblivious of.62  Furthermore, the legal effect of such an interpretation allow for 
‘impractical,unbusinesslike or oppressive consequences’ which should be avoided.63 In 
essence the judgment by Smalberger JA fails to take into consideration the serious 
repercussions of arresting a ship as stated by Didcott J in the Paz: 
‘It is a serious business to attach a ship. To stop or delay its departure from one of our ports, 
to interrupt its voyage for longer than the period it was due to remain, can have and usually 
has consequences which are commercially damaging to its owner or charterer, not to mention 
those who are relying upon its arrival at other ports to load or discharge cargo’.64 
It is submitted that such concerns raised by Didcott J are factors which should have been 
considered by the majority interpreting the provision in the manner in which they did. Such 
factors although being commercial concerns, are still part of the policy considerations which 
need to be deliberated when determining the underlying purpose and contextual setting or a 
provision. 
Hare submits that the purpose of the associated ship provision was to lift the corporate veil 
where there exists the same principal debtor in respect of the debt.65 Such a purpose bears 
resemblance to what was stated by the judgment of Marais JA wherein it was held that the 
purpose of the associated ship provisions is to allow claimants to penetrate the protective 
facades such as nominee shareholdings and demonstrate where the real seat of control lies.66 
Hence, it is submitted that although the provisions assist a claimant in obtaining security for a 
                                                          
61 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1108H-I. 
62 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 1 at 1111F-G. 
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65 J Hare Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) 113. 
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maritime claim, it cannot grant such a claimant carte blanche in obtaining an arrest to the 
extent that the vessel of an innocent party may be arrested.  
In justifying the decision, Smalberger JA held that the decision is not as harsh as it initially 
seems but is rather the result of the ship-owner opting to operate behind a cloak of secrecy 
and that furthermore, the appellant deliberately concealed the identity of the true beneficial 
owner in circumstances where it was the central issue in dispute.67 Wallis submits, and rightly 
so, that such a premise is entirely misconceived and unjustifiable.68 In essence, such 
reasoning does not correlate to the underlying requirement of establishing an association 
which is ‘control’.69 It is therefore submitted that such reasoning further fails to take into 
consideration the objectives of the provisions which as Staniland submits aims to address the 
mischief of ‘one ship’ companies and prevent them from avoiding their debts.70 
3.5.2. The correctness of the interpretation afforded by the majority to the term ‘directly or 
indirectly’: 
 
The majority in the Heavy Metal held that the power to control directly or indirectly, 
sanctions two possible repositories of power namely; one de jure and one de facto of which 
either form of control can be satisfied to bring the subsection into operation.71 In the previous 
chapter it was submitted that when the word ‘control’ was used in the associated ship 
provisions, what it referred to was the ultimate or actual control over the fate and destiny of a 
company. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the legislature had erred in holding that 
there may be two repositories of control. To add substance to this submission, this segment 
will look at the problems associated with the interpretation provided by the majority in the 
SCA judgment and discuss the usual meaning attached to the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’. 
This segment will further look at the term de jure and de facto to determine whether it has 
correctly been compared to ‘directly or indirectly’. 
The main difficulty with the interpretation provided by the majority is that it allows for 
situation in which there exist two repositories of control. This would inevitably result in what 
Wallis describes as a ‘tug of war’ between two persons which in turn will result in one person 
being the principal and the other would be a mere subsidiary.72 In other words, the principal 
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will have final say as to the fate of the company whilst the subsidiary will be subject to the 
will of the former and thus cannot be said to be the person in actual control of the company.73 
The Majority in the Heavy Metal opted for an approach which differentiated between direct 
and indirect control and equated direct control to de jure power and indirect control to de 
facto power to control a company. The problem presented within such an approach is that it 
not only allows control to be placed in more than one person but also results in different 
forms of control.74 Bradfield notes that the error of the majority judgment results in the 
formation of two different sources of power/control as opposed to one source of 
power/control that may be exercised in two possible ways.75 
The approach adopted by the majority in the SCA decision aimed to separate direct and 
indirect control on the basis that such an interpretation is what the legislature intended. 
Essentially the usual interpretation given to the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ when it is used 
is as Wallis suggests, a ‘composite adverbial phrase to indicate that the statutory or 
contractual provision will apply irrespective of the means by which the particular result that 
is its subject is achieved’.76 Put differently, such a phrase is used to ensure that all possible 
situations are accommodated for, irrespective of the manner in which they occur. It is further 
submitted that if it was the intention of the legislature to differentiate between these two 
terms then it would have most likely included a precise definition in respect of each term.  
However, there exists no such definition within the Act. To substantiate further, it will be 
useful to discuss the manner in which the term ‘directly or indirectly’ has been used in other 
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statutes. For this purpose, this dissertation will look at sub-section 9 (3) and (4) of The 
Constitution,77 The Employment Equity Act78 and the Currency and Exchanges Act.79 
Sub-section 9 (3) and (4) of The Constitution state: 
‘9 (3)The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation , age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth. 
9 (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or 
prohibit unfair discrimination’. 
The provisions mentioned above must be read in light of the apartheid regime which existed 
in South Africa until the latter part of the 20th century during which non-whites, more 
specifically black people, were excluded from most aspects of social life.80  It is such 
discrimination which the provisions seek to remedy through ‘remedial or restitutory 
equality’.81  In this respect Woolman notes that direct discrimination refers to where a 
provision explicitly differentiates on the basis of a listed or unlisted ground and provides the 
example where the common law definition of marriage only referred to the relationship of a 
male and female thus explicitly discriminating against same-sex couples on the basis of their 
sexual orientation.82 Indirect discrimination refers to the situation where a provision appears 
to be neutral but nevertheless has the effect of discriminating on a listed or unlisted ground 
e.g. where a legal provision treats people who reside in one area differently from those who 
reside in another is actually based on the fact that black people predominantly stay in the 
former area whilst non-blacks stay in the latter area.83 Although direct and indirect 
discrimination may be distinguished, Woolman submits that the distinction is not relevant 
‘since our jurisprudence focuses on the impact of the impugned law on the complainant and 
enables courts to look beneath any masked prejudice to discover the true face of 
discrimination’.84 It is therefore submitted that the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ applies in 
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the constitution so as to cater for all types of discrimination irrespective of its appearance. In 
other words, courts in such cases will look beyond the out-ward appearance of the act and 
determine whether or not the effect of the relevant provision does in fact unfairly 
discriminate. The advantage of such wording is that it allows for a broad interpretation which 
caters for all types of discrimination regardless of its form.85 
The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 also contains a similar provision which aims at 
equality in the workplace. In this respect, section 6 (1) of the Employment Equity Act states: 
‘No person may unfairly discriminate, either directly or indirectly, against an employee, in 
any employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, 
language or birth’. 
The above provisions complement the equality clause in The Constitution and the Labour 
Relations Act86 in the sense that it aims to remove express and any hidden demographic 
imbalances in the workplace. The Employment Equity Act requires employers to promote 
equal opportunity in the workplace which will involve promoting affirmative action and 
preventing unfair discrimination within the work environment itself.87 Similar to the section 9 
of the Constitution, direct discrimination for the purposes of the Employment Equity Act 
refers to when people are discriminated against because they possess one of the 
characteristics in the Act, such as where a potential employee is refused a job on the basis 
that such a person is a homosexual which therefore amounts to discrimination on the basis of 
their sexual orientation. Indirect discrimination refers to where ‘seemingly objective or 
‘neutral’ barriers exclude members of particular groups because members of those groups 
happen to be unable to surmount the barriers’.88  The main reasoning for the inclusion of 
phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ within labour law is to cover any employment practice which 
has the effect of unfairly discriminating against a person/s regardless of the manner in which 
the discrimination takes place or the motive behind the discrimination.89 
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To substantiate further, in the case of Couve and another90, the court looked at Regulation 
10(1) (c) of the Exchange Control Regulations promulgated in terms of s 9 of the Currency 
and Exchanges Act 9 of 1933 which forbade any person from entering into any transaction 
whereby capital or any right to capital is directly or indirectly exported from the republic, 
except with permission granted by the Treasury and in accordance with such conditions as the 
Treasury may impose. In Interpreting the term ‘directly or indirectly’, the court stated firstly 
that the phrase has received little judicial consideration and thereafter held that the phrase 
was used by the legislature to denote the widest meaning.91 
With reference to the above mentioned legislation and case law, it is therefore submitted that 
the use of the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ allows for a broad interpretation so as to cater for 
all circumstances and situations regardless of the manner in which they occur. It is based on 
an enquiry of whether the actual substance of the matter fits within the context of the relevant 
legislation and not the form in which it appears. 
The majority used the terms de jure and de facto without providing any real meaning of the 
terms. It is thus important to provide an understanding of the terms so as to determine 
whether it was correctly used in the context of associated ship arrests. 
In respect of these terms, Radin92 states the following: 
De facto:  ‘a term used to describe a situation which is acknowledged to exist but of which 
the legality or justice may be in question. It is frequently applied in international law to a 
government of a nation which is in fact in power but which may have come into power by 
violence or unlawful means’. 93 
De jure: ‘a term used to describe a situation of which the rightfulness is admitted, whether or 
not it is carried out in fact’.94 
The Dictionary of Modern legal usage states the following in respect of the Latin terms ‘the 
use of either phrase implies the question whether something exists merely in fact (de facto) or 
by right or according to law (de jure)’.95 
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Black’s Law Dictionary states the following in respect of de facto:  
‘in fact, in deed, actually. This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past 
action, or a state of affairs which must be accepted for all practical purposes, but is illegal or 
illegitimate. In this sense it is the contrary of de jure which means rightful, legitimate, just or 
constitutional’. 96 
The majority noted that ‘Indirect power can only refer to the person who de facto wields 
power through, and hence over, someone else’.97 
What can be noted from the above mentioned dictionaries is that the term de facto refers to 
whether something exists in fact, while de jure on the hand refers to something which is 
legitimate and exists in law. In this respect, Wallis is correct in his submission that de facto 
power to control a company refers to the person who factually controls the company and thus 
refers to ‘real’ or ‘actual’ control regardless of whether or not it derives from an existing legal 
right or is exercised directly or indirectly.98 Upon the ordinary understanding of the term, it is 
clear that it is broad enough to cover the situation where a shareholder may own the shares in 
their own name as well as where a shareholder may opt to register the shares in the name of 
another e.g. a nominee holder.99 The majority in the Heavy Metal used a narrow 
interpretation of the term de facto in the sense that it refers to someone having power over 
another. It is submitted that the majority erred in this regard. 
It is respectfully submitted that by including the term ‘directly or indirectly’ in AJRA, the 
legislature opted to extend the provisions in AJRA to include all possible circumstances 
irrespective of the manner in which they occur. The inclusion of the phrase was not however 
to allow a claimant to arrest a ship in respect of a debt in which the owner of that ship bears 
no resemblance. Such an understanding of the term not only accords to the interpretation 
given by academics but also compliments the notion that ‘control’ for the purposes of 
associated ship arrests refers to ‘overall’ or ‘ultimate’ control. In this respect, Hofmeyr states, 
‘why should the legislature, in stipulating the circumstances which will give rise to an 
association, be concerned with who wields apparent power over a company as opposed to 
who wields real power?’. 100  Hofmeyr submits further and correctly so, that the legislature 
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would only extend liability to an associated ship if there exists a ‘meaningful nexus’ between 
the guilty ship and the associated ship through the exercise of control and not on the basis of 
a common nominee shareholder who acts under the directives of another and thus does not 
actually exercise any control in their own right.101 It is therefore submitted that if the 
legislature was only concerned with the registered shareholder i.e. the person who has ‘direct’ 
control (applying the ratio of the majority), there would be no reason to use the phrase 
‘directly or indirectly’ as the enquiry would end upon determining the identity of the 
registered shareholder.  
3.5.3. The Constitutionality of the majority decision in the Heavy Metal case: 
 
Section 25 (1) of The Constitution102 states that: 
‘no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property’.  
The effect of the Heavy Metal, as stated earlier, is that it allows for an association to be 
formed on the basis of a common nominee majority shareholding between ship owning 
companies even if the respective ships are not actually related to each other. The result is that 
an innocent ship owner’s vessel may be arrested and such a ship owner will thereafter be 
forced to provide security for the respective claim. It is therefore submitted that the decision 
of the majority allows for the arbitrary deprivation of property. This section served as a brief 




This chapter aimed at analysing the majority decision of the Heavy Metal case. In doing so, it 
discussed the High Court decision as well as the three decisions in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. Following this discussion, it is therefore submitted that the majority in the Appeal 
Court erred in the manner in which it had interpreted the associated ship provisions on the 
basis that it failed to support the underlying purpose of the provision which is to locate the 
true debtor and hold this person liable for the maritime claims. Furthermore, the court 
adopted a narrow interpretation of the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ and aimed to distinguish 
‘direct’ from ‘indirect’ by equating the terms to de jure and de facto respectively. Such an 
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understanding diverts from the usual interpretation attached to the phrase which is, as stated 
earlier in this chapter, to ensure that all possible forms of ‘control’ are allocated for regardless 
of the manner in which they occur. The latter understanding supports the underlying notion; 
that what is required for ‘control’, is the ultimate or actual control of a company which may, 
depending on the particular facts of the case, extend beyond the register or nominee 
shareholdings of the company concerned. A further problem in respect of the majority 
decision is that it may fail to pass Constitutional muster on the basis that it allows for the 
arbitrary deprivation of property.  
It is submitted that the law as interpreted by Marais JA and Farlam AJA is to be preferred. In 
this respect, what can be concluded for the purposes of associated ship arrests is that control 
refers to ultimate or actual control.103This will refer to the real seat of control which will lie 
with a single controller.104 The purpose of the associated ship arrest is therefore to penetrate 
the façade presented by the shipping company concerned to the outside world as to who 
controls the said company in order to determine who actually controls the company. This will 
involve an enquiry which extends beyond the company register or nominee shareholdings. 
Although the two Judges were consistent in the manner in which they interpreted the law, 
they differed in respect of the application. It is therefore respectfully submitted that decision 
by Marais JA is to be preferred as in this case as there appeared many factors which were 
emphasised by Marais JA which portray the image that the companies were controlled by the 
same person which in this case was most likely Mr Vafias.  
Following the difficulties outlined in this chapter, chapter four will aim to determine the legal 
impact of the Heavy Metal case so as to determine the practical difficulties faced by courts in 
strictly applying the ratio of the majority judgment. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE LEGAL IMPACT OF THE HEAVY METAL CASE  
4.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter two of this dissertation provided insight as to what is required to establish associated 
ship jurisdiction. In light of this understanding chapter three looked at the leading case in this 
regard which is the Heavy Metal case1. This chapter also looked at the decision of both the 
High Court as well as all three judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal. In determining the 
correctness of the majority decision in the SCA, chapter three concluded that the majority 
erred in the manner in which it had interpreted the associated ship provision firstly because 
the interpretation provided by the majority failed to reconcile with the underlying purpose of 
the associated ship provision as it had the effect of allowing for the arrest of a vessel which 
belonged to an innocent third party. Secondly, the chapter noted that the majority erred in the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ as contained in section 3 (7) (b) (ii) of 
AJRA on the basis that it allowed for two repositories of control. 
In this light of this background and the difficulties presented by the majority decision in the 
Heavy Metal case as outlined in chapter three, this chapter now seeks to determine the actual 
legal impact of the majority decision. In other words, what this chapter aims to do is look at 
what challenges and difficulties courts faced when attempting to strictly apply the ratio of the 
majority in the Heavy Metal. This will provide an understanding as to whether legislative 
intervention is needed to rectify the discrepancies mentioned above. 
 
4.2. The Legal Impact of the Heavy Metal case 
 
Wallis submits that the Heavy Metal has not thus far generated as much problems as 
anticipated as practitioners have applied a common-sense approach in such cases.2 In this 
respect, it is submitted that the decision of the Heavy Metal nevertheless creates an 
undesirable situation as it creates confusion as to what is meant by the term ‘control’. This 
difficulty is further amplified when regard is given to the fact that only the Supreme Court of 
Appeal or the Constitutional Court on appeal from the SCA can alter the decision of the court 
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in that case.3 In order to measure the merits of these assertions, this segment of the chapter 
will look at the following three cases: 
4.2.1.  The M.V. La Pampa Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SNC v Tor Shipping.4   
4.2.2.  Sino West Shipping Co Ltd v NYK- Hinode Line Limited.5 
4.2.3.  M.V. Ivory Tirupati; M.V. Ivory Tirupati v Badan Urusan Logistik (aka Buldog).6 
The reason for looking at the above mentioned cases is that each of them made reference to 
the Heavy Metal case. Looking at these cases will therefore provide insight as to the 
difficulties presented in strictly applying the principles laid out by the majority. 
4.2.1. The M.V. La Pampa Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SNC v Tor Shipping :  
 
The respondent (Tor shipping) caused the m.v. La Pampa to be arrested on the basis that it 
was an associated ship with the vessel which gave rise to the cause of action i.e. the m.v. 
Stefanie H. The applicant, Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SNC (‘LDA’), applied for an order 
setting aside the arrest. LDA is a company duly incorporated and registered in France and 
carries out its business as the owner of the m.v. La Pampa. Tor Shipping Ltd (‘Tor’) is a 
company duly incorporated and registered according to the laws of Cyprus and which carries 
out business as the charterer of vessels.7 
In this case, the m.v. Stefanie H was chartered to Tor Shipping by the owners of that vessel, 
Sealight Marine Ltd of Panama (Sealight). Tor Shipping then sub-chartered the said vessel to 
Takamaka Marine Ltd (Takamaka). Takamaka is a company with limited liability registered 
and incorporated according to the company laws of Jersey and carries out business as a 
charterer of vessels. Takamaka was cited here as the second respondent.8 According to the 
orders of Takamaka, the m.v. Stefanie H proceeded up the River Seine in France to discharge 
coal at Rouen. Due to lack of water, she was unable to reach the discharge berth and was 
forced to wait at the lay-by berth.9 Overnight, a tidal bore which had been predicted passed 
the vessel and caused her to drift across the river. As a result of this tidal bore, she sought the 
                                                          
3 Wallis (note 2 above; 221). 
4 MV La Pampa Louis Dreyfus Armatuers SNC v TOR Shipping 2006 (3) SA 441 (D). 
5 Sino West Shipping Co Ltd v NYK- Hinode Line Limited SCOSA C203. 
6 MV Ivory Tirupati; MV Ivory Tirupati v Badan Urusan Logistik (aka Buldog) 2002 (2) SA 407 (C). 
7m.v. La Pampa supra note 4 at 443I-J. 
8m.v. La Pampa supra note 4 at 444A. 
9m.v. La Pampa supra note 4 at 444C. 
67 
 
assistance of four tug vessels which conducted a salvage operation and which resulted in her 
being safely berthed.10  
Sormar (representing the tug vessels) commenced arbitration proceedings against the owners 
of the m.v. Stefanie H claiming salvage reward. Sealight Marine (owners of the m.v. Stefanie 
H) then commenced arbitration proceedings against Tor Shipping on the basis that it had 
breached the charter-party agreement by failing to warrant the safety of the port, berth or any 
anchorage. Tor Shipping in turn, commenced arbitration proceedings against Takamaka and 
claimed indemnity in respect of their liability to Sealight Marine Ltd.11 In order to secure its 
claim against Takamaka, Tor Shipping arrested the m.v. La Pampa. 12 Tor Shipping relied on 
a series of factors which showed that LDA or its holding company, the Louis Dreyfus Group, 
directly or indirectly controlled Takamaka. Firstly, it argued that LDA’s chartering broker 
represented that Takamaka was a wholly owned subsidiary of LDA. Secondly, it argued that 
LDA indirectly controls Takamaka as it controls 50% of the shareholding of Takamaka; that 
LDA could enter into contracts on behalf of Takamaka without prior consultation or consent 
of the latter; that LDA could receive money on Takamaka’s behalf and that LDA gave all the 
instructions in respect of the m.v. Stefanie H on behalf of Takamaka.13 In summation, Tor 
Shipping’s argument was that because LDA owns the m.v. La Pampa and LDA controls 
Takamaka, the two vessels i.e. the m.v La Pampa and the m.v. Stefanie H are therefore 
associated for the purposes of the Act.  
In respect of the assertion that the agent of LDA represented that Takamaka was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of LDA, Tshabalala JP found favour with the argument presented by Mr 
Shaw (for the applicants). Mr Shaw argued that there is nothing on the papers to suggest 
anything other than that the decision taken by Tor Shipping to enter into the charter-party 
agreement with Takamaka was influenced by the fact that LDA would provide the 
guarantee.14 In other words, the evidence on the papers merely showed that Tor Shipping was 
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more inclined to enter into a charter-party agreement with Takamaka on the basis that LDA 
would provide the necessary guarantees.  
In respect of the second argument by Tor Shipping that LDA indirectly controls Takamaka, 
the court applied the rule of law as laid down by the majority in the Heavy Metal case. 
Tshabalala therefore held: 
‘It is unnecessary in casu to decide whether both 'powers' referred to by the learned Judge of 
Appeal vest in one or two persons or entities. What is important is that in his decision 
Smalberger JA said that, in our legal terminology, determining the direction and fate of the 
company means 'the person who controls the shareholding in the company'. In casu we were 
told, and it was common cause between counsel, that LDA controls only 50% of the shares in 
Takamaka. In the circumstances LDA cannot be said to be in control of the shareholding of 
the company since by having 50% of the shareholding no resolution binding the company can 
be taken by LDA alone’.15 
The court therefore concluded that if Takamaka is owned as a 50/50 shareholding, then 
neither shareholder may be said to control the company, either directly or indirectly.16 
Therefore LDA did not have the requisite control over Takamaka. 
It is however important to note that in this case, Tor Shipping had accepted security in the 
form of a bank guarantee after it threatened to arrest another vessel owned by the applicant 
i.e. the m.v. La Sierra. One of the issues of the case was therefore whether or not Tor 
Shipping was entitled to arrest the m.v. La Pampa i.e. whether it had a reasonable and 
genuine need for security for the claim which would justify the arrest of the m.v. La Pampa. 
The court however held that Tor Shipping failed to prove that the bank guarantee which had 
been given to the company provided no security or if it did, such security was inadequate for 
the purpose of settling the claimed amount. The court therefore held that on this basis the 
arrest was unjustified.17The application for the setting aside of the arrest was therefore 
upheld. 
Analysis of the M.V. La Pampa Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SNC v Tor Shipping:   
In this case Tor Shipping’s original claim lay with Takamaka in relation to m.v. Stefanie H. 
In order to obtain security for this claim, Tor Shipping invoked section 5 (3) (a) of AJRA for 
                                                          
15m.v. La Pampa supra note 4 at 454G-H. 
16m.v. La Pampa supra note 4 at 454I-J. 
17m.v. La Pampa supra note 4 at 449H-I. 
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a security arrest.18 Tor Shipping however did not arrest the guilty vessel for the basis of 
obtaining security for its claim, but rather sought the arrest of the m.v. La Pampa as an 
alleged associated ship of the guilty vessel. Therefore to obtain and maintain such an arrest, 
Tor Shipping would have to satisfy the requirements of a security arrest and also prove that 
the m.v. Stefanie H and m.v. La Pampa were associated vessels.19 One of the essential 
requirements in establishing a security arrest is that a party must establish on a balance of 
probabilities that there is a genuine and reasonable need for security.20It is submitted that 
even if the court found that the vessels in question were in fact associated ships for the 
purposes of AJRA, the arrest of the m.v. La Pampa will still nevertheless be set aside on the 
basis that Tor Shipping failed to prove that the bank guarantee which had been provided to it 
did not provide security or alternatively, if it did provide security that such security was 
insufficient in relation to the claim. In this respect it is submitted that the decision by the 
court was correctly decided. However for the purpose of this dissertation, the discussion here 
will focus more in the manner in which the court has interpreted the associated ship 
provisions. 
The court in this case followed the judgment of the majority in the Heavy Metal case wherein 
Smalberger JA held that the person who controls the direction and fate of a company is the 
person who controls the shareholding of the company.21 Applying this reasoning to the facts, 
the court noted that LDA only owned 50% of the shareholding in Takamaka. Therefore 
because Takamaka is owned as a 50/50 shareholding neither party may be said to ‘directly or 
indirectly’ control Takamaka as no resolution taken alone may bind the company. The 
difficulty with such reasoning and strict application of the judgment of Smalberger JA is that 
it allows for the anomaly where a company may be said, albeit rather technically, to not be 
under the control of any person/s or even a company for that matter. This situation is difficult 
to fathom as it is absurd to state that a company may exist for all purposes yet there is no 
person to control its fate or direction or even to develop the necessary company policies. As 
                                                          
18Section 5 (3) (a) of AJRA states : 
‘(3) (a) A court may in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction order the arrest of any property for the 
purpose of providing security for a claim which is or may be the subject of an arbitration or any 
proceedings contemplated, pending or proceeding, either in the Republic or elsewhere, and whether or 
not it is subject to the law of the Republic, if the person seeking the arrest has a claim enforceable by 
an action in personam against the owner of the property concerned or an action in rem against such 
property or which would be so enforceable but for any such arbitration or proceedings.’ 
19m.v. La Pampa supra note 4 at 443-449. 
20m.v. La Pampa supra note 4 at 448E-D. See also Cargo Laden and Lately Laden on Board the MV Thalassini 
Avgi v MV Dimitris 1989 (3) SA 820 (A) and Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Ltd 1994 (2) SA 563 (A) 
wherein the courts discussed the requirements of a security arrest in terms of section 5 (3) (a). 
21 m.v. La Pampa supra note 4 at 454G-H. 
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irrational and illogical as this may seem, the abovementioned position is nevertheless a direct 
consequence of the strict application of the majority decision in the Heavy Metal case. It is 
respectfully submitted that a further difficulty of the decision of Tshabalala JP in this case is 
that no mention is made as to who owns the other 50% of the shareholding in Takamaka. The 
identity of this shareholder was merely dismissed from the enquiry altogether. It is further 
submitted that even if the other 50% was found to be owned by a company which is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of LDA, then although as a matter of substance LDA would control 
Takamaka, the association will still not be formed based on strict application of the Heavy 
Metal case as according to the register, LDA still only owns 50% of the shareholding. A 
further difficulty in respect of this judgment is that it fails to look at the founding documents 
of the company itself so as to determine whether or not LDA does in fact have authority to 
create legally binding resolutions in respect of Takamaka. 
It is therefore submitted that by changing the enquiry to one which seeks the identification of 
the ‘actual’ or ‘ultimate’ controller of the company, the absurdity as noted above can be 
easily removed. This enquiry will look beyond the registers and nominee shareholdings of the 
company so as to determine the true source of control. In determining the ‘actual’ or 
‘ultimate’ control, courts will also investigate the company laws of the state in which the 
companies in question were registered as well as the internal structures of the respective 
companies.22 
4.2.2. Sino West Shipping Co Ltd v NYK- Hinode Line Limited SCOSA C203 
 
On 24 May 2012, NYK-Hinode Line Limited (respondent) arrested the m.v. Sino West as an 
associated ship of the m.v. Asian Forest which had been the subject of a charter-party 
agreement between the respondent and CPM Corporation Ltd (CPM). The purpose of the said 
arrest was to provide NYK with security for arbitration proceedings which it wished to 
proceed with in London against CPM. The claim in this case was the result of the sinking of 
the m.v. Asian Forest following the liquefaction of iron ore fines.23 Security was provided 
and the vessel was released. The applicant, Sino West Shipping Co Ltd (Sino West) as owner 
                                                          
22see Transportes Del Mar SA v Jade Bay Shipping Co Ltd  SCOSA C42 and China National Chartering Co Ltd 
v The Guangzhou SCOSA C197. 
23The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C204G. 
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of the arrested vessel, sought an order setting aside the deemed arrest of the m.v. Sino West 
on the basis that it was not an associated ship with the m.v Asian Forest.24 
Sino West is the registered owner of the m.v Sino West and is a company duly incorporated 
according to the laws of Hong Kong as a shipping company.25 NYK-Hinode Line Limited is 
a company duly incorporated and registered according to the laws of Japan and conducts its 
business as an operator of sea vessels.26 The respondent alleges that when the maritime claim 
arose, a Mr Wang controlled CPM and also owned all the shares in Sino West. Thus 
according to the respondent, the m.v. Sino West and the m.v. Asian Forest were associated 
ships for the purposes of the Act. In dealing with this assertion the court opted to firstly 
analyse the relationship between Mr Wang and CPM and then secondly, the relationship 
between Mr Wang and Sino West.  
Mr Wang’s relationship with CPM: 
The court began by highlighting the general principle of ‘control’ as stated in the case of EE 
Sharp and Sons Ltd v MV Nefeli27 wherein the court noted that control refers to overall 
control of a company i.e. control of the assets and destiny of the company, not its day-to-day 
management.28The court thereafter referred to the decision of the majority in the Heavy Metal 
where Smalberger JA held that ‘indirect’ power to control refers to de facto control where a 
person exerts authority or control over a person who has de jure authority and where ‘direct’ 
power refers to de jure power and refers to the person who has authority in the eyes of the 
law to control the company29. The applicant however argued that CPM is not controlled by 
Mr Wang but by Ms Wang Bo and Ms Zhang Xinying. The applicant further alleged that in 
2006 the shares in CPM were transferred to these two persons and the consideration of each 
share was the nominal price HKD (Hong Kong Dollars) 50. The transfer of this transaction 
was not recorded in writing and the share certificates in respect thereof were only recorded 
towards the end of May 2012.   
Madondo J found that according to the circumstantial evidence present, the only reasonable 
inference which could be drawn is that Ms Wang Bo and Ms Zhang Xinying were not 
                                                          
24The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C203-204. 
25The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C204D. 
26The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C204E. 
27 1984 (3) SA 325 (C). 
28 The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C206E citing EE Sharp and Sons Ltd v MV Nefeli 1984 (3) SA 325 (C) at 
326I-327A. 
29 The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C206G citing Heavy Metal at 1106D-G. 
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majority registered shareholders or owners of CPM but were rather nominees of Mr Wang. 
The conclusion by Madondo J was therefore that Mr Wang controlled CPM. To support this 
conclusion, Madondo J firstly noted that according to the facts of the case Mr Wang was the 
sole director and shareholder of a company called Vasteast of which both Ms Wang Bo and 
Ms Zhang Xinying were registered employees for the past ten years. The court found that it 
was highly unlikely that Ms Wang Bo and Ms Zhang Xinying would work as employees of 
Vasteast, a third party, whilst simultaneously putting time and effort into their own business 
ventures.30 Secondly, at all social events of CPM (which also shared the same premises as 
Vasteast), Mr Wang was the main host of the events and neither Ms Wang Bo nor Ms Zhang 
Xinying were introduced as representatives.31 Thirdly, the fact that Ms Wang Bo and Ms 
Zhang Xinying bought the shares of CPM at a nominal price of which no record was in 
writing until almost 6 years after the alleged purchase and when it was necessary to produce 
such documentation so as to secure the release of the vessel arrested raised questions as to the 
authenticity of the said purchase.32Fifthly, the court looked at the fact that previously, in 
collusion with Mr Wang, Ms Wang Bo and Ms Zhang Xinying were registered as nominal 
employees of Vasteast so as to obtain social benefits from the Chinese National Social 
Security Fund. The court found that this showed that it was therefore a real possibility that 
Ms Wang Bo and Ms Zhang Xinying could thus camouflage themselves as majority 
shareholders so as conceal the identity of Mr Wang as the true controller of CPM.33 Lastly, 
the court noted that on the business card of Mr Wang it described him as ‘president’ of 
Vasteast and CPM. In light of the abovementioned factors, the court concluded that Ms Wang 
Bo and Ms Zhang Xinying were merely nominee shareholders of Mr Wang and it is the latter 
that had control over CPM. 
Mr Wang’s relationship with Sino West Shipping Company Limited: 
After having found that Mr Wang had control over CPM, the court held that the question 
which now needs to be determined is whether Mr Wang was the de jure controller of Sino 
West.34 The court then noted that in determining who controls a company, one looks at the 
immediate legal control of the company.35 
                                                          
30 The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C209F-H. 
31 The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C209I-C210B. 
32The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C210C. 
33The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C210G-H. 
34The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C212A. 
35The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C212C. 
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The applicant argues that Mr Wang held the shares in Sino West as a nominee shareholder for 
numerous investors until 2011 when the shares were transferred to a company called 
Smoothie Goodie Ltd. (a Seychelles company). According to Mr Wang, he allegedly 
transferred the shares to Smoothie Goodie Ltd. because he was no longer prepared to be 
reflected on the applicant’s public record as the sole registered shareholder of the 
company.36It was however common cause between the parties that when the vessel was 
arrested, Mr Wang was the registered owner of all the shares of Smoothie Goodie Ltd. Once 
again, it was alleged by Mr Wang that he held such shares as a nominee shareholder for 
numerous investors and that he only beneficially owned 20% of the shares.37 The contention 
which is put forth by the applicants is that Mr Wang does not have the power directly or 
indirectly to control Smoothie Goodie Ltd. and that he acted only on the instructions of the 
beneficial owners. It is important to note however that there was only a gentleman’s 
agreement in place between Mr Wang and the ‘investors’ according to which he would be a 
nominee shareholder.38 The court looked at the relevant authorities and acknowledged that 
nominee shareholders do not have the liberty to exercise the voting rights attached to the 
shares which they hold in a manner contrary to the instructions of the beneficial holder of the 
said shares. The choices of the nominee shareholders are therefore confined to the 
instructions given by the beneficial owner.39 Madondo J however held that: 
‘It appears from the decided authorities that the claimant cannot look beyond the register of 
members and seek the individual who controls the company concerned in order to enforce his 
or her maritime claim against that particular company. Likewise, in my view, the court cannot 
look beyond the company and declare a person, who is not the registered shareholder of the 
company concerned, to be in control thereof. The ultimate control over a company’s affairs is 
exercised by its members in general meetings.’40 
Madondo J therefore held that in this case, Mr Wang is the sole registered shareholder in 
Smoothie Goodie Ltd. in which he holds a 100% shareholding. The court thus held that Mr 
Wang had ‘controlling interest’ of the Company.41Furthermore, the court held that as a result 
of being the sole shareholder of Smoothie Goodie Ltd, he had ultimate control over Sino 
                                                          
36The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C212D. 
37The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C212G-H. 
38The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C213B. 
39 The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C213-214. 
40 The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C216C-D. 
41 The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C216G-217B. 
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West and thus has the power directly to control both companies by voting the majority of the 
shares. The court further stated: 
‘Whether or not Mr Wang in fact exercises that power himself or whether it is exercised 
through him by others is immaterial. He is deemed to control Sino West Shipping Company 
Limited whether he does so and in fact not so’42 
Lastly the court made mention of the Heavy Metal case and noted that according to that case, 
if a person who has de jure control over the company which owns the ship concerned and the 
company which owns the alleged associated ship, the statutory nexus between the two 
companies will be met.43Ultimately the court concluded that in this case, the arresting party 
had succeeded on a balance of probabilities that Mr Wang controlled both CPM and Sino 
West. 
 Analysis of Sino West Shipping Co Ltd v NYK- Hinode Line Limited SCOSA C203 
The main difficulty presented in this case is that the manner in which the court has interpreted 
the associated ship provisions is conflicting. On the one hand, in respect of the Mr Wang’s 
relationship with CPM, the court adopted a broader understanding of the term ‘control’ and 
decided to go beyond the share certificate of CPM so as to determine who actually controlled 
it. In this regard, the court concluded that Mr Wang was the controller of the said company. 
On the hand, in respect of Mr Wang’s relationship with Sino West, the court adopted a rather 
narrow understanding of ‘control’ and based the enquiry solely on who the de jure or the 
registered shareholder was. The court noted that in respect of Sino West, Mr Wang was the 
sole registered shareholder of Smoothie Goodie Ltd. which is the company which owned all 
the shares in Sino West. The court therefore concluded that on this basis he had de jure 
control over the latter in terms of the majority decision in the Heavy Metal case. To amplify 
this matter, this analysis will firstly look at the manner in which the court looked at Mr 
Wang’s relationship with Sino West after which it will look at the manner in which the court 
assessed Mr Wang’s relationship with CPM. 
In respect of Sino West, the courts narrow interpretation of the term ‘control’ is immediately 
prevalent as at the outset the court stated that what would need to be determined in respect of 
this company is whether Mr Wang is the de jure controller i.e. the legal controller which is an 
                                                          
42 The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C217B-C. 
43 The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C217E-F. 
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enquiry based on the who is the majority registered shareholder.44 According to Mr Wang, he 
no longer wanted to be reflected as the sole registered shareholder of Sino West as it affected 
his business in the Far East. As such he transferred the shares to Smoothie Goodie Ltd. 
However it was later discovered that he was the sole registered shareholder of Smoothie 
Goodie Ltd. In respect of these shares he argued that he was a mere nominee shareholder 
however the nature of the agreement was that it was a mere ‘gentleman’s agreement’.45 Mr 
Wang stated that he held such shares in respect of numerous parties. However no evidence 
was provided to supplement this allegation either in the form of affidavits or other 
documentation. The court further acknowledged the fact that nominee shareholders act upon 
the instructions of the beneficial owners for whom those shares are held46. The court however 
held that according to the authorities, one cannot look behind the register so as to determine 
who controls the company as the ultimate control of a company’s affairs is decided by its 
members in a general meeting.47 The court thus concluded that because Mr Wang is the 
registered shareholder of all the shares in Smoothie Goodie Ltd. which in turn owns all the 
shares of Sino West, it can therefore be stated that he controls Sino West.48 In respect of Mr 
Wang’s control over Sino West, the court stated the following: 
‘Whether or not Mr Wang in fact exercises that power himself or whether it is 
exercised through him by others is immaterial. He is deemed to control Sino West 
Shipping Company Limited whether he does so and in fact not so’49 
This statement clearly notes the difficulty presented as it states ‘whether he does so and in 
fact not so’. It is respectfully submitted that the problem in this regard is that the statement 
creates the paradox where a person may be said to control a company but then not control it 
all. This approach is creates much confusion as to the manner in which the associated ship 
provisions should be interpreted as the court adopts a completely different approach when 
determining who controls CPM. In respect of CPM, the court adopted a broader 
understanding which aimed to look at the ‘ultimate’ or ‘actual control’ of CPM. The court 
found that there was an abundance of factors which portrayed the image that Ms Wang Bo 
and Ms Zhang Xinying were mere nominee shareholders of Mr Wang who had actual control 
over CPM. This broad interpretation of ‘control’ adopted in respect of the enquiry into CPM 
                                                          
44The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C212C. 
45 The m.v. Sino West supra note 5 at C213B. 
46The m.v. Sino West supra  note 5 at C213-214. 
47The m.v. Sino West supra  note  5 at C216C-D.. 
48The m.v. Sino West supra  note  5 at C216G-217B. 
49The m.v. Sino West supra  note 5 at C217B-C. 
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is however impossible to reconcile with narrow, restrictive interpretation provided to 
‘control’ in respect of the enquiry into Sino West. This judgment creates  much perplexity as 
to what is required for the purposes of establishing ‘control’ in AJRA.  
It is submitted that the court was correct in its approach in the enquiry as to who controls 
CPM. In this respect there were numerous factors which showed that Ms Wang Bo and Ms 
Zhang Xinying were not the actual controllers of CPM but were mere nominee shareholders 
who acted on behalf of the instructions of Mr Wang. One of the significant factors in this 
regard was that the transfer of the shares to Ms Wang Bo and Ms Zhang Xinying was not 
recorded in writing and the share certificates in question were only signed at the end of May 
2012 i.e. after the arrest of the m.v. Sino West which was arrested on 24 May 2012. It is 
further submitted that the conclusion reached by the court that Mr Wang controls Sino West 
is correct. However it is respectfully submitted that the court erred in the manner in which it 
has interpreted the associated ship provisions in this regard. It is submitted that this 
conclusion could have been reached by adopting a much simpler approach. In this respect, 
according to the facts of the case, the most likely conclusion is that Mr Wang held the shares 
in his own name i.e. he was the beneficial owner for the shares which he held in respect of 
Smoothie Goodie Ltd. The reason for this submission is that Mr Wang expressed the view 
that he no longer wished to be represented as the sole registered shareholder of Sino West and 
thus he transferred the shares to Smoothie Goodie Ltd. Based on this decision, it is therefore 
unlikely that Mr Wang would thereafter opt to be registered as the sole registered shareholder 
of Smoothie Goodie Ltd. unless he was in fact the beneficial holder of these shares. 
Furthermore, Mr Wang stated that he merely held such shares as a nominee shareholder 
however all that was stated in this regard is that it was merely a ‘gentleman’s agreement’. No 
further evidence was provided in the form of affidavits or other statements which would add 
probative value to the statement that he was merely a nominee shareholder. In absence of any 
further evidence, it is therefore difficult to attach any real merit to such ipse dixit statements 
on behalf of Mr Wang. It is further submitted that it seems unlikely that one would entrust 
another with shares belonging to the former without any sort of documentation which proves 
that the nature of the agreement is one of a nominee shareholding. Failure of such 
documentation would put such a party in a precarious situation where the nominee holder in 
question acts in a manner contrary to the formers instructions. Such a party will be left with 
very little legal recourse. It is therefore submitted that in this case, Mr Wang most likely held 
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the shares in Smoothie Goodie Ltd. in his own right and was therefore the ‘ultimate’ or 
‘actual’ controller of these shares. 
4.2.3. M.V. Ivory Tirupati; M.V. Ivory Tirupati v Badan Urusan Logistik (aka Buldog): 
 
In this case, the m.v. Amer Prabha was arrested in Singapore according to a claim by the 
respondent for compensation arising out of damage to a cargo of rice. OM, the indemnity 
insurers for the vessel, issued an undertaking in which it undertook to pay the sum amount as 
decided by the Supreme Court of Hong Kong or any appeal thereof. The undertaking also 
included terms that the respondent was to release the m.v. Amer Prabha from arrest and was 
precluded from taking any action against any other vessel in the same association, under the 
same management or control of the arrested vessel in respect of the said claim. Furthermore, 
according to the undertaking, OM was required within 14 days of a request from the 
respondent to instruct solicitors to accept on behalf of the m.v. Amer Prabha, service of the 
proceedings and to file an acknowledgment of the said proceedings. OM failed in its 
obligation in respect of the latter which resulted in the Hong Kong Court giving judgment for 
the respondent and ordered the owners/ demise charterers to pay USD 331 332,30. OM failed 
in its undertaking to pay this amount. The respondent then arrested the applicant vessel, the 
m.v. Ivory Tirupati as an associated vessel of m.v. Amer Prabha.50 
In dealing with the issue of association, the court looked at the background as to the 
ownership and management of the vessels. At the time of the arrest, the m.v. Ivory Tirupati 
was owned by Pembroke Shipping Corporation Ltd (Pembroke), incorporated in Liberia. 
Pemroke is a wholly owned subsidiary of Amer Reefer Company (Amer Reefer). Amer 
Reefer conducts its business through wholly-owned subsidiary companies where each 
company owns a single vessel. All the vessels obtain management and technical support from 
three affiliated companies namely Amer Shipping Ltd (ASL), Amer Shipping Management 
(ASM) and Foresight Ltd. ASL is a registered in Cyprus and acts as the manager of each 
vessel according to the management agreement with each company. In terms of this 
agreement, ASL subcontracts the technical management of each vessel to ASM and the 
general agency responsibilities to Foresight. According to the affidavit by the witnesses, 
Amer Reefer operated seven of its vessels in this manner which included the m.v. Ivory 
                                                          
50m.v. Ivory Tirupati supra note 6 at 411-413. 
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Tirupati. Most of the shareholding in these companies was held by members of the firm 
Loikis Papaphilippou and Co.51 
The court also looked at a report of the activities of Amer Reefer which was lodged with the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission which stated:  
‘'Amer Reefer is a Cypriot limited liability company organised to own all the outstanding 
capital stock of the vessel-owning subsidiaries. Quantoc Shipping Investments Ltd a Cypriot 
company (QSIL), owns all the outstanding capital stock of Amer Reefer. The shares of QSIL 
are held by trustees of a Cypriot trust which was established for the benefit of the respective 
lineal descendants of the late Chotre Lal Mehrotra and his spouse (the trust). Sashi Mehrotra, 
chief executive officer of Amer Reefer, is among the class of trust beneficiaries who 
collectively own 100% of the company's outstanding common stock.’52    
The m.v Amer Prabha was owned by Casterbridge Navigation Co Ltd (Casterbridge) which 
is registered in Cyprus and shares the same address as Loikis Papaphilippou and Co. The m.v. 
Amer Prabha was also managed by ASL and like Pembroke, Casterbridge also has as one of 
its major shareholders as Elpico Nominees (Elpico).53 In respect of Pembroke, Elpico owns 
15% of the shareholding and Elpico Management Ltd holds 15% of the shares. In respect of 
Casterbridge, Elpico owns 23% of the shareholding. 54  
In terms of the aforementioned factors, Mr Wragge for the respondents, sought to draw the 
following conclusion: the m.v Amer Prabha shares the same prefix (Amer) as with most of 
the vessels within the Amer Reefer fleet and therefore it was most likely that it was one of the 
vessels operated by the Foresight Group, Casterbridge and Amer Reefer have the same 
address which is that of Loikis Papaphilippou and Co, all the shares in ASL were registered 
in Elpico Nominees and Elpico Managers of which the majority shareholder of both 
                                                          
51m.v. Ivory Tirupati supra note 6 at 413F-J.  
52m.v. Ivory Tirupati supra note 6 at 414D. The report further stated: 
‘Each of the Amer Shipping Ltd (ASL), Amer Ship Management (ASM) and Amer Reefer are 
members of the Foresight Group, an informal organisation of companies established in 1984 to co-
operatively market, operate and manage dry cargo vessels, jack up drilling rigs, crude oil tankers, 
product tankers, chemical tankers and reefer cargo vessels. The existing vessels receive management 
services from ASL. ASL serves as the fleet manager pursuant to a management agreement with each 
vessel-owning subsidiary, and pursuant thereto ASL has subcontracted with ASM for technical 
management services and with Foresight Ltd for general agency services. ASL provides each vessel-
owning subsidiary with certain commercial management services such as maintaining day to day 
liaison with charterers, ship agents and the crews of existing vessels, accounting services and ensuring 
compliance with Cypriot and Liberian regulations, as the case may be, pertaining to the existing 
vessels.’ at did 414A-C.  
53m.v. Ivory Tirupati supra note 6 at 414E. 
54 m.v. Ivory Tirupati supra note 6 at 414E. 
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companies is Ms Athienite who is believed to be Mr Papaphilippou’s daughter. The Majority 
shareholding in Casterbridge was held in the name of a Mr Andreas Phellas who is also the 
registered shareholder of four of the seven vessels beneficially owned by Amer Reefer and 
was said to be related to Mr Papaphilippou.55 Mr Wragge also relied on the case of Shipper 
D’ Singapore Pte Ltd v M.V. Amer Whitney56, where Squires J looked at the relationship 
between ASM, ASL, the Amer Reefer Company and the Foresight Group and concluded that 
the companies were all controlled by a Mr Ravi Kumar Mehotra. Davis J in the case at hand 
noted that this case provided support for the position that control of the respective companies 
could all be traced back to Ravi Kumar Mehrotra. Mr Wragge therefore argued that the 
beneficial owners of the shareholding of Pembroke and Amer Reefer controlled Casterbridge 
or have the power to control it. Alternatively, Mr Wragge argued that Pembroke, Amer 
Reefer and Pembroke were all controlled by the same person.57 The court therefore held: 
‘In matters of shipping, as with much of offshore tax and corporate planning, it is extremely 
difficult to prove with any measure of exactitude where ownership resides; the very purpose 
of the structures employed in cases such as this one is to hide beneficial ownership through 
the interposition of nominee directors and offshore companies and trusts. An enquiry based 
upon the substance of the evidence rather than upon a rigid reliance on the legal form is 
clearly appropriate in such cases. In this case a strong inference can be drawn from the 
facts which have been put before the Court by respondent.’58 
The court therefore noted that in this case the registered shareholders of Casterbridge (owner 
of the m.v. Amer Prabha) are nominees for Loikis Papaphilippou and Co or Amer Reefer or 
the beneficiaries of a trust which had been established for descendants of the late Mr Ravi 
Mehrotra. In respect of the beneficial owners of Pembroke and Amer Reefer, the court noted 
that except for Elpico Nominees and Elpico Managers, are all members of the firm Loikis 
Papaphilippou and Co. The court also found that each of these companies fall within the 
Foresight Group of which it appears the owner thereof is Mr Ravi Mehrotra. The court 
therefore held that the overwhelming probabilities are that  the beneficial owner of Pembroke 
and Amer Reefer controls or has the power to control Casterbridge or alternatively Pembroke, 
Amer Reefer And Casterbridge are controlled by the same person/s. 
                                                          
55 m.v. Ivory Tirupati supra note 6 at 414G-I. 
56 Unreported case No A 16399 dated 28 September 2000 in D & CLD. 
57 m.v. Ivory Tirupati supra note 6 at 414I-J. 
58 m.v. Ivory Tirupati supra note 6 at 415D-E. 
80 
 
The applicants failed to rebut the above assertions and in this respect the court applied the 
dicum of Smalberger JA in the Heavy Metal where the respected the judge held that the 
outcome reached by the court in that case is a direct and foreseeable consequence of a ship-
owner who chooses to operate behind a cloak of secrecy and who fails to rebut the inferences 
put forth on the papers.59Therefore the court in this case asserted that in light of the failure by 
the applicant to rebut the circumstantial evidence put forth, the decision that the two vessels 
are associated is therefore justified. 
Analysis of M.V. Ivory Tirupati; M.V. Ivory Tirupati v Badan Urusan Logistik (aka Buldog) 
The Heavy Metal case is a decision which was heard in the Supreme Court of Appeal and as 
stated already is the decision which binds the lower courts. As such, lower courts must apply 
the principles laid down by the court in that case. What is interesting in the m.v. Ivory 
Tirupati, is the manner in which the court applied a common-sense approach which aimed at 
locating the ‘actual’ or ‘ultimate’ controller of the companies in question and almost 
circumvented the Heavy Metal decision entirely. The court in this case acknowledged that it 
is extremely difficult to determine who controls or owns a particular shipping company as 
such companies employ the use of corporate structures so as to shield the true beneficial 
owners of the said company. In this respect, the court suggested that what is required in such 
cases, is an enquiry which is based on the substance of the evidence presented as opposed to 
one based on strict legal form.60 Applying these principles to the facts of the case, in forming 
the association between the companies, the court investigated the background of each ship-
owning company including its subsidiary or associated companies. The court further 
investigated the beneficial owners of the companies so as to locate the common thread 
between them and also looked at reports which were lodged with the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission which provided information as to the manner in which the 
companies were incorporated. The court also looked at the case of Shipper D’ Singapore Pte 
                                                          
59 m.v. Ivory Tirupati supra note 6 at 415H-J where the court made reference to the dictum of Smalberger JA in 
the Heavy Metal case at 1107F-H which is as follows: 
‘In my view, and on the undisputed facts, the respondent therefore succeeded in establishing the 
requisite nexus for the conclusion that the Heavy Metal was an associated ship of the Sea Sonnet. If that 
conclusion results in the bizarre position referred to in . . . my Colleague's judgmen, that is the direct 
and foreseeable consequence of a shipowner choosing to operate behind a cloak of secrecy. It is 
precisely for that reason, because the creditor is at such a disadvantage in tracing the assets of his 
debtor, of which this case is a prime example, that the subsection was worded as it is. . . . Apart from 
that, it seems to me that the appellant in any event failed to rebut the inference arising on the papers 
that the power behind Lemonaris in respect of the Heavy Metal is in fact the same entity who is the 
power behind Lemonaris in respect of the Sea Sonnet.’ 
60 MV Ivory Tirupati supra note 6 at 415D-E. 
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Ltd v M.V. Amer Whitney61, where Squires J looked at the relationship between ASM, ASL, 
the Amer Reefer Company and the Foresight Group and concluded that the companies were 
all controlled by a Mr Ravi Kumar Mehotra. What is clear from the approach of the court is 
that it conducted a holistic investigation into the respective companies which extended 
beyond the registered shareholding. The court therefore aimed to locate the true seat of 
control so as to determine whether such control was common to both shipping companies. 
The court therefore held that the overwhelming probabilities are that the beneficial owner of 
Pembroke and Amer Reefer controls or has the power to control Casterbridge or alternatively 
Pembroke, Amer Reefer and Casterbridge are controlled by the same person/s. In its 
reasoning, the court did not make reference to the Heavy Metal case except insofar as it 
related to the applicants failure to rebut any of the facts presented. Other than this, the court 
avoided applying any of the principles laid down in the Heavy Metal which related to the 
interpretation of ‘control’ in terms of AJRA. 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this chapter was to provide perspective and insight as to the practical 
problems experienced by the courts when attempting to strictly apply the ratio of the majority 
in the Heavy Metal case. Although Wallis submits in this regard that the case has not 
generated much problems as initially anticipated, it is respectfully submitted that upon a 
review of the cases mentioned above, it can be seen that the Heavy Metal does present an 
array of difficulties. The most obvious problem with the cases applying the Heavy Metal is 
that there is no consistency in the manner in which courts have interpreted the associated ship 
provisions. In Sino West Shipping Co Ltd62 this can be clearly seen as the court applied a 
broad interpretation of the term ‘control’ in respect of one company whilst the court adopted 
a narrow interpretation in respect of the other company. It is submitted that the reason for 
such a paradoxical judgment is that in respect of the company CPM, there appeared 
numerous factors which portrayed the image that the shareholders in question were mere 
nominee shareholders of Mr Wang who can for all purpose be said to be the beneficial owner 
of those shares. To strictly apply the Heavy Metal judgment in respect of this company and to 
hold that the nominee shareholders in question were the de jure controllers of the company, it 
is submitted that the court would be setting a very dangerous precedent. It is further 
submitted that the court was aware of this difficulty especially in light of the prevailing 
                                                          
61 Unreported case No A 16399 dated 28 September 2000 in D & CLD. 
62 m.v. Sino West supra note 5. 
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factors which strongly portrayed the image that holders in question were merely nominee 
shareholders. In respect of the Sino West however the court seemed more confortable to 
apply the Heavy Metal decision as in respect of that company there were not strong factors 
which showed that Mr Wang was merely a nominee shareholder. Further difficulties in 
strictly applying the ratio can also be seen in the The M.V. La Pampa Louis Dreyfus 
Armateurs SNC63 case, where the effect of that judgment is that if a company is owned as a 
50/50 shareholding, then neither party may be said to control the company. This creates a 
ludicrous situation where a company merely exists but has no controller. Similarly even when 
courts adopt a common sense approach by looking at the ultimate or actual control of a 
company it results in the circumvention of the Heavy Metal case yet the Heavy Metal is the 
leading authority as it is a Supreme Court of Appeal decision which binds all lower courts. It 













                                                          








The two core principles governing company law i.e. the company as a separate legal entity 
and the concept of limited liability provided the perfect tools which allowed ship-owners to 
shield themselves from maritime claimants. These principles effectively allowed ship-owners 
to escape the jurisdiction of the 1952 Arrest Convention64 which allowed for the arrest of 
‘sister-ships’ i.e. ships which are owned by the same person/company. When South Africa 
enacted its reform legislation in 1983, it aimed to dust the cob webs of South African 
maritime law which remained dormant for almost a century.65 In doing so, the legislature 
hoped to provide consistency, coherency and finality within the maritime legal sphere. 
During the reform process, the legislature was aware of the mischief created by one-ship 
companies and thus saw an opportunity to seal this lacuna as the Law Commission stated that 
the associated ship provisions are an extension of the provisions of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention and that ‘since the conclusion of the Convention its provisions have been 
defeated by the proliferation of ‘one-ship’ companies, that is to say, companies owning one 
ship and therefore avoiding the Convention’.66 To defeat this ‘proliferation of one-ship 
companies’, the legislature took a bold approach and enacted the associated ship provisions. 
67 
The true novelty in respect of the associated ship provisions and what makes it unique when 
compared to any other arrest in rem proceeding in the world is that ‘control’ and not 
ownership now forms the central enquiry in determining whether or not a ship may be 
arrested. The purpose therefore of these provisions was to allow maritime claimants to 
penetrate the protective corporate shields of a ship-owning company so as to locate the true 
debtor in question and hold this person liable for the said debt.68 The general understanding 
                                                          
64 The 1952 International Convention for the Unification of Rules relating to the Arrest of Sea-going ships. 
65 G Bradfield ‘Guilt by Association in South African Admiralty law’ (2005) 2 LMCLQ 237. 
66 The South African Law Commission Report on the Review of the Law of Admiralty titled ‘Project 32’ 15 
September 1982. 
67 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ and Others 1986 (2) SA 700 (A) at 711E-F. 




therefore in associated ship cases was that the provisions concerned themselves with the 
ultimate or actual control of a shipping company.  
The leading case in interpreting the term ‘control’ is the Heavy Metal. The interpretation 
provided by the majority in the Supreme Court of Appeal was unfortunate in the sense that 
the court afforded a restrictive and narrow interpretation to the term ‘control’. The majority 
based its enquiry on the registered shareholder of the respective ship-owning companies as 
opposed to locating the true seat of control. The court further distinguished between ‘direct’ 
control and ‘indirect’ control and equated it with the Latin term ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ 
respectively. The majority thus allowed for two repositories of control.69 This case therefore 
created much uncertainty and mystification as to what is required in terms of ‘control’. This 
dissertation therefore aimed to provide meaning and understanding as to what is required in 
order to establish the requisite ‘control’ for associated ship arrests. 
5.2. Summary of the Findings 
 
Chapter one of this dissertation provided the background to the associated ship provisions in 
order to understand the aims, objectives and underlying purpose of the provisions. It was 
found that, even at this early stage of the dissertation, the purpose of the provisions were 
transparent. As stated in the introductory section of this chapter, the purpose of the associated 
ship provisions was to allow a maritime claimant to overcome the corporate strata shielding 
the identity of the true debtor in order to locate and hold this person liable for the respective 
maritime claim. By shifting the enquiry from ‘ownership’ to ‘control’, ship-owners were no 
longer protected from liability through their creative use of the corporate form.  
Following this introduction, chapter two attempted to interpret the term ‘control’ so as to 
determine its correct meaning.  In doing so, the chapter firstly noted that a potential arrestor 
must prove the association i.e. on the basis of either control or ownership on a balance of 
probabilities.70 In this respect, it was submitted that the reasoning for this burden of proof 
was to prevent an innocent ship-owner having their vessel arrested. By comparing the 
original associated ship provisions and its subsequent amendments, it was found that even the 
earlier cases acknowledged that there is a substantial difference between the control of a 
company and the control of all its shares as the former was not dependant on the latter.71 The 
                                                          
69 The Heavy Metal SCA Supra note 5 above at paragraphs [8]-[15]. 
70 Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Ltd 1994 (2) SA 563 (A)  at 581 B-F. 
71 Dole Fresh Fruit International Ltd v MV Kapetan Leonadis and Another 1995 (3) SA 112 (A) at 119F. 
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chapter further noted that whereas the original provisions were restrictive on the basis that 
they focused on the ownership of the shares, the 1992 amendments allowed for a broader 
interpretation to be acquainted to the term control as it focused on the control of the company 
concerned. This chapter also looked at the various meanings which can be associated with the 
term ‘control’ and found that the meaning which gave effect to underlying purpose of the 
provisions is the ‘actual’ or ‘ultimate’ control of the company. This meaning allowed a 
claimant to overcome factors such as inter alia bearer shares, nominee shareholdings and 
pyramid schemes. In terms of the notion of ‘beneficial ownership’, it was submitted that it 
referred to the situation where the true holder of the benefits of the shares in the company 
opts to register the said shares in the name of another. Hence it is the former who will 
exercise actual or ultimate control. 
The aforementioned understanding of ‘control’ provided the yardstick through which the 
findings of the majority in the SCA decision of the Heavy Metal case was critically analysed. 
Chapter three looked at the findings of the High Court decision as well as the three judgments 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal. In respect of the latter, it was found that the majority erred 
in its interpretation of ‘control’, firstly on the basis that the interpretation failed to adhere to 
the underlying purpose of the statutory provisions. Secondly, it was found that the court 
adopted a narrow interpretation of the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ which had the effect of 
allowing for two repositories of control. This chapter also made brief mention of the 
Constitutionality of the majority decision however this aspect will be discussed in more detail 
in the postscript of this dissertation. Ultimately, this chapter noted that the reasoning of 
Marais JA and Farlam AJA is to be preferred in terms of the interpretation which should be 
afforded to the associated ship provisions. 
Chapter four looked at the legal impact of the majority decision in the Heavy Metal case on 
courts strictly applying its ratio. This segment focused on three cases, namely; M.V. La 
Pampa72, Sino West Shipping73 and the M.V. Ivory Tirupati74. In terms of this enquiry it was 
clearly apparent that there is no consistency in the manner in which courts have interpreted 
the associated ship provisions which is a direct consequence of the confusion created by the 
majority decision in the Heavy Metal. Furthermore, by restricting the enquiry to the 
registered shareholding, courts have difficulties applying the ratio of the majority in cases of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
72 The M.V. La Pampa Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SNC v Tor Shipping 2006 (3) SA 441 (D). 
73 Sino West Shipping Co Ltd v NYK- Hinode Line Limited SCOSA C203 
74 MV Ivory Tirupati; MV Ivory Tirupati v Badan Urusan Logistik (aka Buldog) 2002 (2) SA 407 (C). 
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50/50 shareholdings. Other difficulties include the situation such as in the Sino West Shipping 
case, where the court adopted a narrow understanding of ‘control’ in respect of one company 
(Sino West) whilst it adopted a broad understanding of ‘control’ in respect of the other 
company, CPM. It was further noted that the reason as to why the court opted to use a broad 
approach in respect of CPM is that there existed numerous factors which showed that the 
registered shareholders were not the actual controllers of the company. The court in that case 
could not therefore ignore these overwhelming factors and strictly focus on the registered 
shareholding of the CPM. In respect of the M.V. Ivory Tirupati case, the chapter aimed to 
show how some courts opted to ‘side-step’ the Heavy Metal decision and focus on an enquiry 
based on the ultimate or actual control of the company. 
5.3.     Conclusion 
 
The Heavy Metal case was decided nearly fifteen years ago, and as such it creates an 
undesirable situation on the basis that there is uncertainty as to the meaning of the term 
‘control’. The fact however, is that only the SCA or the Constitutional Court on appeal can 
alter the decision of the Heavy Metal case.75 It seems as though the position as it stands, is 
that the lower courts are bound by the decision of the Heavy Metal.76 It is therefore submitted 
that legislative intervention is needed to clarify the meaning of the term ‘control’ as until the 
decision is changed by the SCA, courts will nevertheless be bound by the decision in the 








                                                          
75M Wallis The Associated Ship & South African Admiralty Jurisdiction 1 ed Cape Town (2010) 220-221. 
76 Wallis (note 12 above; 221). 
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POSTSCRIPT: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HEAVY METAL CASE 
 
In chapter three of this dissertation brief mention was made as to the Constitutionality of the 
majority decision in the Heavy Metal case in so far as it relates to the arbitrary deprivation of 
property in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.1 In that chapter it was noted that the 
effect of the majority decision allows for such deprivation. However for the purpose 
completion, this section will aim to look at the Constitutionality of the case in more detail.  
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and as such, any law or conduct which is 
inconsistent with it is deemed to be invalid.2 The constitution is therefore not just a list of 
rights but a lens through which laws must be interpreted. When interpreting any legislation, 
courts must therefore ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of rights’.3 The 
question therefore which need to be determined in respect of the majority decision in the 
Heavy Metal case is whether the decision may pass constitutional muster in terms of Section 
25 (1) of The Constitution4 which states that ‘no one may be deprived of property except in 
terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property’. 
It is important at the outset to determine firstly whether or not s 25 applies to companies and 
secondly whether or not they apply to shipping companies which are incorporated in foreign 
countries.5 In this respect, section 8 (2) of the constitution states that the bill of rights applies 
both to natural and juristic persons ‘taking into account the nature of the right and nature of 
any duty imposed by such a right’.6 It is further submitted that the phrase ‘no one’ as 
                                                          
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2 Section 2 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3 Section 39 (2) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See further Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at [91] where it was held: 
 ‘The technique of paying attention to context in statutory construction is now required by the 
Constitution, in particular, s 39(2). As pointed out above, that provision introduces a mandatory 
requirement to construe every piece of legislation in a manner that promotes the 'spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights’.  
see also South African Airways (Pty) Ltd v Aviation Union of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA 148 (SCA) 
AT [25].   
4 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996. 
5 M Wallis The Associated Ship & South African Admiralty Jurisdiction 1 ed (2010) 269. 
6 Section 8(2) The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.states ‘a provision of the Bill of Rights 
binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable , taking into account the nature of the 
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right’ see also Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19961996 (4) SA 744 (CC)  at 
[57] and Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd and Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others2001 (1) SA 545 
(CC)  at [18]. 
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contained in section 25 (1) of the Constitution is broad enough to apply to companies which 
may be registered in foreign states.7 
The Constitution therefore allows for the protection of property as a fundamental human right 
and in doing so ensures that it is in accordance with international standards.8 At first glance, 
the provision may seem contrary in the sense that it protects property rights on the one hand 
whilst on the other, it allows for state interference. However when read with section 36 of the 
Constitution, this confliction is removed as no human right can be absolutely guaranteed.9  
Section 25 therefore protects private property but permits state intervention under certain 
circumstances. 10 Although the provision does not specifically state what types of property is 
to be included, it is submitted that it is broad enough to encompass all kinds of property 
including but not limited to real property, movable, immovable , corporeal and intellectual 
incorporeal. 11 The prime focus of section 25 is to protect private property on a vertical level 
i.e. from state interference or abuse; however it also applies horizontally amongst private 
individuals or non-state entities.12The provision guarantees that the deprivation of property 
will only take place when authorised by an enabling statute and in this regard, deprivations 
will be regarded as arbitrary if they only affect a single person/group of persons or where 
deprivation in question is unjustified.13  
The most relevant case in this respect is that of First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v 
Commissioner of SARS14( Hereafter ‘Wesbank’) .In this case, FNB leased two vehicles and 
sold another in terms of an instalment sale to two companies. FNB remained the owner of the 
vehicles in all instances and in respect of the instalment sale; ownership was to be transferred 
upon payment of the final instalment. The commissioner of SARS detained and obtained a 
lien over one of the vehicles to obtain security for customs-related debts which were owed to 
it by the first company. The commissioner further obtained another lien over the other leased 
vehicle and the other vehicle under the instalment agreement in respect of a similar debt 
which was owed by the second company. Section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 
                                                          
7 Wallis (note 5 above; 269). 
8AJ Van De Walt & G J Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 6 ed (2009) 306. See also PJ 
Badenhorst…et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 521-583. 
9AJ Van De Walt & G J Pienaar (note 8 above; 306). 
10AJ Van De Walt & G J Pienaar (note 8 above; 307). 
11AJ Van De Walt & G J Pienaar (note 8 above; 307). 
12H Mostert & A Pope The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa 1 ed (2010) 118-119. AJ Van De 
Walt & G J Pienaar (note 8 above; 309-310). 
13AJ Van De Walt & G J Pienaar (note 8 above; 309). 
14First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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1964 enabled the commissioner to sell goods without the need for prior judgment or judicial 
authorisation for the purposes of collecting a debt owed.15 In order to satisfy the debt, the 
commissioner could sell property belonging to the original debtor as well as that of innocent 
third parties which were attached. FNB challenged this provision and asserted that it 
infringed section 25 of The Constitution. They further argued that the deprivation and sale of 
property not belonging to the customs debtor amounted to expropriation and the failure to 
provide such an innocent party with any compensation was unjustified and therefore 
unconstitutional.16 In providing an understanding of the term ‘deprivation’ the court held that 
deprivation for the purposes of section 25 (1) refers to ‘all property’ and ‘all deprivations’. If 
a particular law infringes or limits section 25 (1) and cannot be justified in terms of section 
36 it amounts to a deprivation and is unconstitutional.17 Ackermann J further held that if the 
deprivation does not infringe section 25 (1) or is a justified limitation in terms of section 36 
then the question which must be determined is whether it amounts to expropriation in terms 
of section 25 (2).18 The court further held that ‘arbitrary’ refers to whether there is 
insufficient reason for the particular deprivation or it is procedurally unfair19. The court held 
that sufficient reason will be determined by looking at inter alia; the relationship between the 
means employed and the purpose of the law, the relationship between the purpose of the 
                                                          
15The relevant part of section 114 reads: 
‘(1)(a)(i) The correct amount of duty for which any person is liable in respect of any goods imported 
into or exported from the Republic or any goods manufactured in the Republic shall from the date on 
which liability for such duty commences; and 
(ii) any interest payable under this Act and any fine, penalty or forfeiture incurred under this Act shall, 
from the time when it should have been paid, constitute a debt to the State by the person concerned, 
and any goods in a customs and excise warehouse or in the custody of the Commissioner (including 
goods in a rebate store-room) and belonging to that person, and any goods afterwards imported or 
exported by the person by whom the debt is due, and any imported goods in the possession or under the 
control of such person or on any premises in the possession or under the control of such person, and 
any goods in respect of which an excise duty or fuel levy is prescribed (whether or not such duty or 
levy has been paid) and any materials for the manufacture of such goods in the possession or under the 
control of such person or on any premises in the possession or under the control of such person and any 
vehicles, machinery, plant or equipment in the possession or under the control of such person in which 
fuel in respect of which any duty or levy is prescribed (whether or not such duty or levy has been paid), 
is used, transported or stored, may be detained in accordance with the provisions of ss (2) and shall be 
subject to a lien until such debt is paid… 
(b) The claims of the State shall have priority over the claims of all persons upon anything subject to a 
lien contemplated in para (a) or (aA) and may be enforced by sale or other proceedings if the debt is 
not paid within three months after the date on which it became due’ .as mentioned in Wesbank supra 
note 14 at [11] 
16Wesbank supra note 14 at [7]-[10].  
17Wesbank supra note 14 at [58]. 
18Wesbank supra note 14 at [59]. 
19Wesbank supra note 14 at [100]. 
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deprivation and the person whose property has been affected and the relationship between the 
purpose of the deprivation, the nature of the property and the extent of such deprivation.20 
Applying the principles above, the court held that the end result which was sought by the Act 
is to extract payment for customs debt. Such a purpose is essential to the financial status of 
the country and it is in the best interest of all its inhabitants that such debts be paid. The court 
further held that the in achieving this end, section 114 of the Act casts the net too wide as the 
means its uses to achieve its end or purpose has the effect of allowing for the total deprivation 
of a person’s property in circumstances:  
‘where (a) such person has no connection with the transaction giving rise to the customs 
debt; (b) where such property also has no connection with the customs debt; and (c) where 
such person has not transacted with or placed the customs debtor in possession of the property 
under circumstances that have induced the Commissioner to act to his detriment in relation to 
the incurring of the customs debt.’21 
The court ultimately held that in the absence of a nexus between the innocent third party and 
the customs debt, there can be no justification in terms of section 114 to deprive such persons 
of their property.22Therefore such deprivation is arbitrary for the purpose of s 25(1). The 
court further noted that in terms of the section 36 enquiry, the object achieved by s 114 is 
wholly disproportionate to the infringement of FNB’s rights. 23  
The court further held that even though money may be recovered by the sale of property 
belonging to an innocent party, such income cannot justify the deprivation.24  Ultimately the 
court held that the ‘infringement by s 114 of s 25(1) is not reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The provision is 
accordingly constitutionally invalid’. 25 
The effect of the Heavy Metal, as stated earlier, is that it allows for an association to be 
formed on the basis of a common nominee majority shareholder between ship owning 
companies even if the respective ships are in no manner related to each other. On face value, 
                                                          
20Wesbank supra note 14 at [100]. Therefore when determining the arbitrariness of a provision, it is imperative 
to look whether there is a rational nexus between a legitimate government purpose and the manner in which that 
purpose is achieved. H Mostert & A Pope (note 12 above; 123). 
21Wesbank supra note 14 at [108]. 
22Wesbank supra note 14 at [109]. 
23Wesbank supra note 14 at [111]. 
24Wesbank supra note 14 at [112]. 
25Wesbank supra note 14 at [113]. 
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this seems to infringe section 25 of the constitution as it allows for the arbitrary deprivation 
of property in the sense that a ship-owner may have their ship arrested even though such an 
owner is not in any manner related to the ship concerned.  Wallis further submits that such a 
deprivation cannot be justified in terms of s 36 of the constitution26. It is submitted that there 
may be a justification for the arrest where the two ships are in fact associated ships for the 
purposes of the provision however where the two ships are not associated it is submitted that 
such justification seizes to exist. The result is that an innocent ship owner’s vessel may be 
arrested and such a ship owner will thereafter be forced to provide security for the respective 
claim. The fact that upon the provision of security, the owner can obtain the immediate 
release of the vessel, does not remove the ‘arbitrariness’ in terms of the original arrest.27.  
Section 39(2) of The Constitution28 states that when ‘interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’. Therefore the effect of section 39(2) read 
with section 25 (1) is that when interpreting a legislative provision, the courts should afford 
an interpretation to the particular provision which prevents the arbitrary deprivation of 
property. However as stated above, the legal effect of the ratio of the majority in the Heavy 
Metal case is one which allows for a situation which promotes the arbitrary deprivation of 
property. It is such factors which further question the correctness of the decision in the Heavy 
Metal case. 
It is therefore submitted that the majority decision is problematic in this aspect also and thus 
further adds to the presumption that the overall reasoning of the majority was incorrect in 
terms of its interpretation of the term ‘control. Applying the principles of the Wesbank case it 
is clear that if an innocent third parties property is attached in order to satisfy a debt to which 
the same party bears no link, such deprivation will be regarded as arbitrary and will thus 
infringe section 25 (1) of the constitution. This can be seen in the example: where there are 
                                                          
26Section 36 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
states :  
‘ the rights in the bill of rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including – 
a) the nature of the right;  
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
c) the nature and extend of the limitation;  
d)  the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’ 
27G Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction Law and Practice in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 144. 
28The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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two ships S1 and S2 which are owned by companies namely C1 and C2 respectfully. 
Furthermore, X is the majority nominee shareholder of both companies but acts under the 
instruction of Mr A in respect of C1 and under the instruction of Mr B in respect of C2. 
Applying the ratio in the Heavy Metal case, the two ships (S1 and S2) will be regarded as 
being associated on the basis that they share a common nominee shareholder yet actual or 
ultimate control rest with two different persons. In this sense the debts of Mr A may be 
attached to Mr B and vice versa. This will therefore amount to the arbitrary deprivation of 
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